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Recent studies highlight the importance of improving corporate governance 
practices in order to reduce the impact of financial crises on the economy. 
However, doing so requires consideration of exactly what forms corporate 
governance, particularly in a national context. Such consideration necessitates 
some focus on institutions, an area which has been largely neglected by 
previous research. As such, this research primarily focuses on understanding a 
range of institutions in a non-Western, emerging society. Attention will be paid 
to the influence of such institutions on the emergence and development of 
corporate governance regimes from an institutional theory perspective, as 
perceived by significant social actors. Data were collected from semi-
structured interviews with corporate governance managers in Saudi Arabia. 
Findings suggest that the emergence of corporate governance regimes in a 
non-Western, emerging society (Saudi Arabia) is influenced by family, kinship, 
bureaucratic state, and religion institutions. Family and kinship institutions 
appear to negatively impact on the emergence and development of corporate 
governance in this non-Western, emerging society in terms of issues 
surrounding control, abuse, and conflict of interest. The bureaucratic state and 
religion appear to positively influence the development of corporate 
governance in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society in terms of 
issues centred on implementation, compliance, and supporting roles. This 
research provides a new understanding of the impact of, and role played by, 
institutions in the formation of corporate governance in a non-Western, 
emerging society which is an under-researched context. Implications, such as 
how to reduce negative institutional impacts and take advantage of more 
positive ones, are discussed. Finally, suggestions for further research are 
offered. Such research might focus on exploring the impact of institutions 
from extended standpoints of institutional theory, for example institutional 
logics and institutional work perspectives. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In recent years, both scholars and practitioners have devoted considerable 
interest and attention towards improving corporate governance (CG) practices 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Gompers et al., 2003). In a 
review of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) pointed out 
WKDW ´WKH VXEMHFW RI FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH LV RI HQRUPRXV SUDFWLFDO
LPSRUWDQFHµ7KHLU HDUO\ UHVHDUFKKLJKOLJKWHG WKHFUXFLDO UROHSOD\HGE\SRRU
corporate governance systems in causing major financial crises. Their research 
has proven to be correct, with multiple financial calamities exemplifying their 
predictions. Examples of such calamities include the East Asian financial crisis 
in 1997, Enron in the USA in 2001, Ahold and Parmalat in Europe in 2003, 
and the global financial crisis in 2007 (Johnson et al., 2000; Elson and Gyves, 
2003; Millar et al., 2005; Erkens et al., 2012). The efficiency of these corporate 
governance systems mainly depends on how these systems are formed within a 
particular context (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). One possible explanation for 
this involves institutional influence, which is interesting as it brings institutions 
(largely neglected in previous research) into the debate on corporate 
governance. Indeed, social scientists are largely absent from the intellectual 
community of researching and debating the development of corporate 
governance systems (Davis, 2005). 
 
Corporate governance from an agency theory perspective has dominated the 
literature since the 1980s (e.g. Coffee, 1984; Brudney, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Singh and Davidson, 2003; McCarthy and Puffer, 2008; Filatotchev and 
Wright, 2011). However, a recent stream of corporate governance studies has 
started to move away from this dominant standpoint towards a more holistic 
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view that accounts for a configuration of interdependent elements such as the 
relationship between stakeholders and corporations, and the relationship 
between corporations and society (Davis and Useem, 2002). This view also 
emphasises that corporate governance systems are embedded in larger 
institutional and legal frameworks (Davis and Useem, 2002). The institutional 
approach to corporate governance assumes that its arrangements reflect 
institutional processes, for example political processes (Davis and Thompson, 
1994). This viewpoint accounts for the enactment and acceptance of 
institutions that inform the behaviour of actors within activities such as 
corporate governance (Davis, 2005).  
 
The author of this research study will primarily focus on understanding the 
dynamics of different institutions in a non-Western, emerging society and their 
influence on the emergence and development of corporate governance 
systems from an institutional theory perspective. The domination of the theory 
and conceptual development of corporate governance through agency theory 
leads to the notion of context being ignored. This results in contextual 
specificities relevant to different cultures being missed, leading to an 
incomplete treatment of the emergence and effective running of corporate 
governance. Moreover, those studies that have adopted an institutional theory 
or offered different frameworks of corporate governance which tend to be 
grounded in the Western tradition and do not account for institutional 
contexts far removed from those traditions, where the economic context may 
be more emerging than developed. The following research questions were 
addressed to fill this important gap in the literature: 
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1- What do non-Western, emerging society (Saudi Arabia) institutions consist 
of as perceived by significant social actors? 
 
2- In light of these perceptions, what are the likely influences of these non-
Western, emerging society institutions on the emergence and development 
of its corporate governance regime? 
 
In order to address these research questions, data were collected from semi-
structured interviews with significant social actors who have backgrounds in 
corporate governance practices. A pilot study was conducted initially and then 
followed by the first stage of interviews. The data collected from these 
interviews were analysed using thematic analysis. The findings were discussed 
with the significant social actors in follow-up interviews. After this, a further 
analysis was performed after the second stage of interviews. Archival sources, 
such as the annual reports of listed firms, were used to gather more 
information about the relationships and transactions between listed firms and 
the regulatory authorities.  
 
The findings from this research study suggest that there is an apparent 
influence from family, kinship, bureaucratic state, and religion institutions in 
the eyes of significant social actors. Family and kinship institutions appear to 
negatively impact the development and emergence of CG regime in the Saudi 
Arabian non-Western, emerging context, whereas bureaucratic state and 
religion institutions appear to positively influence the development and 
emergence of a CG system. By understanding this from the institutional theory 
perspective, the original contribution to knowledge from this thesis is to 
reconcile how institutions influence the emergence of corporate governance 
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regimes in a non-Western, emerging society. The process of conducting this 
research study is presented in a detailed figure next and is followed by the 
structure of this thesis. 
 
Process: to illustrate the process of conducting this research, Figure 1.1 
outlines each step of the research, from the research proposal to the 
submission of the thesis. The figure presents all the stages that this research 
has undergone in order to answer the research questions and achieve the 
objectives of the study.  
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Figure 1.1: Research Process 
Source: Saunders et al. (2007: 10) with modification for context and the nature of the study 
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Structure: Chapter One introduces the research topic and briefly outlines the 
methods employed in this research, the process of conducting this research 
study, and the structure of this thesis. Chapter Two presents the theories 
previously employed by different scholars to explain and understand the 
different phenomena of corporate governance. This includes presenting 
agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, transaction cost 
economics, and path dependence theory. Chapter Three presents institutional 
theory in a detailed view as it is the adopted perspective in this research study. 
This includes presenting the historical background of early institutionalism in 
economics, political science, and sociology. This is followed by an introduction 
of the development of institutional theory up to the new institutionalism in 
economics, political science, and sociology. A number of definitions of 
institutions are provided along with examples of institutions including family, 
kinship, bureaucratic state, religion, market, legal, and politics. The limitation 
of institutional theory and its relationship with power and legitimacy are also 
explored. Chapter Four presents corporate governance from an institutional 
theory perspective. This includes defining CG and providing a literature review 
of the influence of institutions on the emergence and development of the CG 
regime. This is followed by presenting the research problem along with the 
research questions and research setting. Chapter Five presents a broad view of 
CG in a non-Western, emerging society (Saudi Arabia). This includes 
describing the context, the Capital Market Authority, the Capital Market Law, 
Companies Act, Saudi Stock Exchange Company, and Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the methods employed in this research. This includes 
presenting the research philosophy, the research design, the research methods, 
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and the analytical process. Chapter Seven interprets, analyses, and evaluates 
the data collected in the first stage of interviews. This includes describing and 
evaluating the emergent themes, providing a comparative analysis, quantifying 
the data, and providing cross-links among institutions. Chapter Eight provides 
further interpretations to the collected data from the second stage of 
interviews. This includes drawing amendments to the cross-links among 
institutions. Chapter Nine discusses the findings of this research. This includes 
interpreting the main observations, discussing the importance and relevance of 
the observations, and discussing the outcomes in light of existing literature in 
the field. Chapter Ten concludes the research. This includes highlighting the 
theoretical contributions of the research, limitations of the study, directions 
for future research, and the research conclusions.  
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Chapter 2: Theories of Corporate Governance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter introduced this research study by providing a brief 
background of the research along with the methods employed in this study, 
the process of conducting this research, and the overall structure of the thesis. 
This chapter aims to present a wide-range of theories employed commonly by 
scholars to investigate and understand the different aspects of corporate 
governance. This includes presenting agency theory broadly as it is argued that 
the CG system emerged from the agency problem that focuses on the 
separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932). After that, the 
chapter will proceed to present the remaining theories used in CG studies, 
specifically stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, transaction cost 
economics, and path dependence theory. In principle, these different theories 
of CG studies aim to achieve common objectives of CG. These objectives are 
outlined in detail at the end of this chapter. Presenting different theories of 
CG offers better understanding of the dimensions of CG which simplify the 
choice of the theory that is most suitable for conducting this research study. 
The presentation of these theories will start by describing and discussing 
agency theory.  
 
2.2 Agency Theory  
 
Berle and Means (1932) identified important problems in the separation of 
ownership and control of firms. Such problems principally emerge from a 
SUHVXPHG FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW EHWZHHQ PDQDJHUV ¶DJHQWV· DQG RZQHUV RU
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VKDUHKROGHUV¶SULQFLSDOV·%HUOHDQG0HDQV·ZRUNIRUPHGWKHEDVLV of 
ZKDWODWHUEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKH¶DJHQF\·SUREOHP-HQVHQDQG0HFNOLQJ
308) define the agency relationship as: 
 
a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. 
 
A basic assumption of agency theory is that the goal of the agent and the 
principal is divergent (Hill and Jones, 1992), which initially means that the 
agent will not always (or automatically) act in the best interests of the principal 
(Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a consequence of diverging 
interests, managers would redirect the main goal of the shareholders, which is 
profit maximisation, towards their own interests, thereby subverting the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH PDQDJHUV DQG WKH FRPSDQ\·V VKDUHKROGHUV 7KH
agency problem was extensively delineated by Ross (1973) who found that 
when this separation occurred, the optimal incentive contract is determined by 
the importance RIWKHPDQDJHU·VGHFLVLRQDQGKLVDYHUVLRQWRULVN)ROORZLQJ
the work of Ross, Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to suggest a 
satisfactory explanation of how a public corporation can be controlled by 
proposing agency theory. They assumed that the managers tend to focus on 
self-LQWHUHVWDQGVRGRQRWORRNVROHO\DIWHUWKHILUPV·LQWHUHVWV 
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Table 2.1: Agency Theory Overview 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989: 59) 
Element  Meaning 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs. 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent. 
Human assumptions Self-interest.  
Bounded rationality.  
Risk aversion. 
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants.  
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion.  
Information asymmetry between principal and agent. 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity. 
Contracting Agency (moral hazard and adverse problems selection).  
Risk sharing. 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing goals 
and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) offered an overview of agency theory (see Table 2.1). 
Agency theory focuses on the basic agency structure of principal-agent 
relationships who are engaged in cooperative behaviour with different 
objectives and interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that, 
at an organisational level, control of the agency problem is crucial when 
decisions are made by managers. This is because managers are not the major 
residual claimants and thus have no bearing on the major share of the wealth 
outcome of their decisions. With no robust control over decisions, such 
managers may make decisions and take actions that are likely to be divergent 
from the core interests of residual claimants (i.e. principals). To overcome this 
problem, they suggest that decisions should be separated from management. 
Eisenhardt (1989) identified another agency problem that can occur in the 
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agency relationship. She stated that it might be expensive or difficult for the 
principal to ensure what exactly the agent is doing. More to the point, the 
principal is unable to discover whether the agent is acting in a proper way or 
not. Thus, risk sharing can be a problem due to the different risk preferences 
between the principal and the agent.  
 
Agency theory is generally the most dominant theoretical perspective applied 
in corporate governance (Davis et al., 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dalton 
et al., 1998; Shankman, 1999) and the main focus of research on corporate 
governance has been to determine optimal contracts between managers and 
shareholders that might resolve the agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Daily et al. (2003) indicate that describing and analysing CG through the 
agency theory perspective is popular for two reasons: (1) the simplicity of 
agency theory, in which the contract is only between two actors (manager and 
shareholder), and (2) the notion of humans as self-interested, advancing their 
interests at the expense of other parties interests.  
 
This discussion has so far highlighted the theoretical logic of corporate 
governance from a contractual perspective. This discussion will proceed to 
define corporate governance in light of a seminal publication by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997: 737), in that corporate governance is: 
 
[the process that] deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. 
 
This definition and viewpoint is grounded in the agency problem, which 
focuses on the way major investors protect their assets and investments 
against expropriation by insiders, such as managers. This protection may also 
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include protecting rights and interests of minority shareholders, the strength of 
creditor rights, and the rights and limitations of executive directors, and the 
ability to pursue class action suits (Claessens, 2006). A broader definition of 
CG under the agency theory is provided by Sir Adrian Cadbury, the chairman 
of the committee of the Financial Aspects of CG in the UK, in that 
´[c]orporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlledµ &DGEXU\&RPPLWWHH7KLVGHILQLWLRQ UHJDUGV&*DVD
set of rules, in which ownership is separated from control. Another broad 
GHILQLWLRQ RI &* LV VXJJHVWHG E\ *LOODQ DQG 6WDUNV   ´governance 
pertains to the organization (firm) as a nexus of contracts. At one level, a 
ILUP·V JRYHUQDQFH FDQ EH YLHZHG DV WKH VHW RI VWUXFWXUHV WKDW SURYLGHV WKH
boundaries for the operation of the enterprise. This entails not only 
participants, such as workers, managers, and suppliers of capital, but also the 
returns to those participants and the constraints under which they operateµ,W
can be understood from the multiple definitions of CG that they attempt to 
include the diverse relationships involved in such a contract. Such 
relationships may include those between corporations and regulators, between 
the corporations and financial markets, and between corporations and 
employees, investors, creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders.  
 
From the perspective of analysing and discussing CG across societies, it is 
important to take into account other factors, such as historical and cultural 
backgrounds and institutional arrangements that are not covered by agency 
theory. These other factors are thought to determine the emergence of CG 
frameworks (Claessens, 2006). Relying only on the laws and rules offered by 
agency theory that shape the frameworks of CG, and not considering the role 
of institutions can be misleading to the concerned parties to an extent. Both 
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rules and institutions matter as they complement each other and evolve over 
time. Institutions can be affected by the rules in a society and similarly, rules 
can be affected by the institutional setup of a society (Claessens, 2006).  
 
It is important to highlight that CG practice in developed societies is 
commonly categorised into two broad types of capitalism in the literature. 
Authors tend to refer to them DV´LQVLGHUµDQG´RXWVLGHUµIRUPVRIFDSLWDOLVP 
(Lerner, 1995; Rueda, 2006; Young et al., 2008) ´VWDNHKROGHUµ DQG
´VKDUHKROGHUµ .HOO\ et al., 1997; Gordon, 1998; Godfrey and Hatch, 2007; 
Allen et al., 2007)RUWKH´OHJDORULJLQVµDQDO\VLVRIFLYLOODZDQGFRPPRQODZ
(La Porta et al., 1997). This categorisation differentiates the German-Japanese 
model of CG from the American Anglo-Saxon model. A recent stream of 
work started to explore a different kind of relationship rather than the 
traditional principal-agent (PA) relationship. This traditional PA conflict has 
received substantial attention by scholars because most of the studies in this 
regard were conducted in developed societies, where ownership is dispersed 
and often separated from control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The other 
relationship, the so-called principal-principal (PP) conflict, is between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This conflict often exists 
in emerging societies and results from concentrated ownership and less 
separated from control (Young et al., 2008). This relationship has received 
much less attention by scholars in part due to the fewer number of studies 
conducted in emerging contexts in this field. It is argued that insight into the 
PP conflicts in emerging societies may be drawn from the German-Japanese 
model of CG as it effectively captures concentrated ownership (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Young et al., 2008). This model of CG often reduces agency 
problems while avoiding PP conflicts associated with concentrated ownership. 
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Table 2.2 summarises the main differences between PA conflict and PP 
conflict. 
 
Table 2.2: PA Conflict versus PP Conflict 
Source: Young et al. (2008: 202) 
 PA Conflict PP Conflict 
Goal incongruence Between fragmented, dispersed 
shareholders and professional 
managers 
Between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders 
Manifestations Strategies that benefit entrenched 
managers at the expense of 
shareholders in general (e.g. shirking, 
pet projects, excessive compensation, 
and empire building) 
Strategies that benefit controlling 
shareholders at the expense of minority 
shareholders (e.g. minority shareholder 
expropriation, nepotism, and cronyism) 
Institutional 
protection of 
minority 
shareholders 
Formal constraints (e.g. judicial 
reviews and courts) set an upper 
bound on potential expropriation by 
majority shareholders. Informal norms 
generally adhere to shareholder wealth 
maximization 
Formal institutional protection is often 
lacking, corrupt, or un-enforced. 
Informal norms typically favour the 
interests of controlling shareholders 
over minority shareholders 
Market for 
corporate control 
$FWLYHDVDJRYHUQDQFHPHFKDQLVPµRI
ODVWUHVRUW¶ 
Inactive even in principle. 
Concentrated ownership thwarts 
notions of takeover 
Ownership pattern Dispersed ± holding 5±20% equity is 
FRQVLGHUHGµFRQFHQWUDWHGRZQHUVKLS¶
A shareholder with 5% equity stake is 
UHJDUGHGDVDµEORFN-KROGHU¶ 
Concentrated ± often more than 50% of 
equity is held by controlling 
shareholder. Often structured as a 
µS\UDPLG¶ZKHUHFDVKIORZULJKWVDUH
greater than ownership rights 
Boards of directors Legitimate legal and social institutions 
with fiduciary duty to safeguard 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWV5HVHDUFK
focuses on factors that affect day-to-
day operations such as insiders vs. 
outsiders, background of directors, 
committee structures, etc 
In emerging economies, boards often 
have yet to establish institutional 
legitimacy and thus are ineffective. 
Research indicates they are often the 
µUXEEHUVWDPS¶RIFRQWUROOLQJ
shareholders 
Top management 
team 
Professional managers who often have 
made their way up through the ranks 
or are hired from outside after 
extensive search and scrutiny of 
qualifications. 
Monitored internally by boards of 
directors and externally by managerial 
labour market 
Typically family members or 
associates. Monitored mainly through 
family consensus or self-regulation 
DGKHULQJWRµJHQWOHPHQ¶VDJUHHPHQWV¶ 
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The main concern in PP conflict is the expropriation of minority shareholders 
by major shareholders such as family owners. Jiang and Peng (2011) argue that 
the control structure adopted by families in emerging societies can be a 
problem in CG when those family members use their control rights to protect 
WKHLURZQ LQWHUHVWVZLWKRXW ORRNLQJDIWHUPLQRULW\ VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWV7R
be more precise, a number of cases where families can exploit their position in 
this contract will be addressed. Firstly, excess control over ownership rights 
may enable families to sell assets of public firms to their parties at below 
market prices (Young et al., 2008). Secondly, families have the ability to take 
advantage of the most profitable parts of a listed firm by engaging with it 
through their own private businesses (Jiang and Peng, 2011). Thirdly, families 
are able to appoint family members as executive managers and therefore have 
the potential advantage of obtaining insider information greater than minority 
shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Through this advantage (essentially 
being aware of future investments of a public firm), families can easily 
expropriate minority shareholders (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). 
 
It can be observed from Table 2.2 that formal institutions1, such as legal and 
state institutions, play a role in driving CG activities in the PA relationship in 
societies where the norms and rules are often effective, such as those in some 
developed societies. Whereas informal institutions, such as family and kinship, 
play an important role in driving CG frameworks in the PP relationship in 
societies where the rules and regulations are relatively weak, ineffective, or 
absent, such as those in emerging contexts (Young et al., 2008). This can be 
attributed to the evidence that the institutional environment in emerging 
                                                 
1
 Formal and informal institutions are the terms that Young et al. (2008) used to distinguish 
between institutions. 
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societies makes the enforcement of agency contracts more expensive and 
challenging (Wright et al., 2005). Therefore, this research will take into 
consideration the role of such institutions in the development of CG in a non-
Western, emerging context. Other theories have been used to explain 
corporate governance. Thus, the discussion will present stewardship theory as 
one of the important theories in CG studies.  
 
2.3 Stewardship Theory  
 
It has been noted that the basis of agency theory is the conflict of interests 
between the manager and the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, 
this theory does not explain whether or not anything causes their interests to 
be aligned. Therefore, scholars in sociology and psychology suggest that there 
are theoretical limits to agency theory (Perrow, 1986; Hirsch et al., 1987). In an 
effort to fill this gap, stewardship theory has been introduced to define other 
behavioural assumptions in this relationship (Donaldson and Davis, 1989).  
 
Stewardship theory has its roots and historical background in sociology and 
psychology, and was developed to explain the relationship between managers 
and principals in which executive managers (as stewards) are presumed to be 
motivated to behave and act in the best interests of principals (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Davis et al. (1997: 24), in their seminal paper on stewardship 
theory, argue that D VWHZDUG·V EHKDYLRXU LV ´RUGHUHG VXFK WKDW SUR-
organizational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility than individualistic, 
self-serving behavioursµ7KH DXWKRUV JRRQ WRRXWOLQHDQXPEHURI VWHZDUG
characteristics that can be summarised as follows: 
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x 7KH VWHZDUG·V EHKDYLRXU GRHV QRW GHSDUW IURP WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ·V
interest. 
x A steward does not substitute individualistic behaviours for cooperative 
behaviours. 
x A steward appreciates cooperation more than defection even if his/her 
interests are not aligned with the principal.  
x A steward seeks to achieve the objectives of the organisation and thus, 
his/her behaviour is collectivistic. 
x $ VWHZDUG·V WDUJHW LV WR SURWHFW VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV DQG PD[LPLVH
profits mainly through firm performance, because his/her utility 
functions will be maximised subsequently. 
x $VWHZDUG·VEHKDYLRXUFDQEHUHJDUGed as organisationally centred.  
x A steward is often motivated to make decisions that he/she believes are 
at the best interest for the team, specifically, in loosely coupled, 
heterogeneous organisations. 
x A satisfactory steward to most groups who genuinely seeks to improve 
the performance of the organisation. 
x A steward recognises his/her personal needs from organisational 
objectives and tends to work towards organisational, collective ends as 
he/she believes, by doing so, that personal needs will be met. 
x An opportunity set of a steward is guided by the notion that the 
benefits obtained from pro-organisational, collectivistic behaviours are 
higher than that obtained from individualistic, self-serving behaviours. 
x A steward believes that his/her interests are aligned with the interests of 
the owner and thus, his/her motivation is oriented towards 
organisational objectives rather than personal needs.  
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x $VWHZDUG·VSHUIRUPDQFHFDQEHDIIHFWHGE\WKHVWUXFWXUDOVLWXDWLRQDQG
whether it facilitates efficient and useful action. 
x A steward can be trusted. Thus, his/her autonomy should be expanded 
to empower the abilities of a steward. 
x Control can sometimes be counterproductive, because it weakens pro-
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOEHKDYLRXUE\UHGXFLQJWKHVWHZDUG·VPRWLYDWLRQ$UJ\ULV
1964). 
 
These characteristics of a steward can be linked with the fundamental 
assumption of stewardship theory in that the behaviour of executive managers 
is aligned with the interests of principals. Moreover, stewardship theory 
focuses on designing structures that empower and facilitate rather than control 
and monitor. Executive managers should be authorised to make decisions and 
act since they are not opportunistic agents. Rather, they are effective stewards 
who naturally act with focus on the best interests of owners (Clarke, 2004).  
 
A number of studies have adopted this stewardship perspective to explain 
different phenomena inherent in the CG debate. For example, Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) conducted a study on U.S. corporations to examine the different 
perspectives of agency theory, which argues that shareholder interests need 
protection by a separation of incumbency of roles within the board of 
directors and chief executive officer. Whereas stewardship theory argues that 
shareholder interests are maximised by shared incumbency of these roles, 
through an empirical test. The results from their study provided some support 
for stewardship theory but failed to support agency theory. Other examples 
focused on the relationship conflicts of family firms (Eddleston and 
Kellermanns, 2007), the behaviour of non-family employees in family firms 
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(Vallejo, 2009), exploration of decision-making influence (Tosi et al., 2003), 
family governance and firm performance (Miller and Breton-Miller, 2006), and 
RZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUHV/HHDQG2·1HLOO0RUHH[DPSOHVFDQEHRIIHUHG
when other theories are employed. Thus, this chapter will now proceed to 
present stakeholder theory as an important theory in CG studies.  
 
2.4 Stakeholder Theory  
 
Stakeholder theory has diffused tremendously after the publication of 
)UHHPDQ·V OHDGLQJ ERRN ¶6WUDWHJLF 0DQDJHPHQW $ 6WDNHKROGHU $SSURDFK·
(1984). This book established a proper roadmap for a variety of field studies 
in: strategic management (e.g. Freeman, 2010), corporate governance (e.g. 
Jensen, 2010), corporate social responsibility (e.g. Roberts, 1992), and 
organisation studies (e.g. Phillips, 2003). Stakeholder theory is based on the 
relationship of stakeholders with the firm. According to Freeman (1984: 25), a 
VWDNHKROGHU LV ´any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
DFKLHYHPHQWRIWKHILUP·VREMHFWLYHVµ6XFKVWDNHKROGHUVPD\LQFOXGHRZQHUV
suppliers, customers, shareholders, employees, among others. Figure 2.1 
illustrates a stakeholder view of the firm. 
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Figure 2.1: Stakeholder View of Firm 
Source: Freeman (1984: 52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue there are three fundamental theses in 
stakeholder theory: descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative 
validity, and they summarise them as follows: 
 
Thesis 1: stakeholder theory describes what a corporation is. According to 
WKHWKHRU\DFRUSRUDWLRQLV´a constellation of co-operative and competitive 
interests possessing intrinsic valueµS7KLVPRGHO LVOLNHO\WREHXVHG
to examine the descriptive accuracy and test empirical claims relevant to the 
theory. 
 
Thesis 2: VWDNHKROGHUWKHRU\LV¶LQVWUXPHQWDO·LQWKDWLWLQYROYHVH[DPLQLQJWKH
link between stakeholder practice and the accomplishment of corporate 
objectives. The conventional wisdom here is that corporations who practice 
Firm 
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Competitors 
Media 
Employees 
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Environ-
mentalists 
Suppliers 
Governments 
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stakeholder management will most likely be successful in terms of profits, 
growth, stability, etc. 
 
Thesis 3: ERWK WKH ¶GHVFULSWLYH· DQG ¶LQVWUXPHQWDO· DVSHFWV RI VWDNHKROGHU
theory are grounded on the basis of normative aspect. According to this 
YLHZ VWDNHKROGHUV DUH ´persons or groups with legitimate interests in 
procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activityµ S  DQG
they can be recognised through their interests in the corporation, in which 
their interests are of intrinsic value. 
 
Jones and Wicks (1999) reflect that these three theses are comprehensive and 
greatly aligned to the concept of stakeholder theory. Jones (1995) adapted the 
VHFRQG WKHVLV RI VWDNHKROGHU WKHRU\ ZKLFK LV WKH ¶LQVWUXPHQWDO SHUVSHFWLYH·
into a promising standpoint for theoretical development and linked it to ethics 
VHHWKHVLVDERYH7KLV¶LQVWUXPHQWDOSHUVSHFWLYH·HVWDEOLVKHVWKHRUHWLFDOOLQNV
between particular practices and particular end states. In addition, the truth or 
falsehood of this theory is an important issue but was ignored in earlier 
research. Jones (1995) developed a number of underlying assumptions that 
provide a broad picture of the firm drawn from economic theory and the 
concept of stakeholders. These assumptions are elicited from firm 
characteristics (Freeman, 1984), contract premises (Eisenhardt, 1989), the firm 
as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), top corporate managers 
(Herman, 1981), and market characteristics (Jacobson, 1992; Kirzner, 1979). 
Through these collective assumptions, the relationship between modern 
corporations and their environments can be described as: (a) firms have 
contracts with numerous stakeholders, (b) firms are operated by qualified 
managers, and (c) firms do exist in markets where competitive pressures are 
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often active (Jones, 1995). Together, they establish an adequate context for the 
GHYHORSPHQWRI¶LQVWUXPHQWDOVWDNHKROGHUWKHRU\· 
 
It has been argued that there is a lack of appreciation for and considerable 
ignorance by scholars in determining the conflicting and negative relationships 
between organisations and stakeholders. For this reason, several attempts have 
been made to uncover a convergent stakeholder theory. Friedman and Miles 
(2002) attempted to present a model that combines stakeholder theory with 
realist theory. Their model intended to explain the importance of 
distinguishing between different stakeholders. Jones and Wicks (1999) 
proposed a different way of theorising that offers a normatively and 
instrumentally sound convergent stakeholder theory. They have provided an 
example of theory convergence through the concepts of trust and cooperation 
and their instrumental relationship to stakeholder performance.   
 
Stakeholder theory is thought to be one of the common theories used to 
explain different aspects of CG. For instance, Jensen (2001) used stakeholder 
theory to examine the role of the corporate objective function in corporate 
productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers 
and directors. Heath and Norman (2004) conducted a historical review of 
public management during the 1960s and 1970s using stakeholder theory. 
They observe that there is a need for an effective CG system to reduce the 
impact of corporate scandals. Freeman and Reed (1983) employed stakeholder 
theory to understand the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors. 
They claim that a volunteeristic approach is recommended to implement a 
structural change that answers the enquiries of CG that focuses on effective 
director behaviour. Hendry (2001) engaged the normative stakeholder theory 
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into the debate of CG ethics by identifying different kinds of normative 
stakeholder theory and different levels of claim. Sternberg (1997) observed 
some defects of stakeholder theory and saw that this theory, far from being a 
source of improvements, as misguided, and incapable of offering better CG, 
business performance and conduct. Moreover, it is incompatible with many 
different objectives. Therefore, other theories are employed to answer 
different enquiries in CG. Some of which, is transaction cost economics that is 
one of the common theories in analysing CG aspects and will be presented 
next. 
 
2.5 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
 
Transaction cost is central to studies in the field of economics. If transaction 
costs are neglected, economic activities become irrelevant because any 
advantages one mode of organisation holds over another will be eliminated by 
any costless contract (Williamson, 1979). Hart (1995: 680) identifies three 
types of transaction costs in literature: (1) costs related tR DOO ´WKH GLIIHUHQW
HYHQWXDOLWLHVµ WKDWFDQ WDNHSODFHZLWKLQ WKHFRQWUDFWXDO UHODWLRQVKLS DQG WKH
need for proper planning to handle and treat them, (2) costs that are essential 
for negotiating these plans with others, and (3) costs required for organising 
and documenting these plans in a way that they can be facilitated and 
´HQIRUFHG E\ D WKLUG SDUW\µ ,Q WHUPV RI WKHRU\ GHYHORSPHQW D QXPEHU RI
propositions underpin the development of transaction cost studies and can be 
drawn as follows: (a) opportunism is deemed to be a fundamental concept, (b) 
opportunism is particularly central to economic activities that are engaged with 
investments in the human and physical capital, (c) an efficient and effective 
processing of information is significant and considerably relevant, and (d) 
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transaction cost is assessed as a comparative institutional undertaking that 
arises in conjunction with alternative modes of governance, the strengths and 
weaknesses of which are always examined comparatively³especially with 
reference to transaction cost features (Williamson, 1979).  
 
TCE emerged through a series of developments between the 1930s and 1970s 
and has its roots from different disciplines such as economics (Coase, 1937; 
Hayek, 1945; Arrow, 1969), contract law (Llewellyn, 1931; Summers, 1969), 
organisation theory (Simon, 1947; Selznick, 1949), and business history 
(Chandler, 1962). Researchers and academics within the sphere of TCE 
focused on the dimensions that characterise transactions, the governance 
structures of transactions, and transactions within institutions (Williamson, 
1979; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Tadelis and Williamson, 2010). The 
fundamental insight of TCE (that transactions must be governed) is widely 
accepted (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). 
 
Governance structures are thought to be an important dimension for 
characterising transaction cost theory through its three broad types: non-
transaction specific, semi-specific, and highly specific governance structure 
(Williamson, 1979). A non-specific governance structure is represented by the 
market, whereas a highly specific governance structure represents the special 
needs of the transaction, and semi-specific governance structure falls in-
between (Williamson, 1979). Tadelis and Williamson (2010) adapt two modes 
of governance in response to the problem that assets are specific and contracts 
are incomplete. These two modes are markets (buy) and hierarchies (make). 
They argue that these modes are internally consistent systems of attributes and 
have unique strengths and weaknesses. Each mode of governance can be 
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described within two key attributes: (1) incentive intensity, where high-
powered incentives of the market provides a way to low-powered incentives in 
the firm, and (2) administrative authority and control, where the firm is 
supported by an extensive array of administrative procedures (Williamson, 
1985, 1998). Figure 2.2 illustrates these alternative modes of governance. 
 
Figure 2.2: Alternative Modes of Governance 
Source: Tadelis and Williamson (2010: 174) 
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Transaction cost theory is considered a part of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) (this will be discussed in further detail when presenting 
institutional theory in Chapter 3) (Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1998; 
Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Williamson (1998) argues that NIE deals with two 
main branches, institutional environment (which was formulated by Coase in 
 LQ KLV SDSHU ¶The ProEOHP RI 6RFLDO &RVW·, and institutions of 
JRYHUQDQFH &RDVH  ¶7KH 1DWXUH RI WKH )LUP·. The institutional 
environment as a level of analysis has benefited from interim development in 
HFRQRPLF KLVWRU\ GXULQJ WKH IRUPDWLRQ SHULRG RI ¶FOLRPHWULFV· )RJel and 
Engerman, 1971, 1974). The institutions of governance as another level of 
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analysis has benefited from the literature of recurrent market failure (Arrow, 
1969), from organisation theory (March and Simon, 1958), and business 
history (Chandler, 1962). 
 
A range of studies in corporate governance adopted TCE to explain different 
aspects inherent in the CG debate. For example, Dittmar et al. (2003) in their 
study of international CG and corporate cash holdings, examined whether or 
not transaction cost motives are larger in countries with extensive shareholder 
protection. Mayer and Salomon (2006) examined the effects of contractual 
hazards and technological capabilities on governance. They argue that robust 
WHFKQRORJLFDO FDSDELOLWLHV LQFUHDVH ILUPV· DELOLWLHs to govern transactions. 
Donaldson (2003) argues that the two dominant theories of CG are agency 
theory and transaction cost economics. Donaldson (2003: 18) emphasises the 
work of Williamson by positing that the main concern when establishing a 
firm is to DYRLGVRPHWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWV WKDWDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK´XQGHUWDNLQJ
PDUNHW WUDQVDFWLRQV LQYROYHG LQ RUGLQDU\ PDUNHW DFWLYLW\µ 2YLDWW 
examined the relationship between managers and shareholders using TCE. 
The results from his study supported the proposed hypotheses concerning 
incentives and monitoring methods. Ezzamel and Willmott (1993) conducted a 
study on CG to review reforms in the public sector in the UK. They adopted 
TCE in their review to analyse potential reforms in listed firms.  
 
TCE has received criticism from a number of scholars as it is not a 
comprehensive theory that can be used merely to analyse many strategic and 
organisational issues. Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that prescriptions 
RXWOLQHG IURP 7&( DUH QRW RQO\ ¶ZURQJ· EXW DOVR ¶dDQJHURXV· for executive 
managers because of the basis and assumptions underlying this theory. They 
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emphasise this by using examples from other studies that show TCE lacks 
generality because of ethnocentric bias (Dore, 1983), embodies a hidden 
ideology that distorts more than it illuminates (Perrow, 1986), is divorced from 
reality in terms of ad hoc theorising (Simon, 1991), and ignores the contextual 
grounding of human actions (Granovetter, 1985). Wieland (2005) claims that 
the critical problem of TCE is to explain the conduct of transactions by the 
efficiency and performance of the chosen governance structures that have 
been customised to perform the transactions at hand. Williamson (1996) 
argues that the CG problem of TCE is not only the protection of 
VKDUHKROGHUV·ULJKWVEXW also the efficient achievement of transactions by firms 
within their political and cultural environment. Having described the potential 
problems associated with adopting TCE in CG analysis, other theories can be 
helpful to fill the gaps. Thus, the next section will present the path dependence 
theory as an important theory in investigating issues in CG. 
 
2.6 Path Dependence Theory 
 
Path dependence theory was first introduced by Brian Arthur (1987, 1988, 
1989, 1990) as an analytical perspective. It encompasses an economic concept 
for understanding a number of aspects such as mathematical models, 
competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events 
(Arthur, 1994). Following the release of the theory, the literature of path 
dependence began to include a wider range of aspects in order to answer 
enquiries in historical sociology (Mahoney, 2000), political science (Pierson, 
2000; Alexander, 2001), and corporate governance (Gilson, 1996; Bebchuk and 
Roe, 1999; Schmidt and Spindler, 2002). These perspectives will be employed 
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as platforms in order to understand the different dimensions of path 
dependence frameworks.  
 
3DWK GHSHQGHQFH LV EURDGO\ GHILQHG DV ´KLVWRU\ PDWWHUVµ RU ´the past 
LQIOXHQFHV WKH IXWXUHµ (North, 1990: 100). Liebowitz and Margolis (1995: 2) 
argue that there are three efficiency outcomes in which a dynamic process 
demonstrates sensitive dependence on preliminary conditions. The first type 
RI SDWK GHSHQGHQFH LV ¶first-GHJUHH SDWK GHSHQGHQFH· and this refers to 
instances in which sensitivity to starting points exists, but with no implied 
LQHIILFLHQF\ 7KH VHFRQG W\SH LV ¶second-degree path dependence· ZKHUH
sensitive dependence on preliminary conditions leads to results that are 
disappointing DQG FRVWO\ WR FKDQJH 7KH WKLUG W\SH LV ¶third-degree path 
dependence·ZKHUHVHQVLWLYHGHSHQGHQFHRQSUHOLPLQDU\FRQGLWLRQVOHDGVWRD
result that is inefficient, but remediable. The first and second types of path 
dependence are commonplace and offer little in the way of an objection to the 
neo-classical paradigm of rational behaviour. The third type is the strongest 
form and challenges the neo-classical paradigm, and requires restrictions on 
price, institutions, or foresight (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). 
 
A group of scholars in the field of historical sociology such as Tilley (1988), 
Aminzade (1992), Griffin (1992), Sewel (1996), Issac (1997), and Somers 
(1998) have suggested that some social phenomena can only be adequately 
explained through the concept of path dependence (Mahoney, 2000). 
Mahoney (2000) adds that according to these scholars, the field of historical 
sociology provides tools of analysis for path dependence studies. As 
sociological studies tend to focus on the normative aspects of social sciences 
(Briton and Nee, 2001), Gartland (2005) argues that studies in sociology that 
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incorporated path dependence theory mainly fall in the normative research 
paradigm that focuses on the rules, regulations, and power of organisations 
and agents. Within the realm of historical sociology, Mahoney (2000) indicates 
that scholars in this field often regard two types of sequences: (1) self-
reinforcing sequences, which are characterised by the shaping and 
reproduction of a given institutional pattern, and (2) reactive sequences, which 
are chains of ¶temporally-ordered· and ¶causally-linked events·. These 
sociological sequences of path dependence indicate the need to focus on the 
behaviours and rules embedded in an organisation that has created lock-in 
(Gartland, 2005). From a CG perspective then, it is necessary to pay attention 
to the path dependency of a given system by considering the sociological 
sequences that focus on the patterns of behaviours, customs, and laws 
embedded in institutional frameworks.   
 
A growing number of social scientists are describing political processes as 
¶SDWK GHSHQGHQW· 3LHUVRQ  7KHVH SROLWLFDO SURFHVVHV WKDW IROORZ SDWK
GHSHQGHQFH DUH RIWHQ FDWHJRULVHG XQGHU WKH WHUP ¶KLVWRULFDO LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP·
(Alexander, 2001). Thelen (1999: 387) points out that historical institutionalism 
´can shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, but they are 
themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political 
strategies of political conflict and of choiceµ Pierson (2000: 263) outlines the 
main features of political life within a path dependence paradigm as follows:  
 
x Multiple equilibria: a wide range of outcomes are promising under 
preliminary conditions conductive to increasing returns. 
x Contingency: tiny events can have great consequences if they occur at a 
convenient time.  
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x A critical role for timing and sequencing: the occurrence of events might be 
crucial, because the earlier part of an event might be much more critical 
than the later part.  
x Inertia: positive feedback about the established returns process can 
potentially lead to a single equilibrium that is likely resistant to change.  
 
Gartland (2005) argues that political science studies that incorporate path 
dependence theory mainly fall in the regulative research paradigm that focuses 
on behavioural change. Berman (1998), in her study of path dependency and 
political action, emphasises the need to look beyond the institutional and 
structural context. She does this by going back and looking at the German and 
Swedish view of the evolution of social democracy. She indicates that decision 
making was path dependent. Such views should be considered in the CG 
debate and will be discussed in the next paragraph.  
 
Gilson (1996) notes that the difference between a traditional and path 
dependence view of CG can be observed from the history of American CG. 
For example, Berle and Means (1932) reported that the separation of 
ownership and control is a fundamental feature of American CG. At that time, 
CG systems of other societies were ignored to a large extent because it was 
thought that the American CG system is an ideal and a practical system in the 
evolution of CG. Other CG systems were almost at an evolutionary dead end. 
Gilson (1996) argues that two major developments in this sense changed these 
thoughts. Firstly, the observation of Roe (1994) that the Berle-Means 
description of American CG was historically and politically contingent, a 
federal system, and a path dependent object of politics. It is worth noting that 
the American CG system is characterised as dispersed ownership, more 
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professional managers, widespread stock market, and limited CG role for 
financial intermediaries (Gilson, 1996; Coffee, 1998; La Porta et al., 2000; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Secondly, the increased development of global 
competition through the 20th century highlighted the need to pay attention to 
the path dependency of the American CG system which showed that this 
system seemed to be failing. The American CG system has not sufficiently 
taken into account the institutional differences that shape the formation of CG 
of different societies. Gilson (1996) argues that the institutional arrangements 
of the American, German, and Japanese CG systems are clearly path 
dependent and claims that the path dependence of a CG system of society 
confronts the effects of environmental selection mechanisms. Other scholars 
employed path dependence concept to focus on the rapid convergence 
towards the best CG systems (Schmidt and Spindler, 2002), understanding 
ownership structure and governance (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999), analysing 
corporate contract (Kahan and Klausner, 1996), examining CG and 
employment relations in Japan and the USA (Jacoby, 2005), analysing the 
cross-cultural theory of CG systems (Licht, 2000), and investigating the 
evolution of CG structure (Kole and Lehn, 1997). The next and final section 
will attempt to outline the central objectives of CG that practitioners and 
policy makers intend to achieve.  
 
2.7 Corporate Governance Objectives 
 
Having presented the various theories that are primarily employed to explain 
aspects of CG, it appears these multiple theories are all seeking to understand 
how to achieve the objectives of CG. A number of scholars such as Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (2000), and Claessens (2006) highlighted 
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many of these objectives of CG. However, for comprehensiveness and a 
better reflection of the actual situation, it is useful to outline these objectives 
of CG as stated in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) document of CG. The OECD as an international 
organisation helps and assists governments to deal with economic, social, and 
governance challenges of a globalised economy. These objectives are in line to 
some extent with those indicated by some scholars in the field of CG. From 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance Document (2004), these 
objectives are: 
 
x To promote a transparent, fair, and efficient market that is consistent 
with the laws and rules. 
x To protect VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWV DQG IDFLOLWDWH WKH H[HUFLVH RI WKHLU
rights. 
x To equate between minority, foreign, and majority shareholders and 
treat them similarly. 
x To encourage co-operation between stakeholders and corporations for 
offering jobs, wealth, and sustainability of enterprises.  
x To ensure accurate, proper, and timely disclosure of all information and 
data materials in terms of financial statements, ownership, performance, 
governance, etc. 
x To make sure that the board of directors follows a clear strategic plan, 
monitors the management effectively, and is responsible for the 
company and the shareholders.  
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These are only the key points of the entire objectives of CG explained in detail 
in 69 pages in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance Document 
(2004). These formal objectives are common worldwide, regardless of the 
nature or classification of the society, or the adopted model of CG in the 
society. They are also compatible with the different theories adopted to 
explain, understand, and analyse CG themes.  
 
In order to understand how these objectives of CG can be achieved, Davis et 
al. (1997) argue that there are two governance mechanisms that have received 
considerable attention by scholars in the field of CG, namely, alternative 
executive compensation schemes and governance structures (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The first mechanism suggests 
using financial incentives as rewards or punishments in order to align the 
interests of the agents and principals. When executive managers are 
compensated based on successful achievement of the shareholders objectives, 
they more than likely become motivated to behave consistently with 
VKDUHKROGHUV· interests (Davis et al., 1997). This is particularly useful when 
monitoring is almost impossible. The second mechanism suggests the 
functioning of governance structures. The boards of directors can monitor 
managers· performance through periodic evaluations and audits. The boards of 
directors can link the objectives of shareholders with managers and watch 
them to keep agency costs observed. An external board (non-management 
board) is desirable to reduce the possibility of any management loss of balance 
or oversight to occur.  
 
It can be seen that conflict of interests between the agent and the principal is a 
dilemma that received much attention by scholars in order to minimise this 
Chapter 2: Theories of Corporate Governance 
34 
 
divergent of interests. Therefore, this research study will attempt to provide 
more attention to this dilemma when discussing CG practices within the realm 
of institutional theory.  
 
2.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented, described, and evaluated the common theories 
employed frequently by scholars to explain the different phenomena of CG. 
The chapter started by describing and discussing agency theory by presenting 
the historical background and roots of the agency problem. The agency 
problem focuses on the separation of ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932). It is here that is highlighted that there is a need to introduce a 
governance system that protects the rights and serves the interests of the agent 
and the principal. Stewardship theory was presented afterwards to argue that 
the interests of the agent and the principal are not always divergent. It can be 
presumed in the relationship between managers and principals that managers 
(as stewards) are motivated to behave and act at the best interest of the 
principals (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Stakeholder theory has been used to 
define the relationship between the firm and stakeholders such as owners, 
suppliers, customers, shareholders, employees, among others. The theory 
describes what a corporation is, examines the connection between stakeholder 
practice and the accomplishment of corporate objectives, and relies on the 
basis of normative aspect (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Transaction cost 
economics is central to the studies in the field of economics and is widely 
employed to understand economics aspects of CG. Studies that adopted this 
approach focused on the dimensions that characterise transactions, the 
governance structures of transactions, and transactions within institutions 
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(Williamson, 1979; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Tadelis and Williamson, 2010). 
Path dependence theory has been used as an analytical approach to understand 
a number of phenomena such as mathematical models, competing 
technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events (Arthur, 
1994). Afterwards, path dependency theory was developed in order to account 
for a wider range of enquiries in corporate governance, historical sociology, 
and political science (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000, 
respectively). However, these different theories of CG do not account for the 
context. As the context does largely matter in this research, institutional theory 
will be introduced to explain different aspects of CG as this theory considers 
the context to a large extent.  
 
These different theories aim to understand how to achieve specific objectives 
RI &* 6XFK REMHFWLYHV DUH FHQWUHG RQ SURWHFWLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWV
upholding justice and fairness between all shareholders through emphasising 
timely and accurate disclosure and transparency of information, maintaining 
equitable opportunities for all shareholders, encouraging co-operation between 
stakeholders and corporations, and making sure that the board of directors 
follows strategies that are in the best interest of shareholders. The next chapter 
will describe and evaluate institutional theory and demonstrate its bearing in 
the CG debate. 
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Chapter 3: Institutional Theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the most common theories used in the CG 
debate. It showed how CG emerged when the agency problem arose and 
evolved over time. It also presented the common objectives of CG that are 
shared by some scholars and practitioners. This chapter will present 
institutional theory in more detail as this theory is the adopted perspective in 
this research study for a number of reasons (to be highlighted throughout 
Chapters 3 and 4). Yet, it is argued that the most important application of 
institutional theory for this research study is that the theory takes into account 
WKH¶FRQWH[W· 
 
This chapter will begin by introducing the historical background of 
institutional theory by presenting early institutionalism in economics, political 
science, and sociology. This will be followed by an introduction of the 
development of institutional theory and the transition from early to new 
institutionalism in economics, sociology, and political science. Institutional 
theory has a long history and encapsulates a wide range of views and positions. 
Through continuous critiques and revisions, it is constantly being developed. 
This continuous development of institutional theory highlights its strength and 
effectiveness in explaining organisational behaviour. Understanding this 
historical development of the theory will establish the foundation of this thesis 
as an attempt to achieve the objectives of this research study. As the definition 
of DQ ¶LQVWLWXWLRQ· KDV HYROYHGRYHU WLPH DV LQVWLWXWLRQDO WKHRU\ HYROYHG LW LV
necessary to evaluate the history of institutionalism and the evolution of 
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institutional theory prior to defining ¶LQVWLWXWLRQ·IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVVWXG\
Since institutions survive and exist as long as they are powerful, the 
relationship between institutions and power will be presented. Similarly, the 
relationship between institutions and legitimacy will also be described. Any 
theory has its own strength, boundary and limitation. Therefore, the 
limitations of institutional theory will be evaluated and discussed. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 will introduce early 
institutionalism in economics, political science, and sociology. Section 3.3 will 
present the development of institutional theory. Section 3.4 will introduce neo-
institutionalism in economics, sociology, and political science. Section 3.5 will 
offer a table that summarises the development of institutional theory by 
presenting seminal works in this theory. Section 3.6 will start by defining 
institutions and will continue to describe institutions such as family, kinship, 
bureaucratic state, religion, market, legal, and politics. Section 3.7 will present 
the relationship between institutions and power. Section 3.8 will present the 
relationship between institutions and legitimacy. Finally, Section 3.9 will 
provide the limitations of institutional theory.  
 
3.2 Early Institutionalism  
 
In order to provide a comprehensive outline of early institutionalism, this 
section will rely to an extent on the historical review of Scott (2008). Much of 
WKHZRUN LQHDUO\ LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPGLIIHUV IURP WRGD\·V LQVWLWXWLRQDOSDUDGLJP
Despite this fact, some academics and writers are inspired and motivated by 
pioneers in the field. The discussion in early institutionalism will be presented 
through three main streams: economics, political science, and sociology.  
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3.2.1 Early Institutional Theory in Economics 
 
Institutional theory emerged in Germany and Austria in the late 19th century, 
in the form of a debate over the use of the scientific method in social science. 
Drawing from the early work on institutional arguments along with the ideas 
of Kant and Hegel, economists argued that economics can be condensed to a 
set of global ODZV/HDGHUVDWWKLVVFKRROVXFKDV6FKPROOHU·VZULWLQJV-
1904), observed that economic practices activated within a social context that 
was formed by historical and cultural influences. Furthermore, those scholars 
embraced more rational forms of human behaviour. This classical approach 
was defended by Menger (1883/1963) who highlighted the importance of 
developing an economic concept that was both abstract and timeless. Menger 
observed that institutions were social phenomena that needed theoretical 
description. 
 
By the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, according to Scott 
(2008) three scholars appeared as influential in the field of institutional 
economics: Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell. These scholars offer quite 
different perspectives but share important criticisms of economic models for 
their inattention to historical change and unrealistic assumptions. Veblen 
(1898) challenged the classical notion that regards individual behaviour and 
argued that much behaviour was governed by convention and habit. Veblen 
GHILQHG LQVWLWXWLRQVDV´settled habits of thought common to the 
JHQHUDOLW\ RI PDQµ. Commons (1924) also challenged the prominence of 
LQGLYLGXDOEHKDYLRXUDVVXPLQJWKDW¶WUDQVDFWLRQ·ZDVDPRUHDGHTXDWHHOHPHQW
of economic analysis. Commons (1924: 7) pointed out that a transaction is 
´two or more wills giving, taking, persuading, coercing, defrauding, 
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commanding, obeying, competing, governing, in a world of scarcity, 
PHFKDQLVPVDQGUXOHVRIFRQGXFWµ. Mitchell (1934) argued that economics was 
a barrier to evaluating the business cycle and focused on understanding 
economic change. He was a pioneer in empirical data collection in economics, 
suggesting that the concepts of the economy should be established on facts as 
opposed to deductive theories.  
 
Having presented the historical roots of the early institutional theory in 
economics, the discussion will now move on to define this approach. 
Hodgson (2000: 318) argues that early institutional theory in economics is not 
a specifically defined theory, but it is a collection of thoughts that can be 
described as follows: 
 
(1) Although institutional economists are keen to give their theories 
practical relevance, institutionalism itself is not defined in terms of any 
policy proposals. 
(2) Institutions are key elements of any economy, and thus a major task for 
economists is to study institutions and the processes of institutional 
conservation, innovation and change. 
(3) The economy is an open and evolving system, situated in a natural 
environment, affected by technological changes, and embedded in a 
broader set of social, cultural, political and power relationships. 
 
These concepts of early institutional theory in economics are different from 
traditional theories of economics, in that early institutional theory in 
economics does not only emphasise human behaviour, but also norms, values, 
and attitudes (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Cognition and habit are central 
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aspects to this approach (Hodgson, 1998). This theory is an institutional 
DSSURDFKWKDWLQYROYHVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWIRUPWKH¶DFWLRQV·DQG¶WKRXJKWV·RI
individual human agents (Scapens, 2006). 
 
Scott (2008) claims that the early institutional theory in economics has much 
more bearing in new institutionalism than the new institutional theory in 
economics (NIE). Hodgson (1998) argues that NIE can be regarded as a 
special and restricted case of the early institutional theory in economics. 
Although the early institutional theory in economics seems to be a broader and 
a more comprehensive theory, it is still a relatively limited perspective for two 
reasons: (1) it does not offer insights into the factors that drive institutional 
change, and (2) it does not explain the relation between human action and the 
presence of institutions (Seo and Creed, 2002). Moreover, it lacks 
methodological consistency and overall persuasiveness (Langlois, 1989). The 
new institutional theory of economics emerged in reaction to these criticisms 
and limitations of the early institutional theory in economics.  
 
3.2.2 Early Institutional Theory in Political Science  
 
Between 1860 and 1925, political science was inspired by institutional 
approaches in both America and Europe. This inspiration emerged from the 
work of pioneers in the field such as Wilson (1889), Willoughby (1896), and 
Burgess (1902). During this time, institutional analysis in political science was 
based on moral philosophy and law (Simon, 1991). Those scholars paid much 
attention to the administrative arrangements and legal frameworks that shape 
governance structures (Scott, 2008).  
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According to Bill and Hardgrave (1981), institutional analysis (developed at the 
beginning of the 20th century) included a number of aspects: (1) it emphasised 
legal systems and formal structures, (2) it focused on configurative description 
that accounts for procedures, rules, and rights, (3) it paid attention to the 
origins but not the change, (4) it was less theoretical and focused on the 
historical reform of institutional arrangements, and (5) it involved aspects 
associated with more moral philosophy and less empirical research.  
 
Eckstein (1963) argues that early scholars embraced a sort of positivism in 
their studies in political science and focused on self-explanatory, hard facts of 
politics. He also argues that the 19th century was a superior era in terms of 
constitution-making, where formal political institutions in administrative rules, 
charters, and legal codes, meant a great deal. Between 1930 and 1960, the early 
institutional approach was challenged with the behaviourism perspective, 
which focused on reshaping the study of politics as a theoretical and empirical 
science (Scott, 2008). In addition to this, it was argued that the early 
institutional approach should focus on the informal distribution of power, 
political behaviour, and attitudes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Academics in 
political studies increased focus on behaviour and moved away from 
emphasising rules and structures. This involved a closer focus on public 
opinion, voting behaviour, party formation, action as a product of self-interest, 
and allocation of resources (March and Olsen, 1984). Between 1970 and 1980, 
these theoretical approaches resulted in a new institutional theory in political 
science to emerge in response to the extreme revolution of the behaviourism 
that seeks to rebuild frameworks in guiding, empowering, and constraining 
political behaviour. 
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3.2.3 Early Institutional Theory in Sociology   
 
The concept of institutions in the 19th and the 20th centuries primarily 
originated from the work of Spencer (1876, 1896, and 1910). He considered 
society as an organic arrangement that changes over time. This arrangement 
ZLWKLQLWVFRQWH[WZDVJDLQHGYLD¶RUJDQV·VWUXFWXUHGRYHUWLPHDVLQVWLWXWLRQDO
systems. Spencer mainly focused on comparing and contrasting the operation 
of institutions in different societies. This approach was extended by Sumner 
ZKRVWXGLHGWKHRULJLQDQGFKDQJHRI¶IRONZD\V·+HSRLQWHGRXWWKDWDQ
institution consists of a concept (that defines the function of the institution) 
and a structure (that engages the idea of the institution that is put into action). 
Soon after this proposition, sociologists rejected the evolutionary arguments 
developed by Spencer and Sumner, but appreciated the importance of 
institutions as a sociological focal point (Scott, 2008). 
 
Scott (2008) has argued that the European approach to institutional analysis 
was led by three figures: Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Marx (1844/1972) 
believed that the materialist world is the real one, and political and economic 
structures, such as beliefs, power relations, and norms, are products of human 
ideas and activities. Early notions of the social construction of reality were first 
described by Marx (1844/1972). Durkheim (1893/1949) emphasised symbolic 
systems, such as belief, knowledge, and collective ideas, which have religious 
and moral characteristics. For Durkheim (1893/1949), these symbolic systems 
are social institutions. He explained that institutions are products of joint 
activities and associations, where fixing and instituting in a subjective way 
UHSUHVHQW LQGLYLGXDOV· DFWLRQV DQG MXGJPHQWV $OH[DQGHU  :HEHU
(1924/1968) mainly focused on cultural rules that define social structures and 
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govern social behaviour. He viewed action as social, where the researcher and 
the object of study are attached to a subjective meaning of events. He also 
viewed the material conditions and interests as guidance and motivation for 
action. From an economics perspective, Weber (1924/1968) viewed rational 
behaviour as a variable, not an assumption (Swedberg, 1998). Recent 
LQVWLWXWLRQDODQDO\VLVLVPXFKJURXQGHGRQ:HEHU·VDSSURDFKDVDNH\JXLGDQFH
in this field (Scott, 2008).  
 
Parsons (1934, 1937) contributed greatly to sociology and followed ideas of 
early scholars such as Durkheim and Weber. He addressed the tension 
between subjective and objective approaches by explaining that normative 
frameworks emerged separately from social actors (Scott, 2008). According to 
Parsons (1934), institutions are systems that regulate and organise the 
relationships between individuals. Modern scholars in the field criticised 
3DUVRQV·DSSURDFK LQWKDW3DUVRQVSXWWRRPXFKZHLJKWRQFXOWXUDOSDWWHUQV
his conception of culture failed to reveal its existence, his cultural analysis 
neglected its cognitive dimensions, and his view of culture is limited to value-
orientations (Alexander, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2008). As a 
result, new approaches of institutional theory in sociology that define the 
relationships of the normative and instrumental in social action emerged.  
 
3.3 Institutional Theory Development 
 
The previous section presented early institutionalism within three main 
disciplines: economics, political science, and sociology. Having done that, it is 
now necessary to understand the development of institutional theory over 
time. Institutional theory has grown and developed with continuous critiques 
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and revisions by different scholars from different fields. Such development of 
the theory is useful as it helps researchers to explain a wide range of diverse 
phenomena and in turn contribute considerably to the literature.  
 
The critiques that early institutionalism received by modern scholars was 
discussed earlier. Above all, this early approach did not focus on organisations 
and organisational analysis as influential forms of social analysis. This 
approach was developed in the 1940s mainly through the pioneer sociologist, 
Selznick (1948, 1949, 1957), with his empirical studies of organisations and 
institutions or the so called, old institutionalism. Selznick (1948: 25) 
established a general definition of forPDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV DV ´a system of 
FRQVFLRXVO\FRRUGLQDWHGDFWLYLWLHVRUIRUFHVRIWZRRUPRUHSHUVRQVµ. In light 
of this, an organisation can be seen as an expression of a social structure 
designated by logical actions for a specific goal. According to Selznick, an 
organisation can be viewed from two angles: (1) an economy, in which it is a 
system of relationships that provides scarce resources, and (2) an adaptive 
social structure, which at the same time is an economy, in which actors and 
individuals influence the formal systems. When organisations (as social 
systems) intend to achieve goals, they become institutionalised (Selznick, 
1949). 
 
Likewise, in the field of old institutionalism, Parsons (1956) employed rules, 
contracts, and authority to integrate organisations with other organisations in 
VRFLHW\ ZKHUH DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ LV GHILQHG E\ 3DUVRQV   DV ´a social 
system oriented to the attainment of a relatively specific type of goal, which 
contributes to a major function of a more comprehensive system, usually the 
VRFLHW\µ. This implies that a group of people work towards intended goals, 
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while they also contribute to the functioning of the society as a whole. In this 
sense, organisations can include: governments, corporations, international 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, cooperatives, universities, not-
for-profit corporations, charities, and armed forces. Parsons articulated formal 
organisations into three primary contexts: (1) procurement of resources, 
financing and other services, (2) the operative code centred on decisions, and 
(3) the institutional structure centred on authority and contract. However, 
3DUVRQV·WKHRUHWLFDOZRUNRQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDOILHOGIDLOHGWRLQVSLUHHPSLULFDO
UHVHDUFKWRWKHVDPHOHYHODV6HO]QLFN·V6FRWW008). 
 
In later work on old institutionalism, Selznick (1957: 16-17) drew attention to 
WKHQRWLRQ WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ LVDSURFHVVDQG´WR LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHµ is to 
´LQIXVH ZLWK YDOXHµ. This process reflects the distinctive history of 
organisations, the people and groups involved, the shared interests, the 
adaptation to the environment. Furthermore, the process is something that 
happens to the organisation over time (Scott, 2008). In addition to the notion 
that institutionalisation is a process, Selznick (1957) posited that 
institutionalisation is variable, in that organisations vary in their degree of 
institutionalisation (Scott, 2008). For example, organisations with specific goals 
and advanced technologies are less subject to institutionalisation than those 
with vague goals or poor technologies (Selznick, 1957).  
 
In the 1970s, Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977) outlined a new 
approach of institutional analysis that highlighted the role of culture and 
cognition in institutional analysis. Meyer and Rowan (1977) emphasised the 
role of modernisation in rationalising taken-for-granted rules from a macro 
SHUVSHFWLYH7KH\SRLQWRXW WKDW´institutional rules function as myths which 
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organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and 
HQKDQFHGVXUYLYDOSURVSHFWVµ (p. 340). This implies that rational concepts of 
institutions are the driving force for organisations to adapt practices and 
procedures to increase their legitimacy and survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 
Zucker (1977) also highlighted the taken-for-granted nature of institutions, 
and the role of cultural persistence as a measure of institutionalisation from a 
micro perspective. In her study, she examined the effect of institutionalisation 
on three aspects of cultural persistence: generational uniformity, maintenance, 
DQG UHVLVWDQFH WR FKDQJH 2EVHUYDWLRQV IURP KHU VWXG\ VXJJHVWHG WKDW ´WKH
greater the degree of institutionalisation, the greater the generational 
uniformity of cultural understandings, the greater the maintenance without 
direct social control, and the greater the resistance to change through personal 
LQIOXHQFHµ S  7KLV RIIHUV YLWDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI LQVWLWXWLRQV LQ ZKLFK
they tend to transmit across generations, be maintained, and to be reproduced.   
 
7KLV QHZ DSSURDFK RI LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP RU ¶QHR-LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP· OHG WR
isomorphism as formal pressures of structuring organisations. In 1983, Meyer 
DQG 5RZDQ·V  ZRUN RQ LVRPRUSKLVP ZDV H[WHQGHG E\ 'L0DJJLR DQG
Powell from the societal level (macro-level) to the organisational field level 
(micro-OHYHO 7KH\ GHILQHG LQVWLWXWLRQDO LVRPRUSKLVP EDVHG RQ +DZOH\·V
  GHVFULSWLRQ DV ´a constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
FRQGLWLRQVµ. They highlighted three isomorphic processes: (1) coercive to gain 
legitimacy, (2) mimetic to avoid uncertainty, (3) normative, which stems 
primarily from professionalisation. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) considered 
the new institutionalism as an explanation for the success and survival of 
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organisations. Moreover, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) rejected rationality and 
emphasised legitimacy rather than efficiency. These three isomorphic 
processes will be described in the following paragraphs.   
 
Firstly, coercive isomorphism arises from formal and informal pressures that 
result from state authority. This authority emerges from the dependency of 
organisations on other organisations and the societal expectations within 
which organisations operate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). An important 
dimension to the characterisation of organisational responses to the 
environment is the variation in the capabilities of organisations in order to 
exercise power over external pressures (Oliver, 1991). In response to changing 
legislation, organisations may alter their practices to comply with these 
changes, but they may also change for more authentic reasons to satisfy 
societal preferences (Oliver, 1991). This loyalty to the preferences of the 
society by organisations can maintain resources, power, and action.  
 
Secondly, mimetic isomorphism arises from uncertainty, which is a powerful 
incentive that promotes imitation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). More to the 
point, when there is symbolic uncertainty, unclear objectives, or a lack of 
understanding, organisations may imitate other organisations in terms of 
acquisition, diversification, strategies, and other processes. Adopting 
institutional designs of other organisations generates patterns more likely to be 
´YDULRXVO\ PRUH PRGHUQ DSSURSULDWH RU SURIHVVLRQDOµ 6FRWW  
Furthermore, DiMaggio and Powell indicate that due to the limited variety of 
organisations that can be imitated as appropriate models, organisational 
structures have a tendency to be homogeneous. It can be understood that the 
effects of cognition are viewed as mimetic isomorphism by focusing on 
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¶DPELJXRXV· EHKDYLRXU LQ UHVSRQVH WR FXOWXUDO UDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ 'L0DJJLR DQG
Powell, 1983). However, Suchman (1995) argues that even without 
establishing such a model, organisations can protect their cognitive legitimacy 
E\FRQIRUPLQJWRSUHYDLOLQJ¶KHXULVWLFV·. 
 
Thirdly, normative isomorphism stems from the pressures associated with 
professionalisation, where professions depend on the normative processes and 
endeavour to establish cultural norms that are consistent with their objectives 
and beliefs (Scott, 1987). DiMaggio and Powell presented two aspects of 
normative isomorphism that are particularly interesting: (1) the legitimation of 
formal education in a cognitive base generated by university specialists, (2) the 
growth of professional ties that allow the rapid emergence of new activities 
and practices across organisations. Universities are central sources for 
promoting normative standards that produce professionals as these 
universities inspire the production of professional norms and values. 
Professionals, such as accountants, lawyers, and doctors, tend to have strong 
networks with their referent bodies, which establish the standards for 
professional behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2002).  
 
It can be stated that new institutionalism shares similarities with old 
institutionalism as outlined by Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 12) in that: 
 
Both the old and new approaches share skepticism toward rational-actor 
models of organization, and each views institutionalization as a state-
dependent process that makes organizations less instrumentally rational 
by limiting the options they can pursue. Both emphasize the relationship 
between organizations and their environments, and both promise to 
UHYHDO DVSHFWV RI UHDOLW\ WKDW DUH LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWKRUJDQL]DWLRQV· IRUPDO
account. Each approach stresses the role of culture in shaping 
organizational reality.  
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Having outlined the common characteristics of both approaches, it is 
important to note that these similarities are important in terms of theory 
development, where the new approach departed from the old one as explained 
by Powell and DiMaggio (1991) in Table 3.1 as follows: 
 
Table 3.1: The Old and the New Institutionalism 
Source: Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 12) 
 Old New 
Conflicts of interest Central Peripheral 
Source of inertia Vested interests Legitimacy imperative 
Structural emphasis Informal structure Symbolic role of formal 
structure 
Organization embedded in Local community Field, sector, or society 
Nature of embeddedness Co-optation Constitutive 
Locus of institutionalization Organization Field or society 
Organizational dynamics Change Persistence 
Basis of critique of 
utilitarianism 
Theory of interest 
aggregation 
Theory of action 
Evidence for critique of 
utilitarianism 
Unanticipated 
consequences 
Unreflective activity 
Key forms of cognition Values, norms, attitudes Classifications, routines, 
scripts, schema 
Social psychology Socialization theory Attribution theory 
Cognitive basis or order Commitment  Habit, practical action 
Goals Displaced Ambiguous 
Agenda Policy relevance Disciplinary 
 
 
Following that, Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 12) also highlighted a number of 
differences between old and new institutionalism, in that: 
 
They identify different sources of constraint, with the older emphasizing 
the vesting of interests within organizations as a result of political 
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tradeoffs and alliances, and the new stressing the relationship between 
stability and legitimacy and the power of common understandings that 
are seldom explicitly articulated. 
 
A fundamental difference between old and new institutionalism is that the new 
institutionalism considers gaining legitimacy as the prime objective for 
organisations to secure their survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). However, the 
old institutionalism emphasises on the political aspects in its analysis of group 
conflicts and organisational strategies (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). For 
LQVWDQFH¶FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVW·LVDFHQWUDOIDFWRULQROGLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPEXWLWLVD
marginal factor in new institutionalism (see Table 3.1). 
 
This new institutionalism approach is important for this research study in 
terms of analysing what institutions might consist of in order to understand 
how these institutions might form and shape organisational structures. It is 
also important to understand what could inform the behaviour of a 
phenomenon (such as corporate governance) that may contribute to the 
development of the theory. 
 
Up to this point, it can be understood that there is a wide range of viewpoints 
and directions in institutional theory. In light of this, a later set of ideas 
developed by Scott (1994) has a similar approach to institutional isomorphism. 
7KLV VHW RI LGHDV KDVEHHQ WHUPHG ¶LQVWLWXWLRQDO SLOODUV· DQG FRQVLVWV RI WKUHH
pillars: regulative (legal), normative (social), and cultural-cognitive (cultural). 
He argues that these pillars are the central building blocks of any institutional 
structure. Scott (2008) points out that these institutional pillars are making up 
and supporting institutions as they guide behaviour and resist change (see 
Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: Three Pillars of Institutions 
Source: Scott (2008: 51) 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of 
compliance 
Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-
grantedness 
Shared understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding 
expectations 
Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
 
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of 
action 
Isomorphism  
Affect Fear Guilt / 
Innocence  
Shame / Honour Certainty / Confusion  
Basis of legitimacy  Legally sanctioned  Morally governed  Comprehensible  
Recognizable  
Culturally supported 
 
Firstly, the regulative pillar, which includes a number of regulatory processes 
that most commonly take the form of rule-setting, monitoring, and 
sanctioning activities, in an attempt to influence future behaviour (Scott, 
2008). Thus, these regulatory processes involve setting up and establishing 
rules, observing conformity, and handing out behaviour-influencing sanctions 
either through reward or punishment. This pillar uses legal sanctioning as a 
basis for legitimacy, which is based on instrumental logic. Organisations as a 
part of the society conform to rules so as to avoid suffering penalties for 
noncompliance (Hoffman, 1999). For instance, in response to conformity to 
environmental regulations, corporations may implement new technologies for 
controlling pollution; and in order to meet tax law requirements, non-profits 
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may hire accountants (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This cycle of behaviour is 
central within the framework of coercive isomorphism (Hirsch, 1997).  
 
Secondly, the normative pillar LQYROYHV ´WKH FUHDWLRQ RI H[SHFWDWLRQV WKDW
introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory GLPHQVLRQLQWRVRFLDO OLIHµ 
(Scott, 2003b: 880). Legitimacy is embedded in societal beliefs and norms. 
Organisations comply with the normative rules out of moral or ethical 
obligation, or in conformance to norms established by trade sectors, 
professional institutions, and universities (Hoffman, 1999). The normative 
pillar allows for broadly designed studies of intentional, self-conscious actions 
and competing interests; the dynamics of change, social action, and policy 
issues; and power and conflict (Hirsch, 1997). 
 
Thirdly, the cultural-cognitive pillar refers to the shared conceptions that make 
up social reality and the frameworks through which meaning is made (Scott, 
2008). Organisations generally abide by these conceptions without conscious 
thought (Zucker, 1983). Legitimacy is rooted in cultural orthodoxy. Culturally 
legitimate constructions are largely imitated, understood, and performed 
within this framework of mimetic isomorphism (Hirsch, 1997). For instance, 
HQYLURQPHQWDO DFWLYLVWV SXUVXH ´LGHDOLVWLF RU FROOHFWLYLVW LQWHUHVWVµ ZKHUHDV
corporations SXUVXH´HFRQRPLFDQGPDWHULDOLVWLFJRDOVµ+RIIPDQ
The cultural-cognitive dimension of institutions is a prime distinctive 
characteristic of neo-institutionalism within sociology and organisational 
studies (Scott, 2008). 
 
The three pillars structure illustrates how significant issues are observed and 
proper actions are developed (Fligstein and Brantley, 1992). These three pillars 
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SURYLGH WKUHH ´UHODWHG EXW GLVWLQJXLVKDEOH EDVHV RI OHJLWLPDF\µ (Scott, 1995: 
47). The three pillars also offer a foundation for analysis when it comes to 
organisational decision making (Grosse and Trevino, 2005). Moreover, the 
three pillars offer distinctive modes of support that assist to create the stability 
of social life (Scott, 2003a). Thus, they play a role when seeking stability. The 
next section will pay more attention to new institutionalism and will present its 
different approaches. 
 
3.4 Neo-institutional Theory Approaches 
 
The previous section presented the historical development of institutional 
theory and organisational analysis over time, and the emergence of new 
institutionalism. A number of approaches of neo-institutional theory were 
discussed by several influential scholars such as Peters (2005), Scapens (2006), 
and Scott (2008). Firstly, neo-institutional theory in economics focuses on the 
structures used to govern economic transactions (Williamson, 1991). Secondly, 
neo-institutional theory in political science assumes that individuals act 
autonomously as individuals, based on ¶socio-psychological· characteristics or 
rational calculation of their personal utility (Peters, 2005). Thirdly, neo-
institutional theory in sociology is concerned with the institutions that shape 
organisational structures and systems (Scott, 2008). This section will closely 
focus on these three main approaches of new institutionalism starting by neo-
institutional theory in economics. 
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3.4.1 Neo-institutional Theory in Economics (NIE) 
 
There is a range of theories, such as transaction cost theory, agency theory, 
property rights theory, and game theory that contribute to NIE. An interesting 
theory particularly relevant to this research study is transaction cost theory 
because it concerns governance systems. Therefore, this sub-section will focus 
primarily on this theory as a main basis for NIE. 
 
&RQWHPSRUDU\VWXGLHVDUHEXLOWRQ&RDVH·VH[SODQDWLRQLQWKDWWKHUHDUH
costs behind using the price mechanisms, in which there are costs for 
negotiation and creating separate contract for each transaction. In other 
ZRUGV´LWLVEHFDXVHRIWKHVHWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWVWKDWILUPVDULVHµ6FRWW
28). Transaction cost economics (TCE)2 concerns the rules, regulations, and 
governance systems that involve in guiding and managing economic 
exchanges. These governance systems can be found in different levels, from 
macro-regimes to micro-exchanges (Scott, 2008). Under a governance 
structure, some economic exchanges, that involve rules and hierarchical 
mechanisms, are conducted within firms, rather than directly considering the 
price mechanism in markets (Scott, 2008). TCE was elaborated considerably 
by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991) who mainly brought TCE into the realm of 
NIE. Williamson (1985) argued that transaction costs increase when individual 
rationality faces uncertainty or complexity, and when opportunism is 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKRWKHUFKRLFHVRIH[FKDQJHSDUWQHUV:LOOLDPVRQ·V 
PDLQ IRFXV LQ 1,( LV RQ ´the comparative efficacy with which alternative 
generic forms of governance³markets, hybrids, and hierarchies³economize 
on transacWLRQV FRVWVµ. A broader focus to NIE was developed by North 
                                                 
2
 Please refer back to Chapter 2, Section 2.5, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
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(1989, 1990) who examined the effect of cultural, political, and legal 
frameworks on economic processes. He treated these institutional frameworks 
as dependent variables to describe the different choices of actors of 
governance mechanisms (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1996). 
 
NIE uses transaction cost economics to explain why transactions are 
organised in particular ways and why corporations have hierarchical structures. 
It is helpful to understand these influences, but the economic factors are only 
tiny elements of a larger picture. Therefore, a broader approach beyond 
economics, such as NIS, is needed in order to offer better understandings of 
these influences (Scapens, 2006). 
 
3.4.2 Neo-institutional Theory in Political Science  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, early institutional theory dominated 
political science during the second half of the 19th century and the first two 
decades of the 20th century (Scott, 2008). March and Olsen (1984) made a 
major contribution to new institutionalism by adding a political perspective. 
They argue that new institutionalism is characterised by: contextualism, 
reductionism, utilitarianism, functionalism, and instrumentalism (Peters, 2012). 
Contextualism views that contemporary political science tends to subordinate 
political phenomena to contextual phenomena such as socioeconomic 
cleavages, economic growth, and class structure. Reductionism tends to reduce 
collective behaviour to individual behaviour. Utilitarianism tends to evaluate 
decisions for what they make for an individual, rather than as expressing the 
value of their own. Functionalism is concerned with history, as an effective 
process moving towards some form of equilibrium. Instrumentalism is 
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concerned with the domination of outcomes over process, identity, and some 
other socio-political values. These are the characteristics of new 
institutionalism from a political science perspective.  
 
Peters (2012) argues that there are a number of institutionalisms that serve as 
the foundation of institutional theory in political science. The first approach is 
the normative institutionalism which has deep roots in the sociological study 
of organisations and institutions (Selznick, 1984). Normative institutionalists 
assume that the behaviour of institutions and individuals is shaped by the 
¶ORJLFRIDSSURSULDWHQHVV·WKDWLQFOXGHVV\PEROVURXWLQHVYDOXHVDQGPHWKRGV
that individuals learn as long as they are members at the institution (Peters, 
2010). The second approach is rational choice institutionalism which assumes 
that individuals act within institutions in order to serve their own interests 
(Weingast, 1996; Peters, 2012). Hall and Taylor (1996) outline four features of 
rational choice institutionalism: (1) it offers a distinctive image of politics; (2) it 
takes into account the role of strategic interaction on the determination of 
political outcomes; (3) it provides a superior technique to problems associated 
with describing how institutions originate; (4) actors have a fixed set of 
preferences, behave instrumentally, and do so in a strategic manner that 
presumes extensive calculation. The third approach is historical 
institutionalism, which assumes that once policies are adopted and 
organisations are established; those structures will persist until a major event 
occurs (Peters, 2012). Hall and Taylor (1996) outline four features of historical 
institutionalism: (1) it tends to conceptualise the relationship between 
individual behaviour and institutions in broad terms; (2) it takes into account 
the role of power associated with the development of institutions; (3) it 
emphasises path dependence and unintended consequences; (4) it engages 
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institutional analysis with other aspects, such as ideas, that can contribute to 
political outcomes. These are the most important approaches of institutional 
theory from the perspective of political science. The next sub-section will 
describe and discuss Neo-institutional Theory in Sociology (NIS). 
 
3.4.3 Neo-institutional Theory in Sociology (NIS) 
 
Scott (2008) argues that neo-institutional approaches to organisational 
sociology were drawn on developments from two theoretical roots: cognitive 
theory and culture theory. With regards to cognitive theory, pioneers in 
sociology focused on the effects of contextual factors, looking at individuals as 
passive, and convergence towards serving self-demands within their society 
(Simon, 1945/1997; Lewin, 1951). As a result, structuration theory and identity 
theory emerged in response to that and correct this over-socialised view of 
individuals through offering active and reflexive identity that maintains and 
changes social structures (Burke and Reitzes, 1981; Giddens, 1984). Culture 
theory was developed by Boas (1974) who posited that human nature 
encompasses infinity of possibilities, rather than a prison of constraints. 
Culture theorists highlight the importance of symbolic systems in social life 
arrangements; not only do they embody content, but also affect (Scott, 2008). 
Symbolic systems are identified as emotional and substantive in which ideas, 
IHHOLQJV DQG LQWHQWLRQV DUH SDUWV RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI V\PEROV '·$QGUDGH
1984). 
 
NIS helps to explain why organisations tend to be similar (Scapens, 2006). It 
explores the effect of political, social, and economic pressures on 
organisations. Within this approach, organisations tend to seek legitimacy 
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through complying with rules and norms that are established by societies and 
the institutions within them. Institutional isomorphism is the principal 
mechanism in NIS in which organisations adopt similar procedures through: 
coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphisms as described earlier in this 
chapter (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Not only do organisations compete for 
resources, but they also seek legitimacy and political stability. It can be argued 
that the NIS approach explains similarities and change in organisational 
structures, rather than exploring differences (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
 
3.5 Summary of the Historical Development of Institutionalism 
and New Institutionalism  
 
The historical development of institutionalism through its seminal works over 
time is summarised in Table 3.3 below. The summary takes into account the 
historical development of the standpoint, as discussed in earlier sections. It 
accounts for pioneer scholars only in the field of institutionalism. It illustrates 
the focus, position, and viewpoint of each scholar or each group of scholars in 
the same field.  
 
Table 3.3: Summary of Institutional Theory Development 
Field Pioneer 
Scholars 
Date Focus / Position / View 
Early 
institutional 
theory in 
economics 
Kant and 
Hegel 
Late 19th 
century 
The earliest institutional arguments 
Schmoller 1900-1904 Economic processes operate within a 
social context and shaped by cultural 
and historical forces. 
Menger 1883/1981 Institutions are social phenomena that 
need theoretical explanation 
Veblen 1898, 1919 Individual behaviour is governed by 
convention and habit 
Commons 1924 Transaction is a more appropriate unit 
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of economic analysis 
Mitchell 1934 The concepts of economy should be 
established on facts as opposed to 
deductive theories 
Early 
institutional 
theory in 
political 
science 
Wilson, 
Willoughby, 
Burgess 
1889, 1896, 
1902 
respectively 
The administrative arrangements and 
legal frameworks that shape governance 
structures 
Early 
institutional 
theory in 
Sociology 
Spencer 1876, 1896, 
1910 
Comparing and contrasting the 
operation of institutions in different 
societies 
Sumner 1906 The origin and change of folkways 
Marx 1844/1972 The materialist world is the true one 
Durkheim 1893/1949 Symbolic systems (belief, knowledge, 
moral authority) are social institutions 
Weber 1924/1968 Cultural rules define social structures 
and govern social behaviour 
Parsons 1934, 1937 Normative frameworks emerged 
separately from social actors 
Old 
institutionalism 
Selznick 1948, 1949, 
1957 
An organisation is an expression of a 
social structure designated by logical 
actions for a specific goal  
Parsons 1956 Integrated organisations with other 
organisations in society through rules, 
contracts, and authority 
New 
institutionalism 
Meyer and 
Rowan 
1977 The role of culture and cognition in 
institutional analysis from a macro 
perspective  
Zucker 1977 The taken-for-granted rules and the role 
of cultural persistence in institutional 
analysis from micro perspective 
DiMaggio 
and Powell 
1983 Isomorphisms: coercive, mimetic, and 
normative 
Scott 1987 Pillars: regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive 
Neo-
institutional 
theory in 
economics 
(NIE) 
Williamson 1975, 1985, 
1991 
Brought TCE into the debate of NIE 
North 1989, 1990 The effect of institutional frameworks 
(cultural, political, and legal) on 
economic processes 
Neo-
institutional 
theory in 
political 
science 
March and 
Olsen 
1984 New institutionalism from political 
perspective is characterised by: 
Contextualism, Reductionism, 
Utilitarianism, Functionalism, and 
Instrumentalism 
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Peters 1999 Three institutionalisms (normative, 
rational choice, and historical) are the 
foundation of institutional theory in 
political science 
Neo-
institutional 
theory in 
sociology (NIS) 
Simon, 
Lewin 
1945/1997, 
1951 
respectively 
Cognitive theory: the effect of 
contextual factors within a society 
Boas 1974 Culture theory: the importance of 
symbolic systems in social life 
arrangements 
 
 
3.6 Institutions 
 
3.6.1 Defining Institutions 
 
Having presented the historical development of institutional theory, it is 
QHFHVVDU\DWWKLVSRLQWWRGHILQH¶LQVWLWXWLRQ·6HPLQDOVWXGLHVZLOOEHXVHGWRGR
this. There is a variety of definitions of institution anchored in different roots 
and disciplines starting from early to new institutionalism. Launching a 
research study based on a particular group of definitions of institution is 
essential to build the linkages between the activities of key actors and 
institutions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). In addition, it is very important to 
FRQFHSWXDOLVH LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGFRQVLGHUWKHPDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQWEHFDXVH´the 
PDOOHDELOLW\RIDQLQVWLWXWLRQFDQYDU\ZLWKWKHJUDLQRIDQDO\VLVµ (Dillard et al., 
2004: 512). A number of definitions described by different scholars are 
highlighted in this section in order to offer a broader view of institutions 
before approaching to the main point of this research study. An early 
definition of institutions is introduced by Hamilton (1932: 84): 
 
Institution is a verbal symbol which for want of a better describes a 
cluster of social usages. It connotes a way of thought or action of some 
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prevalence and permanence which is embedded in the habits of a group 
or the customs of a people. In ordinary speech it is another word for 
procedure, convention, or arrangement; in the language of books it is the 
singular of which the mores or the folkways are the plural. Institutions fix 
the confines of and impose form upon the activities of human beings. 
The world of use and wont, to which imperfectly we accommodate our 
lives, is a tangled unbroken web of institutions. 
 
7KLVGHILQLWLRQZDVWKHFHQWUHRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW·VDWWHQWLRQEHFDXVHWKH\XVHG
to refer to it as the basis for their analysis, description, examination, and other 
theoretical evaluations. In particular, the definition was central to social 
science studies that refer to the socially conditioned behaviour of a rather 
UHSHWLWLYHQDWXUH+DPLOWRQ%DVHGRQ+DPLOWRQ·VGHILQLWLRQDQXmber 
of further definitions emerged in order to define other parts of this holistic 
meta-view of institutions. An interesting one that focuses on the role of power 
LV LQWURGXFHG E\ 6WLQFKFRPEH   ZKR GHILQHV DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ DV ´a 
structure in which SRZHUIXOSHRSOHDUHFRPPLWWHGWRVRPHYDOXHRULQWHUHVWµ. 
This definition emphasises on the role of power and agency, in which values 
and interests are protected by people who only possess power. Another 
definition that concerns the role of power is given by Jepperson (1991: 145) 
ZKRDUJXHVWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHSDWWHUQVRIVRFLDOSUDFWLFHLQWKDW´depart[ing] 
from the pattern are counteracted in a regulated fashion, by repetitively 
activated, socially constructed, controls³that is by some set of rewards and 
VDQFWLRQVµ. This definition takes into account the role of power in the form of 
repetitively activated control, which differentiates institutions from other social 
constructions (Phillips et al., 2004). This relationship between institutions and 
power is also bi-directional in that, institutions exist as long as they are 
powerful and affect the behaviour of actors, individuals, organisations, and 
societies (Lawrence, 2008). The above two definitions have a bearing in the 
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corporate governance debate because they take into account the role of power 
which is a central aspect of CG and thus of this research study.  
 
Other definitions of institutions have focused on what influences human 
behaviour and human relationships. For example, Barley and Tolbert (1997: 
GHILQHLQVWLWXWLRQVDV´shared rules and typifications that identify categories 
RI VRFLDO DFWRUV DQG WKHLU DSSURSULDWH DFWLYLWLHV RU UHODWLRQVKLSVµ. Burns and 
6FDSHQV   H[SDQGHG WKLV GHILQLWLRQ DQG GHILQHG LQVWLWXWLRQV DV ´the 
shared taken-for-granted assumptions which identify categories of human 
DFWRUVDQGWKHLUDSSURSULDWHDFWLYLWLHVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSVµ. Both definitions refer 
to how actors· activities and relationships are identified and influenced by 
social structures. They explain the influence of social structures on individuals 
DFWLRQV ZLWKLQ RUJDQLVDWLRQV VXFK DV ¶YHUEDO V\PEROV· ¶VWUXFWXUHV· ¶VKDUHG
UXOHV· DQG ¶VKDUHG WDNHQ-for-JUDQWHG· 7KXV ERWK GHILQLWLRQV DOVR KDYH D
bearing in the corporate governance debate because human behaviour and 
relationships that are influenced by social structures are central to the 
emergence and formation of corporate governance systems from an 
institutional perspective.  
 
This research is investigating the influence of institutions on the emergence of 
corporate governance in an institutional context. As such, the role of power 
and human behaviour influenced by social structures is central to this research 
study. All the above definitions focus on these aspects of institutions and 
together they collectively form a meta paradigm that explains the meaning of 
institutions that, in turn, adequately establish the foundation and cornerstones 
of this research study.  
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For a comprehensive understanding of institutions, Scott (2001: 48) outlines a 
dense conception of the institutions that offers a broader view of institutions, 
in that: 
 
x Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience. 
x Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative elements that, together with associated activities and 
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. 
x Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including 
symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts. 
x Institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world 
system to localised interpersonal relationships.  
x Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change 
processes, both incremental and discontinuous.  
 
This conception contains a number of expressions, in which institutions are 
social structures, enduring patterns, stable but vulnerable to change, and 
operational on a macro to micro level. These are what distinguish institutions 
IURP RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZKHUHDV DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ LV ´a consciously coordinated 
social unit, composed of two or more people, which functions on a relatively 
continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goalsµ 5REELQV DQG
-XGJHV,WLVDOVRDERXW´the theory of formal organizations, systems 
of coordinated action among individuals and groups whose preferences, 
LQIRUPDWLRQ LQWHUHVWV RU NQRZOHGJH GLIIHUµ (March and Simon, 1993: 300). 
7KXV ¶LQVWLWXWLRQ· LV QRW D V\QRQ\P RI DQG QRW LQWHUFKDQJHDEOH ZLWK
¶RUJDQLVDWLRQ· 6FRWW5DWKHU WKHQRWLRQ LVDERXWKRZVocial structures 
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influence human behaviour and action within an organisation (Scott, 2001). 
Based on the literature review, it appears that there is particular focus on 
studying family, kinship, bureaucratic state, religion, market, legal, and political 
institutions. As such, this research will primarily focus on these institutions.   
 
3.6.2 Family Institution  
 
Family institution has long been discussed among scholars in social sciences 
due to its central role in different fields. Family institution exists in every 
human society. However, its impact varies among societies due to its distinct 
nature in each context. In the early sociological literature, Laslett (1973) 
indicated that there are three main streams of discussions of family institution: 
(1) the development of nuclear family at the expense of extended family 
structures, (2) the progress of companionship compared to the classical or 
traditional family, and (3) the lack of functionality of the family in this era in 
comparison to the past. Each group attributes the change in the family to the 
development of its urban and industrial society that is concerned about the 
spirit of enterprise, responsibility, and solidarity (Belardinelli, 2002). 
 
$FFRUGLQJWR/HDSWURWWWKHIDPLO\LV´an organization that has an 
LGHQWLILDEOH VWUXFWXUHµ. This structure varies contextually. One set of 
descriptions of the family structure is illustrated by Kertzer (1991). He 
SURSRVHV WKDW ¶QXFOHDU IDPLO\· UHIHUV WR D PDUULHG FRXSOH DQG WKHLU FKLOGUHQ
¶FRPSOH[IDPLO\·UHIHUVWRNLQVKLSEH\RQGWKHQXFOHDUIDPLO\¶H[WHQGHGIDPLO\·
UHIHUVWRDKRXVHKROGZKHUHNLQEH\RQGWKHQXFOHDUIDPLO\LVSUHVHQW¶PXOWLSOH
IDPLO\· UHIHUV WR D KRXVHKROG ZKHUH WZR RU PRUH QXFOHDU IDPLOLHV UHVLGH
together.  
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As old institutionalism deals with structural change resulting from 
environmental pressures and new institutionalism deals with the symbolic 
nature of organisations, institutional theory offers great insights in terms of 
understanding phenomena in family institutions. For example, institutional 
theory helps to determine the heterogeneity in family businesses resulting from 
differences in their structure and symbolic nature (Leaptrott, 2005). In 
organisational studies, Fang et al. (2012) argue that institutional theory 
contributed considerably to the discussions that focus on the prevalence of 
family versus non-family firms, and organisational behaviour in an institutional 
context, such as the adoption of family norms, which tends to become 
isomorphic over time.    
 
3.6.3 Kinship Institution  
 
The subject of kinship has been greatly discussed in social anthropological 
literature. Studies in such literature tend to explore the basic principles that 
describe kinship systems (e.g. Radcliffe-Brown, 1941, 1950, 1952; Parsons, 
1943). Radcliffe-Brown built a kinship structure based on an elementary family 
that consists of a husband and wife, and their children. The existence of the 
elementary family creates three orders of relationships as outlined by Radcliffe-
Brown: the first order which is the relationship between parent and child, 
between children from the same parents (siblings), and between husband and 
wife as parents of the same children; the second order is the relationship 
between two elementary families through common members, and is such as 
ZLIH·V VLVWHU IDWKHU·V IDWKHU PRWKHU·V EURWKHU DQG VR RQ WKH WKLUG RUGHU LV
UHODWLRQVKLSVVXFKDVPRWKHU·VEURWKHU·VZLIHDQGIDWKHU·VEURWKHU·VVRQ%DVHG
on this structure of kinship, Radcliffe-Brown (1941: 2) defined the kinship 
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system DV ´a system of dyadic relations between person and person in a 
community, the behaviour of any two persons in any of these relations being 
UHJXODWHGLQVRPHZD\DQGWRDJUHDWHURUOHVVH[WHQWE\VRFLDOXVDJHµ. Social 
purposes, such as certain duties and rights, or certain modes of behaviour, can 
also create these relationships in any society (Radcliffe-Brown, 1941).  
 
Parsons (1943) was the first to intertwine social anthropological literature with 
sociology in terms of describing and analysing kinship systems. He attempted 
to bring the sociological debate (that focuses on individuals) into the 
anthropological literature that focuses on major structural aspects of a large-
scale society. As a result, the kinship discussion has begun to emerge from a 
sociological perspective. From a sociological standpoint, Young and Willmott 
highlight the importance of kinship in a series of works (1957, 1986, 2012, 
 DQG VWDWH WKDW ´NLQVKLS UHPDLQV DQ LPSRUWDQW IRUFH LQ PRVW SHRSOH·V
lives, and is in particular still overwhelmingly the main source of informal care 
DQGVXSSRUWµ (2013: xxiii). It can be argued then, that they treat kinship as a 
distinct and separate institution from the family institution due to its high 
importance and influence in society.  
 
A seminal series of works by Zucker, starting with a 1983 paper entitled 
¶2UJDQL]DWLRQVDV,QVWLWXWLRQV·KDVRIIHUHGDGHWDLOHGKLVWRULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH
institutionalisation of the organisational form in social science. One interesting 
analysis in this series of works focused on the articulation of work systems 
ZLWK NLQVKLS V\VWHPV =XFNHU·V DQDO\VLV HQFRPSDVVHV WKUHH SULQFLSOHV WKDW
ultimately define three types of kinship systems: (1) the level or the degree that 
classifies or differentiates kin type such as the son of brother versus son of 
sister; (2) the length of the term; and (3) whether the term is compound, 
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specifically, comprises another kin term such as sister-in-law. These 
determinants reflect and perhaps affect the cultural centrality of the classifying 
systems (Zucker, 1983). 
 
3.6.4 Bureaucratic State 
 
Watson (2007) has asserted that organisations are authoritatively co-ordinated, 
human enterprises, businesses, corporations, and other public administrations 
that are all bureaucratically co-ordinated. This micro-level view of bureaucracy 
was conceptualised by Weber (1978) and placed authority, in the form of 
legitimised power, at the centre of organisational processes. However, Watson 
(2012) argues that this bureaucratisation view of work should be regarded 
through a wider set of historical processes that take into account further 
aspects of life that are influenced by instrumental styles of thinking. Based on 
this view, bureaucratisation as a general societal and historical process can vary 
considerably among societies. Moreover, its key principles can be clearly seen 
ZKHQ RUJDQLVDWLRQV DUH ¶UDWLRQDOLVHG· RU ¶PRGHUQLVHG· (Watson, 2012). Thus, 
their influence can vary from supporting to problematic to a noticeable extent.  
 
Indeed, the bureaucratic state is not always a constructive factor or supportive 
SDUWRI WKH VRFLHW\%RXUGLHX  DUJXHV WKDW´[s]tate bureaucracies and 
WKHLU UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV DUH JUHDW SURGXFHUV RI ¶VRFLDO SUREOHPV· >DQG@ VRFLDO
science does little more than ratify whenever it takes them over as 
¶VRFLRORJLFDO· SUREOHPVµ %RXUGLHX  LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKH VWDWH DFURVV
societies and periods is often associated with specific problems, such as 
educational failure, poverty, and immigration. He also suggests that two 
important factors should be considered when explaining the historical and 
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cross-national variations, in that: (1) the underlying assumptions of the social 
world emphasised by the social demand for knowledge, which rely on the 
philosophy prevailing within state bureaucracies. Thus, an influential state may 
offer conditions favourable to the development of studies in social science that 
are independent from economic pressures but dependent on the state; (2) the 
degree of independence of the academic system and the scientific field (as 
constructive parts of the state) from economic and political pressures.  
 
3.6.5 Religion Institution  
 
Any attempt to speak without speaking any particular language is not 
more hopeless than the attempt to have a religion that shall be no 
religion in particular . . . Thus every living and healthy religion has a 
marked idiosyncrasy (Santayana, 1905/1982: 5-6). 
 
Early scholars adopted different views of religion. Marx (1818/1883) viewed 
religion as a variable structure that depends on economics (Davie, 2006). 
:HEHU·V  IRFXV RQ PHDQLQJ YLHZHG UHOLJLRQ DV D V\VWHP IRU
RUGHULQJ WKH ZRUOG %RZLH  'XUNKHLP·V  V\PEROLF
functionalism viewed religion as a collective social act (Bowie, 2006). 
However, all of these scholars agreed on a central feature of religion in that 
religion explains what was happening, why it was happening, and what the 
FRQVHTXHQFHVZHUH 'DYLH$VDG  DUJXHV WKDW´there cannot 
be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements 
and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself 
WKHKLVWRULFDOSURGXFWRIGLVFXUVLYHSURFHVVHVµ. It can also be attributed to the 
very different characteristics of different types of religion, such as Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism.   
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Sociologists conceive that there is a system of values or a common moral 
order that binds people together into a society or community that describes 
the phenomenon of social integration (Turner, 1991). These communal 
practices are regarded as a fundamental framework of social relations and thus 
they are vital in any communal activity. Within the realm of sociology, religion 
is often treated as a principal element of an integrative value system (Parsons, 
1991). However, Beckford (2003) argues that this centrality of religion tends to 
be marginal in sociological perspectives over the 20th century for two reasons: 
(1) the ways that religion has been conceptualised as an object of study and (2) 
the changes that occurred in what regarded as a religion.  
 
3.6.6 Market Institution  
 
A range of theoretical schools have discussed diverse aspects of the market 
institution in different fields and contexts in order to better understand how it 
operates. Neo-classical economics views the market as a central category of 
economics (Chang, 2001). According to Lie (1997), this approach is led by 
Becker who asserted that the economic approach is applicable to all human 
behaviour and thus, all human behaviour can be YLHZHG DV ´involving 
participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and 
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of 
PDUNHWVµ (Becker, 1976: 8). Moreover, neo-classical economics views non-
market institutions, such as the state, as substitutes for markets (Aoki, 1996). 
In contrast, New Institutional Economics (NIE) views that the state plays a 
complementary role in advancing market institution when the latter is 
incomplete (Aoki, 1996: 18); one important insight is as follows:  
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the relationship between markets and other institutions, including legal 
rulings, contracts and organizations, cultural beliefs and norms, is not 
necessarily that of simple substitute, but may be understood as reflecting 
equilibrium strategies in underlying economic games. 
 
The emergence of non-market institutions that aim to maximise efficiency is a 
result of the absence or imperfection of market institutions (Coase, 1938). In 
developed societies, market institution plays an important role in the attempt 
to create stable worlds and find social solutions to competition (Fligstein, 
1996; Fligstein and Mara-Drita, 1996). La Porta et al. (2000) classify a number 
of developed societies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as 
market-centred systems due to the efficient and prevailing role of the market 
in these contexts. However, they argue that the laws were not addressed in 
response to market pressures because legal families originated before the 
presence of financial markets. Rather, it appears that legal families shape legal 
rules and this in turn influences financial markets (La Porta et al., 2000). 
 
3.6.7 Political Institution 
 
A body of work in the literature of political science has discussed the political 
institution and the characteristics it displays, such as its durability, its capacity 
WR LQIOXHQFH LQGLYLGXDOV·EHKDYLRXUDQG WKH OHJLWLPDF\ WKDW LQKHULWHG LQ WKHVH
institutions (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1996; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 
2001, 2005, 2010). In principle, the fundamental assumptions of this 
institution were underpinned in old institutionalism and greatly advanced in 
new institutionalism in order to understand better political institution (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). This new approach has deepened discussions about this 
institution with particular attention on the theory that informs behaviourism 
and rational choice analysis (Peters, 2005). March and Olsen (1989: 21), 
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SLRQHHU VFKRODUV LQ WKH ILHOG GHILQH SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DV ´collections of 
interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of 
relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining what 
the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligation of that role 
in that situation isµ 6XFK SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV FDQ EH LGHQWLILHG DV OHJDO
systems, legislatures, political parties, bureaucracies, and mass media (March 
and Olsen, 1996). These political institutions generate the rules that regulate 
the possession and use of political rights and resources (March and Olsen, 
1996). An interesting feature in the above conceptualisation is the 
appropriateness aspect of institutions that influences behaviour and perhaps 
VKDSHV LQGLYLGXDOV· DFWLRQV$QRWKHU IHDWXUH LV WKH UROH WKHRU\ DQ HOHPHQW LQ
political institutions described by Peters (2005) as a set of behavioural 
expectations for individuals in positions within the institution. In his research, 
Peters (2005) adopted two input measures for identifying the influence of the 
political institution, namely, voting for parties and measures of openness. 
Voting for parties refers to the electoral system that sets out the rules on how 
parties are elected to represent the parliament which, therefore, can form the 
government (Dow and Endersby, 2004). A basic measure of openness is 
defined by Leamer (1988), who points out that it is the trade intensity ratio: 
exports plus imports divided by Gross National Product (GNP). These two 
input measures are often used to explore the influence of political institutions 
(Peters, 2005). 
 
3.6.8 Legal Institution 
 
A body of work in the literature has discussed legal institution from different 
perspectives in terms of the legal behaviour and social norms that this 
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LQVWLWXWLRQ HPERGLHV LQIOXHQFHV LQGLYLGXDOV· EHKDYLRXU DQG OHJLWLPLVHV DV
inherent characteristics in these institutions (MacCormick, 1981; Weinberger, 
1986, 1991; La Torre, 2010). For Weinberger (1986), action represents 
behaviour guided by thinking, while thinking itself is the processing of 
information. Based on this view, Weinberger built his work on the institutional 
WKHRU\RIODZDQGREVHUYHGWKDWQRUPVH[LVWDV¶WKRXJKWREMHFWV·DQGEHORQJWR
WKH¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOIDFWV·RIRXUVRFLDOH[LVWHQFH)RU0DF&RUPLFNODZLV
on the one hand, a social reality, on the other hand, a system of norms. This 
KDV UHVXOWHG LQ WKH HPHUJHQFH RI ¶QRUPDWLYH UHJXODWLYHV· DV LQWHJUDO SDUWV RI
social reality (Weinberger, 1991).  
 
Two conceptions are well recognised by scholars and writers in the area of 
legal and political theory. According to La Torre (2010), the first and more 
widespread is that law is an expression of power, and the second and less 
widespread is that law is the source of, or prerequisite for, or limit on power. 
These opposing viewpoints can be referred back to the structure of legal 
argumentation, and in particular, to what can be considered as a legally valid 
argument (La Torre, 2010). The next section will highlight the relationship 
between institutions and power.  
 
3.7 Institutions and Power 
 
It has been indicated earlier in this chapter that there is a close relationship 
between power and institutions, since institutions exist as long as they are 
powerful. This relationship was ignored in early new institutionalism but 
addressed, to some degree, in more recent works. These recent works point to 
the importance of incorporating power in organisational and institutional 
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studies as it is essential to understand the relationship between institutions and 
organisations and how institutions operate in a society (see Lounsbury, 2001; 
Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch, 2003; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). However, the importance of power and its 
association with institutions is not addressed in this recent stream of research. 
As a result, a systematic and theoretical consideration of power relationships is 
highlighted and addressed in a number of contemporary studies (e.g. Clegg, 
/DZUHQFH&OHJJSRLQWVRXWWKDW´the concept of 
power is absolutHO\FHQWUDOWRDQ\XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVRFLHW\µ and he attributes 
this lack of discussion of power to the absence of the state. Lawrence (2008) 
argues that there are three dimensions in the relationship between power and 
institutions³institutional control, institutional agency, and institutional 
resistance. Each element describes how actors relate to institutions within 
power relations. Institutional control describes the potential impacts of 
institutions on the beliefs and behaviours of individual and actors. Institutional 
agency represents actors influence and work to create and transform 
institutions. Institutional resistance involves the attempts of actors to impose 
limits on both institutional control and institutional agency (Lawrence, 2008). 
It can be understood from the above relationships between power and 
institutions that the emphasis here on power as an effect of social relations, 
rather than a capacity for effect or something an actor can have, hold, or keep. 
The interaction of these relationships establishes the evolution of institutions, 
networks, and positions that shape the experiences and opportunities of actors 
(Lawrence, 2008). The next section will highlight the relationship between 
institutions and legitimacy.  
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3.8 Institutions and Legitimacy  
 
Theorists adopted the concept of legitimacy in early sociological studies 
(Parsons, 1956, 1960; Weber, 1978). Drawing from their work, scholars in the 
field tend to work under two distinct streams of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
They are strategic approach (e.g. Pfeffer, 1981; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) and 
institutional approach (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991). The strategic approach proposes that organisations 
instrumentally arrange and operate evocative symbols to obtain support from 
society. On the other hand, the institutional approach emphasises that 
structuration dynamics produce cultural forces that go beyond any 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO FRQWURO 6FRWW   DUJXHV WKDW ´legitimacy is not a 
commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural 
DOLJQPHQWQRUPDWLYHVXSSRUWRUFRQVRQDQFHZLWKUHOHYDQWUXOHVRU ODZVµ. A 
broad-based and inclusive definition of legitimacy that incorporates divergent 
theoretical orientations has been suggested by Suchman (1995: 574): 
 
a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. 
 
This definition takes into account three types of legitimacy which have been 
further explained by Deephouse and Suchman (2008). These different types of 
OHJLWLPDF\ DUH  SUDJPDWLF ZKLFK LV EDVHG RQ DFWRU·V VHOI-interest and 
comprises of interest, influence, exchange, and character, (2) moral, which is 
based on normative approval and includes procedures, structures, 
consequences, and persons, and (3) cognitive, which is based on 
comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness and comprises of plausibility, 
permanence, predictability, and inevitability. According to Deephouse and 
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Suchman (2008), other theorists have identified more dimensions of 
legitimacy, such as cultural legitimacy (Archibald, 2004), and corporate 
environmental legitimacy (Bansal and Clelland, 2004). There are many reasons 
for seeking legitimacy. The two most important are: (a) pursuing credibility 
and continuity and (b) seeking support (Suchman, 1995). The next section will 
discuss the limitations of institutional theory.  
 
3.9 Limitations of Institutional Theory 
 
It has already been indicated that institutional theory is continually being 
developed via systematic critiques and revisions. As a result, new 
institutionalism has been derived primarily from old institutionalism (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). Institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) and 
institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) are the outcomes of this 
continuous development. This indicates that there is, to an extent, a limitation 
of institutional theory. Phillips et al. (2004) highlight its limited analysis of 
processes of institutionalisation (e.g. DiMaggio, 1988; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996; Sherer and Lee, 2002). More precisely, Phillips et al. (2004) 
claim that institutional theory needs to re-focus on power and politics. They 
attempted to complement institutional theory with insights drawn from 
discourse analysis. However, Phillips et al. (2004) focused on actors who enjoy 
discursive legitimacy, rather than on the operation of power and politics in the 
production, reproduction, or discrediting of the discursive institutional 
SURFHVVHV WKDW´IRVWHUEHVWRZVXVWDLQRUVXEYHUWµVXFK OHJLWLPDF\ /RNDQG
Willmott, 2006: 478). 
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A number of theorists point out that institutional theory does not fully explain 
the broader view of the micro-processes inside organisations or why 
organisations influence and react to their environments (e.g. Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991; Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997). In response to this, Powell 
(1991) highlighted three areas of institutional theory that can be improved: (1) 
existing work under the framework of institutional theory highlights large 
differences between market sectors and institutionalised sectors, whereas they 
are not necessarily oppositional; (2) the understanding that organisational 
structures and practices are loosely coupled is a great insight to the field, but 
this has led to divergent lines of thoughts in that institutionalised organisations 
are passive, rather than substance; (3) further enhancement is needed in both 
the source of heterogeneity in institutional environments and the processes 
that produce institutional change. These three areas represent additional 
evidence in terms of the limitations of institutional theory. The next section 
will summarise this chapter.  
 
3.10 Summary  
 
This chapter has presented diverse viewpoints and dimensions of institutional 
theory based on existing literature. Scholars in this field employ old and new 
institutionalism in different disciplines, such as economics, political science, 
and sociology in order to understand how organisations become 
institutionalised. The historical background of institutional theory has been 
introduced to create a solid foundation for this research and offer a better 
understanding of the research topic. This historical background section has 
shown how neo-institutionalism emerged primarily from early institutionalism. 
Having presented the diverse viewpoints of old and new institutionalism, this 
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research study adopts the perspective of neo-institutionalism in order to 
explain and understand issues in corporate governance.  
 
A number of definitions of institutions are offered. One of these definitions in 
particular focuses closely on a subject of interest. This research study has 
adopted a number of definitions that focus on the relationship between 
institutions, power and legitimacy as the power of rules and authorities are 
inherent in studies of CG. Institutional theory fails to fully account for power 
and politics. Since power relationships of rules and regulations are central 
characteristics of CG, the relationship between institutions, power and 
legitimacy has been discussed to show how institutions operate in a society 
(Lounsbury, 2001). In addition, the limitations of institutional theory have 
been discussed in that neo-institutionalism primarily departed from early 
institutionalism due to continuous critiques and revisions (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). The discussion will move ahead to show the bearing of institutional 
theory in the CG debate and the potential influence of institutions on the 
emergence of a CG regime in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Corporate Governance and Institutional Theory 
78 
 
Chapter 4: 
Corporate Governance and Institutional Theory 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has described and discussed institutional theory as a 
perspective for this research study. It has presented the different views and 
dimensions of institutional theory based on existing literature in this area. This 
chapter will present corporate governance within an institutional theory 
framework. A definition of CG from an institutional theory perspective will be 
provided in order to set the context for discussion in this thesis. In order to 
investigate the influence of institutions on CG, a review of the literature on 
CG practices within institutional contexts will be presented based on the 
existing literature on this subject. This review of the literature will present the 
potential influence of institutions of family, kinship, religion, market, legal, 
politics, and bureaucratic state on the emergence of the CG regime and the 
development of CG practices. This literature review plays an important role in 
drawing a larger picture of the topic in order to understand the potential 
influence of institutions on the emergence of a CG regime in a non-Western, 
emerging society, one that is rarely addressed in literature and whose 
institutions operate differently from those in Western contexts.  
 
The problem statement is presented in this chapter to show the significance of 
this research study. This includes a presentation of the major financial crises 
that were caused by poor corporate governance systems. This is followed by 
highlighting the objectives of this research study and the choice of the research 
context, Saudi Arabia. This leads to two research questions which will be 
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addressed in order to offer new insights that add to existing knowledge in this 
area.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 will describe CG from an 
institutional theory perspective. Section 4.3 will present a review of the 
literature on CG practices within institutions. Section 4.4 will highlight the 
research problem along with the research setting and research questions. 
Section 4.5 will summarise what is learnt from this chapter. 
 
4.2 Corporate Governance from an Institutional Theory 
Perspective 
 
The theoretical logic of corporate governance from an agency theory 
perspective was presented in Chapter 2. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) have 
posited that corporate governance is: 
 
[the process that] deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. 
 
This definition is grounded largely in the agency problem. However, Bradley et 
al. (1999: 11) argue that corporate governance is more than the simple 
relationship between the firm and its capital providers. They point out that:  
 
corporate governance also implicates how the various constituencies that 
define the business enterprise serve, and are served by, the corporation. 
Implicit and explicit relationships between the corporation and its 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, host communities³and 
relationships among these constituencies themselves³fall within the 
ambit of a relevant definition of corporate governance.  
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Some users of institutional theory address authority and control structures. As 
such, it can provide significant contributions to the existing literature on 
corporate governance. As noted before, the contractarian view (i.e. the 
contract between the principal and the agent) of corporate governance has 
been the dominant paradigm in the literature since the 1980s (see for example 
Coffee, 1984; Brudney, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). However, a number of recent 
studies on corporate governance have started to move away from this view 
towards a more holistic view that accounts for a configuration of 
interdependent elements such as the relationship between stakeholders and 
corporations, and the relationship between corporations and society (Davis 
and Useem, 2002). This view also emphasises that corporate governance 
systems are embedded in larger institutional and legal frameworks (Davis and 
Useem, 2002). 
 
The institutional approach to corporate governance presumes that corporate 
governance arrangements reflect political processes (Davis and Thompson, 
1994). Governance models such as the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental 
models are comprised of implicit and explicit normative theories about power 
distribution and the priority or order of interests in the corporation. This 
means that governance models are coherent systems of meaning that represent 
the moral order as they rationalise the appropriate distribution of power and 
resources (Fiss, 2008). These governance models are equivalent to the concept 
of control as they reflect local orders that supply actors with cognitive frames 
in order to interpret theirs and the actions of others (Fligstein, 2001). 
 
Corporate governance models looked at from an institutional perspective, as 
presented above, should be more dynamic and culturally constructed than that 
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in agent-principal practice. Given that power relations are central to corporate 
governance, such consideration is important and has to be addressed. From an 
institutional perspective, there is an account for not only the role of power, as 
in the contractarian view, but also for both sides of the power relationship; 
obedience to power and resistance to it (Clegg, 1989). In this sense, there is an 
account for the enactment and acceptance of institutions in addition to the 
forms of resistance to institutions which can take the shape of the actual 
enactment of institutional orders in governance (Davis, 2005). Furthermore, 
governance models through an institutional point of view are symbolic orders 
that require continuous treatment (by way of human (re)enactment) to be 
maintained rather than being thought of as rigid structures as in the 
contractarian approach (Fiss, 2008). Corporate governance systems might then 
erode in time if institutional change takes place or current institutional 
activities are substituted by alternative orders. 
 
Fiss (2008) explains why CG models are more fragile and vulnerable to 
alternative theories in three points: (1) instability of CG models as the symbols 
that form them are open to different understandings that may empower 
different actors; (2) existing models should be reproduced, socialised, or 
converted with new members; and (3) CG models are vulnerable to technical 
and economic changes that lead to a divergence between actual experience and 
explanation offered by the normative narrative embodied in them (e.g. 
Goodrick et al., 1997). Another influential viewpoint regarding CG models 
and institutional theory is the relationship between taken-for-grantedness and 
purposive agency (Colyvas and Powell, 2006). This viewpoint suggests a 
continuum of CG practices from openly contested to the taken-for-granted. 
The taken-for-grantedness of CG aspects is explained by Comaroff and 
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&RPDURII   LQ ZKLFK WKH\ ´JR ZLWKRXW VD\LQJ EHFDXVH EHLQJ
D[LRPDWLF WKH\ FRPH ZLWKRXW VD\LQJµ (YHQ KLJKO\ OHJLWLPDWHG PRGHOV DUH
vulnerable to challenges, because symbolic orders are fragile in the first place 
and cannot be taken for granted (Thompson, 1990), and their maintenance is 
as problematic as its change in which the ideological work of repair and 
renovation is a non-ending project (Scott, 1985). That does not mean that CG 
regimes cannot be stable. The symbolic orders that form the building blocks 
of CG regimes can be strengthened by formal authority, such as legal or 
political authority (Fiss, 2008). But such regulations take time to have effect 
and to demonstrate stability. Therefore, what comes about eventually is 
influenced by historical and cultural narratives of power and control that 
upholds current orders or offers mechanisms for building new ones (Swidler, 
1986). 
 
These CG models are not elite systems of meaning. Rather, the action of 
institutions represented by everyday enactment and abstract meaning are 
visible in everyday experience. In order to understand how institutions 
operate, it is necessary to link them with action and daily practice (Fine and 
Sandstrom, 1993). Based on this, focusing on practices establishes a fruitful 
enquiry in corporate governance debate because the normative aspects of CG 
models are not always transformed into equivalent practices (Fiss, 2008). 
Exercising power may reflect opposition. Thus, concerned actors tend to turn 
this power into formal and structured practices. These formal and structured 
practices such as monitoring and auditing arrangements can be influenced by 
social situations (Covaleski et al., 1993). This shows the importance of 
focusing closely on CG practices. The discussion will proceed to present a 
review of the literature on CG practices within institutions. 
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4.3 Corporate Governance Practices within Institutions 
 
Institutional theory represents an interesting paradigm to apply CG practices. 
While CG practices deal with a variety of aspects such as legitimacy, power, 
and control, institutional theory addresses aspects of norms and orders within 
cognitive and social arrangements. The institutional approach to CG indicates 
that CG practices diffuse into a pre-existing moral environment or cultural 
field (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991) that offers insights into the 
institutionalisation of CG systems. A number of studies have adopted this 
approach to explain the role of institutions and their influence on the 
emergence of CG regimes and the development of CG practices in different 
institutional contexts (e.g. Becht et al., 2002; Gourevitch, 2003; North, 2005; 
Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Yeung, 2006; McMillan, 2007; Young et al., 2008; 
Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). These studies take into account a variety of institutions 
such as family, kinship, religion, market, political, legal, and bureaucratic state, 
depending on the contexts that these institutions interact in.  
 
This research focuses on developing an understanding of how key institutions 
potentially influence the emergence of a CG regime in a non-Western, 
emerging society (Saudi Arabia). More recently, an increasing number of 
studies are beginning to probe into the emerging contexts and institutions that 
differ considerably from those in developed societies. Such studies are 
beginning to appreciate the influence of formal and informal institutions (Peng 
et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008). In emerging contexts, formal institutions (for 
example legal and state) are often weak, inefficient, or absent (Peng et al., 
2008; Young et al., 2008), and do not promote ¶mutually beneficial impersonal 
exchange· between social actors (North, 1990). As a result, informal 
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institutions (for example family and kinship) tend to be more prevalent in 
these contexts, and play a greater role in forming CG (Peng and Heath, 1996; 
Yeung, 2006). However, informal institutions tend to be less transparent and, 
WKHUHIRUHDVRXUFHRI¶XQFHUWDLQW\·0H\HUDQG1JX\HQ 
 
Based on an extensive review of the literature, these formal and informal 
institutions will be discussed in the following sub-sections. The focus here will 
be on listed firms in stock exchange because compliance with the CG system 
in listed firms is mandatory and not voluntary as is the case for private or non-
listed family businesses. Thus, they are more likely to be the concerned parties 
in the CG debate. The review of the literature of CG practices will begin by 
presenting the potential influence of the family institution on these practices.  
 
4.3.1 Family Institution  
 
As indicated previously, family institution has long been discussed among 
scholars in the social sciences due to its central role in different fields. With 
regards to discussing family institution within the domain of CG, it can be said 
that agency theory is extensively employed to explain the optimal contract 
between the agent (manager) and the principal (family owners) (e.g. 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, agency theory does 
not explain the different institutional environments. As a result, family 
institution has gained attention among sociologists and social scientists who 
are interested in understanding the aspects of this institution while taking into 
consideration the cultural and institutional differences (e.g. Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Young et al., 2008). 
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The literature on family institution indicates that there is a prevalent impact of 
this institution on CG practices in developing and emerging societies where 
the family institution is dominant, whereas this impact is lesser to an extent on 
developed societies due to the minor strength of family institution versus the 
presence of robust rules and laws (Peng and Heath, 1996; Yeung, 2006). It is 
also partly due to the difficulty that the family has in trusting and monitoring 
people outside of a small circle of family and friends (Young et al., 2008). This 
impact takes different forms, such as family ownership, control, selection of 
board members, conflict, and resistance. This section will discuss these 
different influences of family institution on CG based on a review of the 
literature. It is worth noting that institutional theory has not focused much on 
the role of ownership and control, while family owners present an interesting 
case, as conflicts over economic versus social factors of investment are most 
likely to be prevalent (Fiss, 2008). The immediate family of a person refers to 
his/her spouse, children, parents, siblings, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sons 
and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law (Yeh et al., 2008).  
 
In terms of family ownership, an empirical study by Claessens et al. (2000) in a 
number of emerging societies sought to review the ownership concentration 
of families. They report that family control negatively impacts on firm 
performance due to the influence of ownership concentration of the family on 
driving the relationship between performance, cash-flow, and control rights 
and these elements are associated with CG efficiency. However, Ben-Amar 
and Andre (2006) did not observe that family ownership has an apparent 
impact on firm performance, and thus, on CG efficiency in Western societies. 
This contradiction in findings raises the question of why such institutional 
impact, represented by family ownership, is different across societies. Thus, it 
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is important to gain an understanding of these differences from an institutional 
theory perspective.  
 
Morck and Yeung (2004) discuss family control in emerging societies and 
observe that the majority of listed firms have controlling shareholders such as 
wealthy families. This implies that the managers (mostly family members) 
serve the interests of those wealthy families, not the interest of public 
shareholders. Carney (2005) indicated a similar view in that family members 
FRHUFHFHUWDLQFRQWUROULJKWVRYHUWKHILUP·VDVVHWVDQGH[SORLWWKHVHULJKWVWR
influence the decision-making process. It can be understood that the reliance 
only on family members can have such negative implications for CG 
processes. The task for this research then is to examine family control 
practices and how it links and adds to institutional theory and knowledge of 
CG systems in non-Western, emerging contexts. 
 
In terms of family selection of board members, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) 
reported that controlling shareholders (family owners) do wield influence over 
ERDUGPHPEHUV·VHOHFWLRQLQHPHUJLQJVRFLHWLHVGXHWRWKHUREXVWGRPLQDWLRQ
of the family in these contexts. This implies that the controlling family can 
expropriate minority shareholders by appointing less mature, less qualified, less 
experienced members from the family in senior managerial positions in the 
firm (La Porta et al., 2000) to serve their own interests rather than those of 
shareholders. Selecting and appointing family members to the board has been 
found to have negative effects on CG practices in developed societies. Some 
research has shown a relationship between appointing family successors and 
poor corporate performance (Smith and Amoako-Ado, 1999), an element that 
is associated with CG. In addition, they observe that there is a slight decline of 
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stock prices when family successors are appointed into managerial positions in 
the firms. These examples show the drawback of appointing less-mature 
family members in the board of directors from a CG standpoint. As far as 
power is a chief component in institutional theory, it is interesting to 
understand how CG regime emerged and dealt with the matter of 
redistribution of power in a non-Western, emerging context. 
 
With regards to family resistance of CG rules, Handler and Kram (1988) noted 
that the basis of conflict between family and business, which they consider a 
problem of resistance, is a function of diverging values and interests. This can 
be attributed to the conflict of interest between shareholders and family 
members, which forms a shape of resistance by the family. Calabro and 
Mussolino (2011) extend this line of thought in that family-controlled firms 
are generally characterised by a society that is constrained by resistance to 
change, which creates concerns over the continuation and survival of these 
firms in a global economy. It seems that family resistance is under-explored 
and expanding our knowledge on this part may add value to existing 
knowledge. Therefore, family resistance will be explored in this research study 
as it is important to address the problem of resisting power (Clegg, 1989).  
 
In terms of conflict of interest between family owners and management which 
can be identified as the agency/principal problem, Young et al. (2008) 
conducted a review of CG in emerging societies. The authors observed that 
extensive family ownership and control can cause conflicts between 
controlling shareholders (mostly family members) and minority shareholders, 
which they identified as principal-principal conflict. This conflict alters the 
dynamics of the process of CG practices which in turn, needs different 
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treatment from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts, which remains 
the largely-discussed perspective in the literature under the agency/principal 
problem (Young et al., 2008). Conflict of interest caused by family members is 
an issue that not only impacts on emerging societies, but also developed 
societies. This highlights its danger and influence on CG practices, as 
demonstrated in a study by Vilaseca (2002) when he observed that appointing 
family members to the board of directors may reduce the level of commitment 
to the firm which can cause conflict of interest. The above studies presented a 
number of causes of conflict of interests but there might be more than what 
we already know in terms of conflicts caused by the family. Thus, this research 
study will explore thoroughly potential causes of conflict of interests created 
by the family in order to broaden our understanding of this subject.  
 
It can be seen from reviewing the literature that the family institution has an 
impact on CG practices, particularly in emerging contexts where the family 
institution is dominant. This influence of the family institution is apparent in a 
number of aspects, such as family ownership, control, selection of board 
members, resistance, and conflict of interests. Understanding these impacts of 
the family institution on the emergence of CG regimes in emerging contexts 
and understanding how this impact differs from other developed societies 
offers additional understanding and new insights to the existing knowledge. 
The discussion will proceed to present the potential influence of kinship 
institution on the emergence of CG regimes.  
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4.3.2 Kinship Institution  
 
As indicated previously, kinship has been greatly discussed in anthropological 
literature in order to explore the basic principles that describe kinship systems 
(e.g. Radcliffe-Brown, 1941, 1952). Within the realm of CG, the literature on 
kinship institutions indicates that there is an apparent impact of this institution 
on CG practices in emerging societies as kinship institution is strong, while 
this impact is limited in developed societies (Yeung, 2006; Young et al., 2008). 
This impact takes different forms, such as kinship control and the extent of 
independence of board members from the founding family. This section will 
discuss these different influences of kinship institution on CG practices based 
on a review of the literature. Kinship ties are generally relatives from the first 
degree (i.e. blood relationships) such as nephews, cousins, uncles, etc. (Young 
and Wilmott, 2012).  
 
In terms of kinship control, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) conducted an empirical 
study in emerging societies to examine the determinants of board composition 
in listed firms. They found that boards dominated by members affiliated with 
the controlling family (kinship ties), is associated with poor CG practices. This 
indicates that kinship control, through the presence of family relatives in the 
board of directors, may have destructive implications on CG practices. This 
may be due to the view that they might make decisions that serve the interests 
of the family and relatives only, ZLWKRXW FDULQJ DERXW RWKHU VKDUHKROGHUV·
interests. It is necessary to understand the broader dimensions of kinship 
control and how it can potentially influence the emergence of CG systems in 
non-Western, emerging contexts in order to provide better understanding of 
this subject.  
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Focussing on the extent of independence of board members from family 
owners, Filatotchev et al. (2005) conducted an empirical study in an emerging 
society to examine the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics 
on performance (an associated element with CG) in listed firms that are mainly 
controlled by founding families. They conclude that board independence from 
the founding family has a positive impact on performance. In contrast, if 
board members are affiliated with the founding family, this is more likely to be 
associated with poor performance. There seems to be a relationship between 
the presence of relatives on the board of directors and CG effectiveness. It is 
interesting to consider what these kinship influences mean in terms of the 
nature of the emergence of a CG system and what is important to learn from 
this relationship.   
 
It can be noted from reviewing the literature that kinship institution is relevant 
to and has some bearing on CG practices, specifically in emerging contexts 
where kinship institutions are particularly prevalent. The influence of kinship 
institution is noticeable in a number of aspects, such as kinship control and the 
extent of independence of board members from the family owners. 
Considering these influences from an institutional theory perspective may 
offer a broader understanding and a unique contribution to knowledge. The 
discussion will continue to present the potential influence of the bureaucratic 
state on the emergence of CG regimes and development of CG practices.  
 
4.3.3 Bureaucratic State 
 
A body of work in the literature addresses topics relating to the bureaucratic 
state. However, within the domain of CG, a limited amount of work focuses 
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on the influence of the bureaucratic state on the emergence of CG regimes. 
Therefore, this section will attempt to create a platform that will aid the 
investigation of the potential influences of the bureaucratic state on the 
development of CG practices. This section will focus mainly on compliance 
with CG rules and the implementation of CG practices.  
 
In terms of the notion that CG is an imposed regime requiring compliance, 
Becht et al. (2002) offer an explanation of why CG rules are being imposed by 
regulatory authorities, since these rules apparently provide adequate protection 
to shareholders that helps to meet the objectives of CG. They argue that 
organisations, such as regulatory authorities, may not have all the detailed 
information available to offer efficient rules. Thus, they might impose rules 
favouring one group over another. Therefore, social actors may look at it from 
their point of view and then interpret it differently, perhaps seeing CG as an 
imposed system. In a non-Western, emerging society, Robertson et al. (2012) 
indicate that the stock market, in Saudi Arabia as an example, grew greatly in 
 EXW WKLV IDVW ERRP ZDV D ¶EXEEOH· WKDW EXUVW LQ 07, which in turn 
caused a collapse. This event led the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to issue 
a CG document to force listed firms to apply, implement, and comply with the 
rules of CG. This indicates that listed firms comply with institutional pressures 
to achieve legitimacy in their operating environment beyond legal compulsion 
alone. In the context of Saudi Arabia, it appears that the CMA is the main 
regulatory body that is supported by the state to apply the CG system to listed 
firms. For this reason, the CMA is addressed as the expression of the 
bureaucratic state in this research study and its influence on the emergence of 
the CG regime will be examined. 
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With regards to compliance with CG as required by the CMA in emerging 
contexts, Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2009) reported that listed firms, for 
example in Saudi Arabia, are required to inform the CMA about their 
compliance or the reasons for non-compliance with CG rules through 
comprehensive annual reports. The CMA reviews these annual reports to 
make sure that these listed firms comply with the required rules and standards 
(Hassan et al., 2009). In the event of non-compliance, the CMA takes action 
against the firm and this can lead to the suspension or de-listing of the firm 
(Hassan et al., 2009). On the other hand, listed firms have the choice to exceed 
minimum requirements and comply with the best practices internationally, 
VXFK DV FRPSO\LQJ ZLWK WKH ¶&RGHV RI %HVW 3UDFWLFH· ZKLFK LV YROXQWDU\ LQ
nature (Denis and McConnell, 2003). It appears that the degree of compliance 
with CG rules varies between listed firms in a particular context, from the 
standard compliance up to exceeding this standard to achieve the best practice. 
This variation in compliance is interesting as it raises the question: what 
potential institutional influences promote voluntary additional compliance that 
exceeds the bare minimum? To this end, this research explores institutional 
bureaucratic-state influence in complying with CG regulations. 
 
With regards to CG implementation, Che and Qian (1998) argue that local 
authority is seen as a driving force in the development of societies as it is an 
empowered and constrained body. In this sense, the CMA for example, as it is 
empowered by the state, can drive the implementation of CG rules through 
speaking, sending letters, imposing penalties, and enforcing other correction 
procedures. On the other hand, it can encourage the implementation of CG 
through conducting workshops, raising awareness, cooperating with and 
advising firms, and other supportive procedures as the CMA proved to be the 
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most suitable source for information (Hassan et al., 2009). Thus, it seems that 
there are different roles played by the CMA to urge listed firms to implement 
CG practices. This can be regarded as an influence of an expression of the 
bureaucratic state on the development of CG practices. This represents an 
interesting avenue to investigate in this research study.  
 
With regards to recent discussions in Western CG models, Mueller (2006) 
discussed the applicability of the Anglo-Saxon model in less-developed 
societies. He indicates that many firms in these societies have attractive 
investment opportunities which can be financed through various sources of 
capital, such as internal funds, bank loans, issuing bonds, issuing equity, and 
subsidies from the state. Mueller argues that these different investment 
opportunities and various sources of capital are the main reasons for the 
Anglo-Saxon model being inapplicable to these societies since it will lead to 
adverse long-term effects on the growth prospects of these societies. 
+RZHYHU0XHOOHU·VVWXG\LVIRFXVHGRQWKHHIIHFWRIWKHVWDWHDVDQLQVWLWXWLRQ
on the applicability of the Anglo-Saxon model only without considering 
contextual or institutional arrangements. Examining the role of such 
institutional arrangements on the emergence of corporate governance regimes 
in non-Western, emerging societies will broaden the views and provide better 
understanding of the issue. 
 
Gugler et al. (2004) present evidence based on an empirical study using a 
sample of more than 19,000 firms from 61 developing societies across the 
world in favour of the argument that state intervention can improve the 
SHUIRUPDQFHRIILUPV*XJOHUHWDO·VREVHUYDWLRQLVVXSSRUWHGE\6LQJKHWDO
(2005) who claim that the Anglo-Saxon model is ill-suited to less-developed 
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societies because the state as an institution plays an important role in supplying 
capital to firms in these societies. However, this might lead to a market failure 
due to the view that the state chooses which firms and industries should grow 
faster as a part of a development plan rather than just allowing the capital 
markets to make these choices (Singh et al., 2005). In other words, the state 
can make bad choices and create soft budget constraints for firms, propping 
XS¶ORVHUV·UDWKHUWKDQSLFNLQJ¶ZLQQHUV·0XHOOHU7KHVHPL[HGILQGLQJV
can be attributed to the big variation of the institutional effect on the 
formation of corporate governance which, therefore, suggests the need for 
more investigation on the issue. Moreover, Gugler et al. (2004) and Singh et al. 
(2005) consider only the role of the state as an institution without considering 
the role of other institutions. Indeed, Fligstein and Choo (2005) argue that 
political and social factors are fundamental in shaping firms and economic 
growth. The review of the literature will proceed to present the potential 
influence of religion institution on CG practices. 
 
4.3.4 Religion Institution 
 
The literature suggests that there is an influence of the religion institution on 
CG practices in a range of societies. This influence varies across societies in 
terms of the types and strength of religious practices. A religion institution is 
common in many Western and non-Western, emerging societies where it is 
important to examine the influence of this institution on the emergence of the 
CG regime and the development of CG practices. In this section, the 
compatibility between religion and CG will be discussed using specific 
examples for illustration. Furthermore, the implementation and compliance of 
religion institutions with CG rules will be addressed.   
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With regards to the compatibility of principles between religion and CG, 
monotheistic religions, such as Islam, Christianity and Judaism, share common 
values and concepts with CG, such as justice, honesty, and public interests 
(Lewis, 2005). The presence of these ethical principles in a society is important 
LQ RUGHU WR KHOS SURWHFW VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV DQG DFKLHYH WKH EHVW SUDFWLFH
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Achieving the best practice is not only about gaining 
greatest profitability, fair trading, or best efficiency, but also it is about trying 
to lead and guide firms according to moral standards (for example religion) 
acceptable to the society (Gooden, 2001), where the religion has a role in 
shaping ethical behaviour (Rizk, 2008). This research study examines the 
influence of such ethical values on applying, implementing, and complying 
with CG practices in a non-Western, emerging context.  
 
In terms of CG implementation, Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) argue that CG that is 
supported by a religion would encourage capital formation, foster strong 
markets, creates incentives to engage in value-maximising behaviour, and 
encourage judgment and transparency. Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) argues that any 
system that lacks an appropriate ethical and moral structure will most likely fail 
to create a proper system of governance. It appears that the religion institution 
influences the development of CG practices in a way. Therefore, this research 
study examines this influence and tries to understand how it contracts the 
emergence of CG activities in a non-Western, emerging society.  
 
With regards to compliance with a CG system, listed firms in Islamic societies 
always have the choice to comply with Sharia-based law in all their legal and 
financial activities and it is optional as it is compatible with the ethos of CG 
and does not contradict it. Khalifa (2003) explains why some people in such 
Chapter 4: Corporate Governance and Institutional Theory 
96 
 
contexts prefer conducting businesses under Sharia-based rules. He argues that 
financial transactions within Sharia-based law have genuine concern for 
ethically and socially responsible activities as well as prohibiting involvement 
in illegal activities or those which are harmful to social and environmental 
well-being. This reflects underlying moral orders that illustrate how business 
and social relations can be conducted and whose interests have priority. Thus, 
the task of this research study is to explore the potential influences of 
compliance with Sharia-based rules on CG practices in non-Western, emerging 
societies. The discussion will continue to present the potential influence of the 
market institution on the emergence of a CG regime. 
 
4.3.5 Market Institution  
 
Young et al. (2008) observed that labour markets, product markets, and 
takeover markets appear to be ineffective or corrupt in emerging societies. As 
a result, these markets are less effective in informing appropriate corporate 
governance. McMillan (2007) attributes the lack of strong markets in emerging 
societies to the absence of formal institutions in these contexts. Lasserre and 
Schutte (1995) offer an explanation of how Asian business groups do 
successful work. They suggest that the actors in these business groups, 
through their close relationships, exploit the imperfection of the market by 
REWDLQLQJ DQ ¶LQVLGHU· RU DFFHVV WR SULYLOHJHG LQIRUPDWLRQ LQ WKHVH HPHUJLQJ
contexts. Lin (2001) argues that the key factor that influences CG in emerging 
societies is the view that markets and legal institutions are often 
underdeveloped. He also notes that many of the drawbacks of practicing CG 
in these contexts are derived from weaknesses in policies and institutional 
environments in addition to the different cultural governance traditions. Che 
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and Qian (1998) analyse the important and helpful role that community 
JRYHUQPHQWVSOD\LQWKHJRYHUQDQFHRI&KLQD·VWRZQVKLS-village enterprises in 
response to the imperfect institutional environment of the market in this 
emerging context. At an individual level, Lau (1998) perceives that market and 
political pressures formed institutional constraints on the chief executives of 
Chinese businesses and therefore, many firms in such emerging societies are 
vulnerable to face change that influenced by existing institutional factors. 
 
Allen (2005) argues that it is not necessarily optimal to use the law to ensure 
good corporate governance in emerging societies since market institutions in 
WKHVH VRFLHWLHV DUH ¶LPSHUIHFW· DQG ¶LQFRPSOHWH· +H Flaims that other 
mechanisms such as competitive markets, trust relationships, and reputation 
may be preferable and he cites China as an example since it has fast economic 
growth even though corporate governance systems are weak. However, 
Mueller (2006) argues that trust relationships take a long time to develop and 
lack the flexibility of well-functioning impersonal markets.  
 
It can be observed that the market institution plays a role in developed 
societies among various domains, some of which is CG practice. However, 
this role appears to be different in emerging contexts due to the existence of 
incomplete, incompetent, or corrupt market institutions in these societies. 
Therefore, this research study examines the role and potential impact of 
market institution on the development of CG practices in a non-Western, 
emerging context. Understanding this presents an opportunity to contribute 
significantly to existing knowledge in this field. The review of the literature will 
proceed to present the potential influence of political institution on the 
development of CG practices. 
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4.3.6 Political Institution 
 
A limited amount of literature has explicitly discussed the influence of political 
institutions on CG practices and has mostly conducted research in developed 
societies. One of the tasks in this research is to determine if any themes arise 
during the data analysis. This section will provide a review of the literature in 
light of the existing studies in CG that are associated with political 
arrangements.  
 
In a number of studies related to the American CG, Gilson (1996) points out 
that non-economic factors, such as politics, influence the formation of any 
QDWLRQ·V &* V\VWHP DQG WKXV LQVWLWXWLRQDO GLIIHUHQFHV PDWWHU D JUHDW GHDO
North (1990) adds to this view by suggesting that institutions are considered as 
the incentive structure of a society, and political institution is an essential 
determinant of economic performance. Roe (2003: iii) offers an example of 
the influence of politics on CG arrangements by stating thDW´Solitics can press 
managers to stabilise employment, to forego some profit-maximising risks 
with the firm, and to use up capital in place rather than to downsize when 
markets no longer are aligned with the firm·V SURGXFWLRQ FDSDELOLWLHVµ ,Q
addition, KHSRLQWVRXWWKDW´ZKHQZHOLQHXSWKHZRUOG·s richest nations on a 
left-right political continuum and then line them up on a close-to-diffuse 
RZQHUVKLS FRQWLQXXP WKH WZR FRUUHODWH SRZHUIXOO\µ2EVHUYDWLRQV IURPKLV
study suggest that CG and ownership structures are associated with basic 
political configurations in Western societies. It appears that these studies 
generalise their findings to all levels of societies, while these studies were 
conducted in developed societies only without considering emerging or 
developing contexts. Thus, the task of this research study is to investigate 
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whether political institutions have an apparent influence on CG practices in a 
non-Western, emerging context or not. If there is any influence, how would 
this present itself in emerging societies, and in what ways and what forms? 
Answering such questions is important as there is an opportunity to bridge a 
significant gap in knowledge; that is, the behaviour of actors that shape actions 
within those institutions. 
 
Gourevitch (2003: 1832) explains: 
 
«\HW ZKDW D FRXQWU\ GRHV ZLWK LWV OHJDO WUDGLWLRQ DQG V\VWHP WXUQV RQ
politics: the rules that determine the extent of economic competition 
within and between countries; the laws and decrees that structure 
banking, corporate finance, and the securities industry; the rules that 
shape the markets for capital and labor; and the degree of state 
involvement in the economy. 
 
The above statement highlights a number of factors that have some bearing in 
forming CG systems caused by the political institution. For example, the 
author highlighted the influence of the laws and decrees on organising the 
work of the banking sector, structuring financial systems, and issuing securities 
of firms. These motives signal the direct or indirect links of politics with CG 
systems. The task then is to explore these links in a non-Western, emerging 
context. The review of the literature will continue to discuss the potential 
influence of the legal institution on the emergence of a CG regime. 
 
4.3.7 Legal Institution 
 
A growing body of research has discussed the aspects of legal institution and 
their influence on the emergence of CG regimes, more apparently, in 
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developed societies. This section will attempt to provide a review of the 
literature characterised by the impact of legal institution on the development 
of CG activities. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that legal institutions in developed contexts 
have a considerable role in protecting investors and shareholders. They offered 
the case in the United States as an example where courts attempt to increase 
the protection of firms· assets through controlling managerial diversion 
towards serving their own interests. Milhaupt (1996) points out that, in 
developed contexts, the law in the form of legal rules shapes the basic 
structure of CG, defines the rights of actors, and sets the boundaries for the 
private ordering. He indicates that this influence can also appear in the form of 
a managerial market that controls managers and shrinks the divergence of 
interests between shareholders and managers. Cioffi (2000) posits that the law, 
in the form of company law, financial market regulation, and labour law, has 
an influence in determining the governance of corporations. He argues that 
this theoretical approach emphasises the juridical character of CG that 
emerged from neo-classical economic tKHRU\DVD ¶QH[XVRIFRQWUDFWV·7KHVH
insights from developed societies indicate that legal institution has a great 
influence on the formation of CG in these contexts. The question now is 
whether or not this is also the case in emerging societies. The investigation 
must therefore account for the tendencies and forms of social activities in this 
respect in non-Western, emerging contexts.  
 
Young et al. (2008) observe that emerging societies tend to have an ineffective 
and unpredictable rule of law which creates a weak or unhealthy environment 
for CG. They indicate that the emerging contexts adopted the legal 
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frameworks of developed societies, such as the Anglo-American system, due 
to either internal reforms or response to global prerequisites. However, they 
argue that, legal institution including disclosure parameters, accounting 
requirements, and securities trading boundaries is missing, incompetent, or 
does not work as required. As a result, other institutions, such as family and 
kinship ties, government connections, and business groups drive the role in 
the formation of CG systems in emerging societies (Yeung, 2006). 
Dharwadkar et al. (2000) argue that emerging societies lack efficient legal 
frameworks which make resolving the agency problem almost unachievable. 
They claim that bankruptcy laws in emerging contexts tend to be interpreted in 
favour of managers which, in turn, increase the agency problem.  
 
It can be understood from reviewing the literature that there is an influence of 
the legal institution in developed societies, but this influence is less to an 
extent in emerging contexts. Taking such influence into account may offer a 
broader view of the picture which can increase the understanding on this 
regard. The following sections will present the research problem, research 
setting, and research questions.  
 
4.4 Research Problem 
 
Numerous studies indicate that major financial crises share the same 
fundamental reasons for failure. Corporate governance mechanisms have been 
shown to play a significant role in causing such crises (Radelet and Sachs, 
1998; Johnson et al, 2000; Elson and Gyves, 2003; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 
2003; Monas, 2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Millar et al., 2005; Cornett et 
al., 2010; Erkens et al., 2012). These studies suggest that poor corporate 
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governance mechanisms were significant reasons for such collapses. These 
financial crises such as, the East Asian crisis in 1997, Enron and WorldCom in 
the USA in 2001 and 2002, Ahold and Parmalat in Europe in 2003, and the 
global financial crisis in 2007, have proven the central role of effective 
corporate governance systems, thus, they emphasise the importance of 
improving corporate governance practices to help avoid such collapses in the 
future (see Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: World Major Crises 
Crisis Studies Main Reasons for Crisis 
Enron 2001 (USA) Elson and Gyves, 2003 Conflict of interests between 
owners and top management; lack 
of board independence from family 
ownership  
Ahold, Parmalat 
2003 (Europe) 
Millar et al., 2005 Lack of institutional transparency 
WorldCom, Tyco, 
Adelphia, Global 
Crossing, and 
HealthSouth 
Holmstrom and Kaplan, 
2003 
Poor corporate governance 
systems; illegal managerial 
behaviour; multiple board and 
regulations conflicts 
Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005 
Independence of board and 
executive managers from the 
family, poor audit systems 
East Asian 1997 ± 
1998 
Johnson et al., 2000 Weakness of formal institutions of 
corporate governance (i.e. 
bureaucratic state)  
Lemmon and Lins, 2003  Family ownership: entitlement and 
conflict of interests  
Global Financial 
Crisis 2007 
Erkens et al., 2012  High institutional ownership and 
low board independence due to 
diversified institutions with a 
relatively high appetite for risk  
 
In the contemporary academic world, there has been an increasing interest in 
understanding the evolution of institutions across developed and less-
developed societies. These institutions play an important role in the formation 
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of corporate governance systems (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Bodies of 
literature in social science have begun to determine the role of social factors in 
the governance of developed and less-developed societies (La Porta et al. 
2002a; Djankov et al. 2003; Rodrik, 2003). This research study will look at this 
role in order to provide better understanding of different institutions and 
examine their impact on the formation of corporate governance in a non-
Western, emerging society.  
 
From the literature review of CG within institutions that is presented earlier in 
this chapter, it seems that existing corporate governance models, such as the 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental models are inappropriate in certain contexts. 
These models may not fit with different types of markets which operate in 
difIHUHQW ZD\V WR PRUH ¶W\SLFDO· PDUNHWV LQ GHYHORSHG VRFLHWLHV 7KLV PHDQV
that there is something rendering certain models inappropriate for a given 
context. There are a variety of possible explanations for this particular 
problem. For example, differences could be due to a national culture effect or 
the role of institutions such as, family, legal, political, religion, kinship, 
bureaucratic state and market in less developed societies. Investigating such 
differences in institutions is interesting as it brings institutions into the debate 
on corporate governance, which is rare and inadequately treated despite the 
fact that the institutions shape and inform behaviour and the emergence of 
activities. By understanding this from the institutional theory perspective, the 
contribution then is to reconcile how institutions potentially influence the 
emergence of corporate governance regimes in non-Western, emerging 
societies. 
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4.4.1 Research Setting 
 
The main concern of this research study is to focus on the potential impact of 
different institutions on the emergence of the corporate governance regime in 
a non-Western, emerging society as understood by significant social actors in 
Saudi Arabia such as: CG managers of listed firms, financial regulatory 
authority officials, and stock exchange mediator representatives who have a 
background in corporate governance systems. Chapter 5 will attempt to 
provide a comprehensive description of the Saudi Arabian non-Western, 
emerging society along with its key actors in the field of corporate governance.  
 
Figure 4.1: A Map for the Research Study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitive markets in Western capitalist societies have developed as both 
kinship and religion institutions have tended to weaken (Watson, 2012). 
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Currently, the market and managerial control are the dominant ones in these 
societies (Watson, 2012). This has highlighted the need for strong corporate 
governance systems as guidance within these societies. However, the Saudi 
Arabian non-Western, emerging society has different influential institutions 
from those in Western societies, for example, kinship and religion institutions 
are still strong (Altorki, 1980; Ali and Al-Shakis, 1985). Therefore, this less-
researched context has been chosen to examine the potential effect of 
different institutions on the emergence of the corporate governance regime as 
perceived by significant social actors. In order to accomplish this objective, the 
following research questions were addressed.  
 
4.4.2 Research Questions 
 
1- What do non-Western, emerging society (Saudi Arabia) institutions consist 
of as perceived by significant social actors? 
 
2- In light of these perceptions, what are the likely influences of these non-
Western, emerging society institutions on the emergence and development 
of its corporate governance regime? 
 
This research study is based on the perception of significant social actors in 
Saudi Arabia. Answering the above research questions will offer a better 
understanding of the nature of non-Western, emerging context institutions 
along with their potential influence on the development and emergence of the 
corporate governance regime. This is interesting as it brings institutional 
theory into the debate of corporate governance in the emerging contexts that 
have different institutions from those in developed societies. Understanding 
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this will contribute to knowledge and add further insight to the existing 
literature, and strengthen the ground for future research on institutions in non-
Western, emerging societies. The next section will summarise what has been 
learnt from this chapter.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has attempted to engage the discussion on CG practice with 
institutions based on the existing literature in order to provide broader views 
about the topic and help achieve the intended objectives of this research study. 
Defining CG from an institutional theory perspective indicates the tendency of 
recent studies to move away from the simple relationship between the firm 
and its capital providers to a more holistic view that accounts for a 
configuration of interdependent elements such as the relationship between 
stakeholders and corporations, and the relationship between corporations and 
society. This holistic view of CG indicates that CG systems are embedded in 
larger institutional frameworks. This means that CG systems should be more 
dynamic and culturally constructed than the simple relationship of the agent-
principal view.  
 
From reviewing the literature, it appears that the emergence of CG regimes in 
emerging contexts is influenced by a number of institutions such as family, 
kinship, religion, bureaucratic state, political, legal, and market. This impact is 
not clearly defined and ranges from positive to negative in terms of the 
development of CG practices. It also appears that the impact of institutions in 
emerging societies differs from that in developed contexts due to the diverse 
nature and strength of institutions in each society. Understanding governance 
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arrangements and the role of family owners and the state in non-Western, 
emerging societies requires a holistic approach to CG, and the institutional 
perspective is well positioned to contribute such an approach (Fiss, 2008). The 
literature indicates that there is a need for more cross-national studies of CG 
that would go beyond national differences to examine the underlying 
dimensions along which institutional contexts vary (Fiss, 2008). Thus, the task 
of this research study is to explore the different impacts of institutions on CG 
in a non-Western, emerging society in order to broaden the views and offer 
new insights of the nature of institutions in this type of contexts. This area of 
exploration has the potential to contribute largely to the literature. The next 
chapter will describe and discuss the research context by presenting CG in the 
Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society. 
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Chapter 5: Corporate Governance in Non-Western, 
Emerging Societies: The Context of Saudi Arabia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused on the CG debate from an institutional theory 
perspective. It provided a review of the literature on the potential impact of 
institutions on CG practices based on the existing literature. This chapter 
intends to draw a broad picture for the research setting, Saudi Arabia, which 
according to a number of scholars, is best described as a non-Western, 
emerging society (e.g. Wright et al., 2005). Mitton (2002) argues that recent 
research highlights the importance of understanding CG in emerging societies 
in order to understand what causes financial crises in these contexts (e.g. La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). This chapter will provide a general 
overview of the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society in order to 
understand what this context looks like. It will also present the historical 
beginnings of the CG regime in this society, the role of the regulatory 
authorities, and describe CG guidelines including the CG document and other 
official documents that must be followed by listed firms. This will help to 
simplify our understanding about the nature of institutions in this non-
Western, emerging society in order to achieve the objectives of this research 
study. 
 
Institutional theory appears to be one of the leading theories when probing 
into emerging societies (Wright et al., 2005). Institutions have an effect on 
organisational practices, they influence the framing of organisational strategies, 
and they affect a fLUP·VDFWLRQV)HOGPDQDQG5DIDHOL3HQJ+HHW
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al., 2007). However, the institutions in emerging societies are unstable, where 
formal institutions such as laws and regulations are absent, or inefficient, or do 
not operate as intended, and often do not promote ¶mutually beneficial 
impersonal exchange· between actors (North, 1990, 1994; Young et al., 2008). 
This can be explained in that emerging societies tend to adopt legal 
frameworks of developed societies, such as the Anglo-Saxon or European 
systems, either to conform to internally driven reforms or to respond to 
international pressures (Young et al., 2008). As a result, informal institutions 
such as family and kinship ties, business groups, and government connections, 
are the prime guidance of organisations in emerging contexts (Peng and 
Heath, 1996; Jiang and Peng, 2011). The market institution, including its 
functions such as the product market, takeover market, and labour market are 
ineffective or corrupted in emerging societies and, as a result, are not so 
effective in governing managers and board members (Groves et al., 1995; La 
Porta et al., 1998; Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Investigating this issue is 
interesting to understand the relationship and influence of the market 
institution in non-Western, emerging contexts.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides a general overview 
of the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society context. Section 5.3 
discusses the emergence of CG in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging 
society. Section 5.4 describes the Capital Market Authority. Section 5.5 
presents the Capital Market Law. Section 5.6 provides an idea about the 
Companies Act. Section 5.7 presents the company that is responsible for 
organising the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul). Section 5.8 describes the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency. Section 5.9 summarises this chapter.  
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5.2 General Overview  
 
Since this research study is concerned with context, it is important to provide a 
general background about the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society 
context and the culture to better understand the research site. Saudi Arabia is 
located in the South West of Asia, with a land area of about 865,000 square 
miles, with a population of around 28 million. It was founded by King 
Abdulaziz Al-Saud (1880-1953) and announced as the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in 1932, after numerous attempts to unite it under one flag (Al-Turaiqi, 
2008). Riyadh is the capital city and Jeddah is the second biggest city in the 
country in terms of size, population, and economic growth. The desert forms 
over 80% of the country from the North to South and includes the Empty 
Quarter, which is considered to be one of the largest sandy deserts in the 
world (see Figure 5.1). Saudi Arabia has a desert climate characterised by 
extreme heat ranging from 10 degrees in the winter up to 50 degrees in the 
summer. The national currency is Saudi Riyal (SR), where one sterling pound 
equals six riyals (an approximate exchange rate, where this rate may vary). 
Arabic is the first language and English is the business language.  
 
Figure 5.1: Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Source: www.bbc.co.uk 
 
Chapter 5: Corporate Governance in Non-Western, Emerging Societies: The 
Context of Saudi Arabia 
111 
 
Saudi Arabia is a non-Western, emerging society and it can be classified as a 
´WUDQVLWLRQHFRQRP\µDVLGHQWLILHGE\:ULJKWHWDO,WLVDSDUWRIWKH
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In 
the past, Saudi Arabia was a poor country and agriculture was the main source 
of income. In 1937, oil was discovered in different areas of the country which 
then became the main source of national income, producing and exporting 
ODUJHTXDQWLWLHVRIWKLV¶EODFNJROG·6DXGL$UDELDSRVVHVVHVDURXQGRQHTXDUWHU
RI WKH ZRUOG·V FUXGH RLO UHVHUYHV DQG UDQNV DV WKH GRPLQDQW DQG ODUJHVW
exporter of oil with around 32% of oil exports (OPEC, 2013) (see Figure 5.2). 
Apart from oil, Saudi Arabia produces other materials such as gas, gold, iron, 
and copper. Although Saudi Arabia has a large land area that almost equals the 
area of the UK, Germany and France combined together, it lacks some 
important natural resources such as lakes and rivers due to the lack of rain. It 
SURGXFHVDERXWRI WKHZRUOG·V WRWDOSURGXFWLRQRIZDWHU WKURXJK VDOLQH
water conversion.  
 
Figure 5.2: OPEC Countries of Oil Exports (2013) 
Source: www.ubc.ca 
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The legal system in Saudi Arabia is based on the Holy book (Quran) along 
ZLWK WKH 3URSKHW 0RKDPPHG·V VSHHFK +DGLWK 6KDULD-based law, which 
emerged from those two sources, is an Islamic law that provides the code of 
conduct or religious law. Thus, Saudi Arabia is deemed to be an Islamic state 
and Islamic principles affect social behaviour, business deals and daily 
operations. Any adopted system, such as a CG system, is altered to become 
compatible with the religion and accepted by the society. Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia, to a large extent, is a tribal society, in which people are influenced by 
the Arabic tradition, where there are strong family and kinship relationships. 
Additionally, this country has never been invaded by any other country. As a 
result, this society has developed its own institutions, national culture, and 
economy.  
 
This is not to say that there are no external influences. Rather, there are 
political and economic ties between Saudi Arabia and Western societies that 
have, to an extent, influenced the culture of Saudi Arabia. In terms of 
marketing and commercial sectors, a number of Saudi Arabian firms would 
replicate Western plans, strategies, and procedures in their operations and 
practices. For example, Saudi ARAMCO, an oil production and refining 
company in Saudi Arabia, is a joint US-Saudi Arabian company. With regards 
to financial and accounting practices in Saudi Arabia, it can be said that they 
are, to an extent, influenced by Western practices (Askary, 2006). However, 
they are modified to be more compatible with the law of the country. The 
discussion will proceed to present the emergence of CG particularly in this 
context. 
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5.3 The Emergence of Corporate Governance in the Saudi 
Arabian Non-Western, Emerging Society 
 
In the last two decades, the economy of Saudi Arabia has improved due to the 
strategic development in oil production and oil exporting, which has increased 
liquidity in the stock market exchange. Public shareholders have achieved 
significant profits, where a group of shares has risen up to 700% of its original 
value between 1999 and 2007. However, this boom deteriorated to one third 
of the market value between February and April in 2007 due to the loss of 
confidence amongst shareholders and investors, with an estimated loss of 
around £230 billion (Hassounah, 2007). 
 
At that time, a formal CG system was just being introduced after it was 
initiated by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2006. The weakness of the 
CG system was a key reason for this collapse in Saudi Arabia (AME info, 
2007). A large number of minority shareholders lost their fortunes and there 
were some signs that public shareholders had lost their desire for trading in the 
Saudi Arabian stock market (Hassounah, 2007). However, Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) continued to be issued normally. A speech was given by the 
governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Mr. Al-Sayari in 
0D\  XQGHU WKH WLWOH ¶&RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH LQ 6DXGL $UDELD· ,Q KLV
speech, the governor stressed the importance of improving CG practices by 
proper compliance and implementation of CG rules and regulations to boost 
macro-economic development, growth, and to stabilise the Saudi Arabian 
economy (BIS, 2013). 
 
By this stage, the strategy suggested by SAMA was to ensure full compliance 
and implementation of CG practices watched by the board of directors of 
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listed firms, supervised by senior management of listed firms, and set by the 
regulatory authority³the CMA. This was to maintain financial stability, which 
is a primary objective of CG. Since then the CMA became the prime 
authorised regulatory authority that observes, supervises, and guides the 
implementation of CG practices in listed firms in the country. The CMA 
attempted to adopt the best practices learnt from the West to enhance 
transparency and disclosure, educate investors, and motivate the private 
business sector to join the stock market and become public (the author will 
return to the role of the CMA in Saudi Arabia in detail in the next section).  
 
It can clearly be seen from the above historical rise of CG that institutional 
factors are neglected, misunderstood, and under-explored. To a great extent, 
the influence of institutions is important as institutions shape and inform the 
behaviour of the emergence of CG practices in any institutional context. 
Having presented the emergence of Saudi-Arabian CG, it is now important to 
look at the main actor in this context, the Capital Market Authority.   
 
5.4 The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
 
The CMA is the main regulating authority in this country for all listed firms 
and thus, it is considered as an expression of the bureaucratic state in this 
research study (see Sub-section 4.3.3). This authority was unofficially 
established in the 1950s and was running until the government created its 
basic regulations in the 1980s (CMA, 2013). In 2004, the CMA became an 
official government organisation through royal decree, in which it has full 
authority to play financial, legal, and administrative roles and furthermore 
directly shadows the prime minister. The main functions of the CMA are to 
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regulate and develop the stock market through issuing and applying the rules 
that conform to the Capital Market Law (this will be discussed further in 
Section 5.5). The main objectives of the CMA are to enhance the investment 
and stock exchange environment; develop an organised, transparent, fair 
financial market; advance confidence in the market; encourage listed firms to 
LQFUHDVH WKH OHYHORI WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQGGLVFORVXUH DQGPDLQWDLQ VKDUHKROGHUV·
rights and protect their interests from irregular activities in the stock market 
such as fraud, deceit, manipulation, or cheating (CMA, 2013).  
 
In order to achieve this, the CMA conducts a number of tasks and duties on a 
regular basis: 
 
x It aims to protect shareholders and investors from any bad practice, 
including manipulating, cheating, fraud, or any illegal trading. 
x It attempts to reduce risk through developing proper measures and 
standards. 
x It monitors the extent of disclosure of information produced by listed 
firms.  
x It encourages listed firms to enhance the quality of transparency. 
x It monitors all the transactions and activities in the stock market. 
x It endeavours to regulate and develop the market and improve 
standards and techniques for better trade operations. 
x It monitors all security-related issues and under-trading transactions. 
 
As far as the CMA has financial, legal, and administrative roles, it has formed a 
board of directors that includes five full-time commissioners appointed by 
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royal decree. According to the CMA (2013), those members are not allowed to 
be involved in any commercial or special interests due to their job nature, 
where they are considered as insiders who have full access to future 
investments of any listed firm. 
 
In 2006, the CMA applied CG rules on all listed firms through issuing a CG 
document which becomes the main guidance for listed firms to implement and 
comply with CG rules (see the appendix for more details of the Saudi CG 
document). This document has a total of nineteen pages and is available from 
the CMA in both languages, Arabic and English. The document includes five 
chapters, each with a number of articles. Chapter one, the preliminary 
provisions, presents a preamble and a number of definitions such as an 
independent member, non-executive director, first-degree relatives, 
stakeholders, accumulative voting, and minority shareholders. Chapter two, 
rights of shareholders and the general assembly, provides the general rights of 
VKDUHKROGHUV IDFLOLWDWLRQ RI VKDUHKROGHUV· H[HUFLVH RI ULJKWV DQG DFFHVV WR
information, shaUHKROGHUV·ULJKWVUHODWHGWRWKHJHQHUDODVVHPEO\YRWLQJULJKWV
and dividend rights of shareholders. Chapter three, disclosure and 
transparency, presents the policies and procedures related to disclosure where 
the firms should write disclosure procedures DFFRUGLQJWRWKH&0$·VODZ, and 
GLVFORVXUH LQ WKHERDUGRIGLUHFWRUV· UHSRUW that should include a number of 
items, such as provisions that not have been implemented and why, and details 
of compensation and remuneration paid to the chairman, board members, and 
executive directors. Chapter four, board of directors, shows the main 
functions of the board, responsibilities of the board, formation of the board, 
committees of the board, audit committee, nomination and remuneration 
committee, meetings of the board, remuneration and indemnification of board 
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members, and conflict of interest within the board. Chapter five, closing 
provisions, includes publications and entry into force (CMA, 2013).  
 
Listed firms should report about all the processes and procedures they 
perform to inform about their compliance with CG rules in accordance with 
the CG document. The CMA receives comprehensive annual reports from 
these listed firms which include the profit and loss, the risks, future 
investments, the activities of the firm and contracts, financial reports, 
FRPPLWWHHVWKHDXGLWRUV·UHSRUWWKHH[Went of compliance with CG rules, the 
reasons for non-compliance with any of the CG items, the remuneration of 
the board, and the disclosure of all mandatory and optional items. The CMA 
usually sets a deadline for submitting these reports each year and penalises 
those who fail to meet this deadline. This is to ensure an effective and smooth 
process of disclosure which is a key item in a CG system (Hussainey and Al-
Nodel, 2008). 
 
In summary, the CMA plays an important role in regulating and developing 
the stock market exchange through setting the rules and instructions that guide 
listed firms to behave appropriately in the market. This is to meet the 
objectives of the CMA and thus of CG that call for offering adequate 
SURWHFWLRQ WRVKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWVDQG LQWerests, and gaining financial stability 
and security in the market. This role of the CMA, as an expression of the 
bureaucratic state, will be examined in this research study in order to attempt 
to understand the roles and impact of the bureaucratic state institution on the 
emergence of CG practice which may offer a broader insight of the topic. As 
far as the CMA issues the rules that must conform to the Capital Market Law, 
it is important to present information about this law.  
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5.5 Capital Market Law (CML) 
 
The CML is a set of rules that was created by the Saudi Arabian government in 
2003 and approved by royal decree. This document includes 28 pages, 10 
chapters, and 67 articles. These chapters, along with their articles, clearly 
address the rules, what is required and expected from concerned bodies, and 
help regulate and monitor the market. Chapter one comprises three articles 
and presents a number of basic definitions that are often used in the Saudi 
Arabian market such as the kingdom, the authority, the board, the chairman, 
the exchange, the committee, etc. Chapter two includes 16 articles and offers a 
broad description of the entity of the Capital Market Authority, its 
organisational structure, its functions, its responsibilities, its objectives, its 
authority and limitation, its financial resources, and its internal regulations and 
procedures. Chapter three consists of six articles and discusses the stock 
exchange, including a description of the joint-stock company³currently 
operated by Tadawul (I will return to this soon in Section 5.7)³terms and 
conditions, the way to place transactions and carry out trading in securities, 
and creating committees. Chapter four consists of five articles and provides 
details about the securities in the depositary centre. The chapter describes the 
roles and responsibilities of the depositary centre in terms of registration of 
ownership and property rights of securities traded on the exchange, 
confidentiality of information, and the roles of the board of the exchange. 
Chapter ILYH LQFOXGHV HLJKW DUWLFOHV DQG FRQVLGHUV EURNHUV· UHJXODWLRQV 7KH
chapter addresses the conditions and limitations of brokers, who are 
authorised to perform brokerage activities, and the requirements to grant a 
license. Chapter six comprises of one article that deals with investment funds 
and collective investment schemes and how to regulate them. Chapter seven 
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consists of nine articles and discusses, in detail, disclosure issues. It determines 
WKHFRQGLWLRQVWKDWPXVWEHFRYHUHGIRUDSURVSHFWXV·SXEOLFation such as the 
LQIRUPDWLRQUHTXLUHGE\WKHDXWKRULW\·VUXOHVWKDWSURYLGHGHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQV
of the issuer, the nature of the business, board members, the securities to be 
issued, and the financial position of the issuer. The chapter also illustrates the 
contents and required information in the quarterly and annual reports, such as 
the balance sheet, profit and loss account, the cash flow statement, and other 
information required by the rules. Additionally, the annual report should also 
include a description of the firm, its business nature and activities, the 
members of the board and other staff, investors or major shareholders, future 
developments, and the confidentiality of information before submitting them. 
Two articles form chapter eight cover manipulations and insider trading. It 
outlines cases where a firm may fall in violation and then penalised such as 
creating a false or misleading impression of trading in a security that may be 
contrary to reality. The chapter also defines an insider as any person who 
obtains inside information through the family, business or contractual 
relationship, and defines insider information as information obtained by the 
insider which is not available to the general public. Chapter nine comprises 
four articles and describes the regulation of proxy solicitations, restricted 
purchase and restricted offer for shares. It deals with the restrictions of 
purchase of shares in case the ownership exceeds 10%, where announcing 
such ownership is required. Chapter ten consists of 13 articles that describe in 
detail the sanctions and penalties for violations. It states who is vulnerable to 
be penalised such as board members, senior officers and other staff, and major 
shareholders (SAGIA, 2013).    
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The CML has added further enhancements to the Saudi Arabian market 
through regulating and developing the stock market, which was needed since 
the implementation of the Companies Act in 1965 with its latest update in 
1982 (this will be discussed further in Section 5.6). The CML also addresses a 
QXPEHURILPSRUWDQWUXOHVVXFKDVGLVFORVXUHEURNHUV·UHJXODWLRQVDQGLQVLGHU
trading, that are essential to organise and regulate the stock market efficiently. 
However, the rules of the CML appear to still be open for further 
development to promote an effective and efficient operation of CG practice in 
a fast growing emergent society. Since the Companies Act document is the 
first document issued in 1965 to regulate the work of companies, it is 
important to present it. 
 
5.6 Companies Act (1965, 1982, 1985) 
 
The Companies Act is the first document that was issued in 1965 to regulate 
and organise the work of all types of companies in Saudi Arabia. The 
document includes 15 chapters along with 234 articles and was issued by the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC) based on royal decree. Part of the document 
considers the work of listed firms in a number of chapters in terms of how to 
form them, how to manage them, how to conduct general assemblies for 
shareholders, accounting and auditing, and increasing or decreasing capital. 
These rules were revised and amended in 1982 and again in 1985 through 
official decisions from the prime minister in order to fulfil modern 
requirements. All Saudi Arabian firms were required to comply with the rules 
of the Companies Act as it was the basic system issued in 1965. However, it 
was difficult at that time to adopt and comply with these rules due to the lack 
of adequate accounting and finance training and thus, a shortage of 
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professionals (Abdeen and Yavas, 1985). Moreover, there was an absence of 
an authorised professional body to audit, review and inspect the conduct of 
accounting and auditing practices (Shinawi and Crum, 1971). As a result, 
external auditors were permitted to perform auditing practices and listed firms 
are now required to submit their annual reports along with reviewed and 
checked financial statements through external auditors. A company was 
established in Saudi Arabia in 2007 to organise and facilitate stock exchange 
RSHUDWLRQV LQ WKH PDUNHW WKLV FRPSDQ\ ¶7KH 6DXGL 6WRFN ([FKDQJH· ZLOO EH
presented next.  
 
5.7 The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul)  
 
7KHWHUP¶7DGDZXO·LVDQ$UDELFWHUPWKDWUHIHUVWRWKHH[FKDQJHRIVWRFNVDQG
shares. The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) company was established in 2007 
as the only authorised body to carry out trading in the Saudi Arabian market. It 
is a joint company that is owned by the Public Investment Fund (PIF). It 
works as a mediator between listed firms and their shareholders in which it 
facilitates stock exchange. This company has a number of objectives, such as 
supporting and educating investors, operating the stock market efficiently, 
developing the capability and competency of the stock exchange, supporting 
the capital raised for companies, providing diverse financial services, and 
attracting participation from national and international investors (Tadawul, 
2013).  
 
The board of directors in Tadawul consists of nine members that are 
nominated by the chairman of the CMA and then appointed by a decree of the 
council of ministers. Consistent with its sensitive position in the market, 
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Tadawul issued a comprehensive code of conduct for its employees as well as 
its board members. This code includes confidentiality of information, dealing 
with the press and the media, prohibition of disclosure of internal information, 
responsibilities, disciplinary penalties, conflict of interest, and acceptance of 
gifts and hospitality invitations (Tadawul, 2013). 
 
Over the last decade there has been a considerable increase in the number of 
firms that changed from private or family to public due to the effort of the 
government in setting a clear scheme for helping firms to turn public through 
issuing Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). For example, between 2005 and 2010, 
the number of listed firms increased dramatically from 81 to 144 firms 
(Tadawul, 2013). Currently, the number of listed firms is almost 160 firms 
distributed in different fields of industry around the country. This increase 
indicates that the Saudi Arabian market becomes more stable and more 
attractive for local and foreign investors providing that the regulations are 
organised. Thus, the attempt of the bureaucratic state in developing CG 
practice in this society is apparent through establishing a mediator that is 
authorised to conduct the operations of the stock exchange securely. 
Therefore, this research study will attempt to examine the influence of the 
bureaucratic state on the development of CG practice in a non-Western, 
emerging society. Banking and insurance sectors in this context are regulated 
by two authorities, the CMA and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA). Thus, a brief introduction about SAMA will be presented next. 
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5.8 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
 
SAMA is a governmental organisation that acts as the central bank of Saudi 
Arabia and was established in 1952. The main functions of SAMA are to issue 
national currency, act as a banker to the government, supervise all the local 
banks and insurance companies, control foreign exchange reserves, conduct 
monetary policy for maintaining exchange rate stability, and encourage the 
growth of the financial system (SAMA, 2013). The board of directors includes 
the governor, the vice governor, and three nominated members from the 
private sector. SAMA has its own internal audit department that reviews and 
evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of operations.  
 
SAMA is a regulatory body for all banks and insurance companies as they deal 
directly with money. This organisation looks after and observes the functions 
and activities of the banking and insurance sectors but has nothing to do with 
CG rules or practice. SAMA did have a direct connection with the CMA as 
they are both regulators in the country so they often sign a memorandum of 
understanding between them in order to avoid any overlap (CMA, 2013). It 
appears that this organisation has no direct relationship to CG and thus, it will 
not take part in the investigations of this research study. The next section will 
summarise what has been discussed in this chapter.  
 
5.9 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed CG in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging 
society. It has offered a general overview of this context. Compared to other 
societies, Saudi Arabia has a short history and its economy started from 
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agriculture and evolved to become a leading country in oil production. Its legal 
framework is to a large extent, based on religion. Its culture is influenced by 
the West in terms of commercial, financial, and accounting practices. 
 
In terms of the emergence of CG in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging 
society, oil production and exportation was the main factor in increasing the 
liquidity in the stock exchange. It has been indicated that the CG system is in 
its first stages and needs a lot of improvement in order to maintain financial 
stability. The discussion of this topic has revealed the importance of 
understanding the role of institutions in this non-Western, emerging context. 
Understanding this role may inform the behaviour of the emergence of CG 
practice that may broaden the knowledge in this field and contribute to the 
theory. 
 
The Capital Market Authority is the main actor in the development of CG 
practice and thus, it is considered as an expression of the bureaucratic state in 
this society. It has issued a CG document that must be complied with by all 
listed firms in the stock market. This CG guideline conforms to the Capital 
Market Law. The CML, in turn, contributed to the development of the Saudi 
Arabian market by adding value to the existing Companies Act at that time. 
The Companies Act was the only main source of regulation before other 
authorities appeared. Any stock market needs a mediator body between listed 
firms and their shareholders to organise operating the stock exchange and for 
this purpose, the Tadawul Company was established. In this context, the 
banking and insurance sectors (as they deal directly with money) are regulated 
by two authorities, the CMA and SAMA. SAMA has an important role in 
maintaining exchange rate stability and improving financial systems. The 
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following chapter will present the methodological techniques that have been 
used to conduct this research study.   
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Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have critically reviewed the existing literature on 
institutional theory, its relation to CG studies, and the institutions that 
potentially impact the emergence of a CG regime in emerging societies. This 
chapter will discuss the methodology used for conducting this research study. 
The methodology takes into consideration the relationship between research 
objectives and research questions. The purpose of this research study, as 
discussed previously, is to explore the impact of institutions on the formation 
of corporate governance in a non-Western, emerging society. Thus, this 
chapter will describe the methodology that has been used to collect primary 
and secondary data in order to accomplish this goal. The research philosophy 
will be presented first. The research design will be presented second. The 
methods will be presented last.    
 
6.2 Research Philosophy 
 
Generally, research aims at answering questions relating to a particular 
phenomenon. In order to do this, the researcher needs to think about the 
design of the research in a logical sequence, starting from a particular 
philosophical position. Once a philosophical standpoint is established, the 
theoretical perspective, the methodology, and the method of conducting the 
research are developed (Creswell, 2003).  
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There are two approaches that all research should take in order to develop an 
understanding of (1) what the world is and (2) how the world can be known. 
7KHVHWZRDSSURDFKHVKDYHEHHQODEHOOHG¶HSLVWHPRORJ\·DQG¶RQWRORJ\·&URWW\ 
GHILQHVHSLVWHPRORJ\DV´DZD\RIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGH[SODLQLQJKRZ
ZHNQRZZKDWZHNQRZµ2QWKHRWKHUKDQGRQWRORJ\LVGHILQHGE\:DOOLPDQ
  DV ´D WKHRU\ RI VRFLDO HQWLWLHV WKDW LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK ZKDW WKHUH
H[LVWVWREHLQYHVWLJDWHGµ Epistemology is concerned with what is regarded as 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman, 2008). Also, it deals with the 
nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and general basis (Hamlyn, 1995). 
Moreover, it provides a philosophical grounding for deciding which forms of 
knowledge are possible and how the researcher can ensure they are legitimate 
and adequate (Maynard, 1994). On the other hand, ontology is concerned with 
¶ZKDW LV· LQ WHUPV RI WKH QDWXUH RI H[LVWHQFH DQG WKH VWUXFWXUH RI UHDOLW\
(Crotty, 2007). 
 
There is a range of epistemological standpoints that underpin social science 
and have been discussed by many scholars and philosophers. Two of these 
standpoints are positivism and constructionism (Hart, 1957; Papert and Harel, 
1991; Burr, 2003; Caldwell, 2003). According to Denscombe (2002: 27), 
SRVLWLYLVP LV ´DQ DSSURDFK WR VRFLDO UHVHDUFK WKDW VHHNV WR DSSO\ WKHQDWXUDO
science model of research to investigations of social phenomena and 
H[SODQDWLRQVRIWKHVRFLDOZRUOGµ3RVLWLYLVPLQYROYes deductive study and one 
main principle of deductivism is to create hypotheses that can be tested. 
Testing hypotheses allows for explanations and generalisable laws to be 
developed and examined under different conditions. This method of 
investigation offers objectivity and scientific control (Bryman, 2008). 
Deductivism is said to be objectivist as it revolves around scientific knowledge, 
Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
128 
 
which is empirically measurable. In this sense, deductivism is less concerned 
with qualitative, subjective data that is collected using non-scientific methods 
(Crotty, 2007).  
 
&URWW\KDVSRVLWHGWKDW´DOONQRZOHGJHDQGWKHUHIRUHDOOPHDQLQJIXO
reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and 
out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and 
transmitted within an eVVHQWLDO VRFLDO FRQWH[Wµ 7KLV YLHZSRLQW H[SODLQV KRZ
SHRSOH·V PLQGV UHFRJQLVH DQG LQWHUSUHW WKLQJV DQG KRZ WKH\ UHVSRQG 6RFLDO
FRQVWUXFWLRQLVPFDQEHYLHZHGDVDSKLORVRSKLFDOWUDGLWLRQLQZKLFK¶UHDOLW\·LV
determined by people rather than by objective and external factors. Thus, the 
task of the researcher is to understand the different constructs and meanings 
that people place upon their experience (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
 
The discussion of research philosophy has so far presented common positions 
that have been adopted by many research studies. However, a third position, 
ZKLFK LVQHLWKHUSRVLWLYLVWQRU FRQVWUXFWLRQLVW DQG LV DKLJKO\ IOH[LEOH ´PHWD-
YLHZµ ZKLFK KDV D SODFH LQ ERWK QDWXUDO DQG VRFLDO VFLHQFHV LV NQRZQ DV
¶FULWLFDOUHDOLVP·3UDWW, 2011: 16). Critical realism derives mainly from the work 
of Bhaskar (1975, 1979, 1989) and it prioritises ontology over epistemology 
(the theory of being over the theory of knowledge) in the way that the world is 
should guide the way knowledge of it can be obtained (Fleetwood and 
Ackroyd, 2004). Critical realism is relatively new to organisation and 
PDQDJHPHQWVWXGLHVDQGZDVSUHYLRXVO\NQRZQDV¶WUDQVFHQGHQWDOUHDOLVP·DQG
¶FULWLFDOQDWXUDOLVP· %KDVNDU$FFRUGLQJ WR%KDVNDU FULWLFDO
rHDOLVP´UHJDUGV WKHREMHFWVRINQRZOHGJHDV WKH VWUXFWXUHVDQGPHFKDQLVPV
that generate phenomena; and the knowledge as produced in the social activity 
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RI VFLHQFHµ 7KXV LW UHMHFWV SRVLWLYLVP·V SUHRFFXSDWLRQV ZLWK SUHGLFWLRQ
quantification and measuremenWZKLFKUHO\SULPDULO\RQ¶VFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJH·
(Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004). Alternatively, it offers a different perception 
of the nature of the social world and of social explanation from that perceived 
by positivism (Reed, 2005a). Also, the phenomena being studied are the core 
structures and mechanisms which produce empirical events rather than the 
empirical events in themselves, as argued by positivists (Reed, 2005a).  
 
Critical realism also rejects that scientific theories and the knowledge that 
human constructions produce cannot be evaluated or examined because they 
are socially constructed. Instead, these scientific theories accept the notion that 
the basic structures and mechanisms should be examined as they produce 
patterns of events and outcomes (Reed, 2005a). Similarly, critical realism 
UHMHFWVWKDWDKXPDQ·VVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
reality is exhaustive of that reality (Trigg, 2001). In other words, both social 
constructionism and critical realism agree that a hXPDQ·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
QDWXUDO ZRUOG LV ´VRFLDOO\ PHGLDWHGµ 1HZWRQ HW DO   +RZHYHU D
number of critical realists consider this as an over-socialised view of nature 
within a social constructionism perspective (Soper, 1995). In this sense, social 
actors from a critical realism perspective understand and interpret structures 
and mechanisms that produce the events they are attached to (Reed, 2005a).  
 
The ontological proposition of critical realism sees the world as an open 
system with emergent properties (autopoiesis, i.e. self-production; complexity 
theory, i.e. a way of understanding organisations and achieving organisational 
change). Critical realism is neither a closed system (a determinist machine with 
stable properties), as positivists asVXPH QRU DQ RSHQ V\VWHP ZKHUHE\ ´WKH
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ZRUOG LV QRWKLQJEXW WKHPHDQLQJ WKDWZHJLYH WR LWµ DV WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQLVWV
SUHVXPH 7KRUSH DQG +ROW   $FFRUGLQJ WR %KDVNDU·V 
ontological view, both knowledge and the world are structured, differentiated, 
and changing. The world exists independently of knowledge, and experiences 
and the things it affords us are normally out of phase with one another 
(Bhaskar, 1975). This separation of thought (knowledge) and object (the 
world) can lead to a distinction between practice and structure (Al-Amoudi 
and Willmott, 2011). Knowledge can be divided into practices, such as 
linguistic, scientific, technical, aesthetic, and so on. Structures, which range 
from the atomic to the economic, are not exclusive to particular practices. 
Thus, the role of science is to examine them.  
 
Sayer (2000) argues that critical realism is not what many people think it is, in 
WKDWWKH\DVVXPHLWLVWKH¶WUXWK·DQGWKXVLQYROYHVDIRUPRI¶IRXQGDWLRQDOLVP·
However, this is inconsistent with realism. Sayer (2000: 2) argues that critical 
UHDOLVP LV ´WKH EHOLHI WKDW WKHUH LV D ZRUOG H[LVWLQJ LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI RXU
NQRZOHGJH RI LWµ 7KXV WKLV LQGHSHQGHQFH RI REMHFWV IURP NQRZOHGJH
weakens any content assumptions about the relation between them and 
UHQGHUV LW SUREOHPDWLF 6D\HU  :KDW PDNHV FULWLFDO UHDOLVP ¶FULWLFDO· LV
that the identification of generative mechanisms (which Bhaskar (1975) refers 
to) offers the prospect of introducing changes that can transform the status 
quo (i.e. stable things) (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The next sub-section will 
present the main characteristics of critical realism.  
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6.2.1 Characteristics of Critical Realism 
 
There are fundamental characteristics of critical realism shared by widely 
regarded critical realists such as Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew 
&ROOLHU7RQ\/DZVRQDQG$ODQ1RUULHZKRWRJHWKHUHGLWHG¶&ULWLFDO5HDOLVP
(VVHQWLDO5HDGLQJV·7KHVH characteristics will be discussed as follows:  
 
Transitive-Intransitive Dimensions: a fundamental aim of critical realism is 
WR ´VXVWDLQ D FOHDU FRQFHSW RI WKH UHDOLW\ RI EHLQJ³of the intransitive or 
ontological dimension³in the face of the relativity of our knowledge³in the 
WUDQVLWLYHRUHSLVWHPRORJLFDOGLPHQVLRQµ%KDVNDUD[7KLVPHDQVWKDW
our knowledge of the world is transitive. This transitive knowledge 
corresponds to established knowledge which is used to produce new 
knowledge. It includes established theories, facts, models, methods, and so on 
(Bhaskar, 1978). Science produces transitive objects. The intransitive 
dimension refers to the objects of knowledge. This includes structures, 
mechanisms, processes, events, and the possibilities of the world which exist 
independently of us in which science seeks to discover and investigate 
(Bhaskar, 1978).  
 
In distinguishing between transitive and intransitive dimensions, Burkitt 
(1999), King (1999), and Newton (2007) share an understanding that interprets 
WKH ¶LQWUDQVLWLYH· DV WKH UHDOPRI WKH LPPXWDEOH REMHFWV RI WKH QDWXUDO ZRUOG
WKDW H[LVWV LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI KXPDQ DFWLYLW\ DQG WKH ¶WUDQVLWLYH· DV WKH
historically transient realm of human activity (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011). 
Thus, transitive and intransitive refer to two ontologically distinct realms of 
UHDOLW\)RUH[DPSOH´WKHUHLVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWKHRU\WKDWLVRODWHVWKH
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tendency of the profit to fall, and the actual economic mechanisms in 
RSHUDWLRQµ -RVHSK   $QRWKHU XQGHUstanding highlights that the 
distinction between transitive and intransitive is similar to the distinction 
between reference (which is knowledge as noted by Bhaskar (1979)) and 
referent (which may or may not be knowledge). In this regard, transitive 
dimension holds a considerable part in the formation of intransitive 
dimension. The transitive is differentiated from the intransitive which informs 
that knowledge is inexistent in a separate world (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 
2011). 
 
Generative Mechanisms and Causal Structures: Bhaskar (1998a: xvi) 
SRLQWV RXW WKDW ´JHQHUDWLYH PHFKDQLVPVµ DQG ´FDXVDO VWUXFWXUHVµ RI QDWXUH
DFFRUGLQJ WR FULWLFDO UHDOLVP DFFRXQW IRU WKH EDVLF SKHQRPHQD RI ¶KXPDQ
KLVWRU\· %KDVNDU E DOVR DUJXHV WKDW WKH\ PXVW ¶H[LVW· DQG ¶DFW·
inGHSHQGHQWO\ VR WKDW WKH\ DUH ¶VWUXFWXUHG· DQG ¶LQWUDQVLWLYH· 6LPLODU WR WKLV
%KDVNDU E DUJXHV WKDW ¶HYHQWV· PXVW RFFXU LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI WKH
¶H[SHULHQFHV· RI LQGLYLGXDOV 0HFKDQLVPV HYHQWV DQG H[SHULHQFHV FRPSULVH
three overlapping domains of reality: (a) empirical: which expresses 
experiences; (b) actual: which expresses events along with experiences; (c) real: 
which includes mechanisms as well as experiences and events (Bhaskar, 
E0HFKDQLVPVUHIHUWR´DFRPSOH[OD\HULQJRIQDWXUDODQGVRFLal forces 
which are not subject to human control, and which shape events (i.e. they 
SURYLGH FDXVDOLW\µ 3UDWW   *HQHUDWLYH PHFKDQLVPV DQG FDXVDO
VWUXFWXUHVDUHFRQVLGHUHGWREH´UHDODQGGLVWLQFWIURPWKHSDWWHUQVRIHYHQWV
that they generate; just as events are real and distinct from the experiences in 
ZKLFK WKH\ DUH DSSUHKHQGHGµ %KDVNDU E  7KHVH PHFKDQLVPV DQG
VWUXFWXUHV RSHUDWH LQ GLIIHUHQW ZD\V ZKLFK SURYLGH WKH ZRUOG ZLWK D ¶PXOWL-
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OD\HUHG·FKDUDFWHUWKXVFULWLFDOUHDOLVPLVDQLQ-depth realism (Al-Amoudi and 
Willmott, 2011). Sayer (2000) argues that stratification is an important feature 
of critical realism in which generative mechanisms belong to different strata, 
such as social, psychological, and chemical. The interaction between these 
mechanisms within a single stratum generates new phenomena at a higher 
level in the emergence process (Sayer, 2000). 
 
Reality is viewed as complex and changing. Uni-dimensional positivism is 
GLIIHUHQW DV LW YLHZV NQRZOHGJH SXUHO\ DV ¶DFFXPXODWHG Vense-GDWD· QRW
necessarily an aspect of all positivists) (Pratt, 2011). Fleetwood (2005: 200) 
points out that the domain of real can include other modes of real, such as: 
´PDWHULDOO\ UHDOµ LH PDWHULDO HQWLWLHV VXFK DV WKH VXQ DQG WKH VHD ´LGHDOO\
reDOµ LH FRQFHSWXDO HQWLWLHV VXFK DV GLVFRXUVH EHOLHIV PHDQLQJV
XQGHUVWDQGLQJV DQG WKHRULHV ´DUWHIDFWXDOO\ UHDOµ LH V\QWKHVHV VXFK DV
FRPSXWHUV DQG FRVPHWLFV DQG ´VRFLDOO\ UHDOµ LH VRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV VXFK DV
rules, relations, and practices). Thus, critical realism is a project of enormous 
depth, dimension and scope (Pratt, 2011). 
 
Reed (2005a) reflects on the relevance, nature, and consequences of adopting a 
critical realism approach as an investigative orientation in organisation and 
PDQDJHPHQW VWXGLHV +H SRLQWV RXW WKDW FULWLFDO UHDOLVP FDQ RIIHU ¶FRKHUHQW
RQWRORJLFDO· JURXQGV DQG ¶FDXVDO-H[SODQDWRU\· PHWKRGV IRU GHWHUPLQLQJ
IXQGDPHQWDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGPHFKDQLVPVZKLFKFUHDWH¶REVHUYDEOHHYHQWV·DQG
RXWFRPHVWKDWPD\RUPD\QRWEH¶DFWXDOLVHG·LQSDUWLFXODUKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[WV
and social settings. Contu and Willmott (2005: 1646) inGLFDWH WKDW ´FULWLFDO
realism can assist in opening-up deep-seated issues in the philosophical 
VWDQGLQJ RI VRFLDO DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQDO DQDO\VLVµ 3UDWW  DVVHUWV WKDW WKH
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critical realism approach seeks in-depth investigation of natural and social 
phenomena and attempts to identify the mechanisms operating in a given 
context. He also argues that critical realism attempts to go beyond the 
boundaries of experience by suggesting the reality behind it. Moreover, a social 
SKHQRPHQRQ FDQ RIWHQ EH ¶XQGHUVWRRG· EXW QRW RIWHQ ¶PHDQLQJIXOO\
PHDVXUHG· KHQFH LWV SUHIHUHQFH IRU TXDOLWDWLYH PHWKRGV )OHHWZRRG DQG
Ackroyd, 2004). Looking at the world from this perspective is better for 
exploratory and descriptive studies that seek to understand, investigate, and 
explain a phenomenon in depth.  
 
For the above-mentioned reasons, this research study will look at the research 
problem from a critical realism perspective, which prioritises ontology (the 
theory of being) over epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and focuses on 
the mechanisms that produce events rather than the events themselves, as 
¶VWUXFWXUHG·DQG¶GLIIHUHQWLDWHG·%KDVNDU&ULWLFDOUHDOLVPFDQEHVHHQDV
´DSKLORVRSK\RIVFLHQFHWKDWSURYLGHVDWKHRU\DQGPRGHORIVRFLDOVFLHQWLILF
explanation, based RQDV\VWHPDWLFIRUPRI«PHWKRGRORJ\ZKLFKFRPELQHV
historical, structural and processual analysis in a coherent and integrated 
IUDPHZRUNµ 5HHG E  7KHQH[W VHFWLRQ ZLOO SUHVHQW WKH UHVHDUFK
design of this study.   
 
6.3 Research Design 
 
A research design is essentially a framework for collecting, analysing and 
interpreting data (Zikmund, 2003). It helps researchers to collect solid data 
sets and use them appropriately to answer research questions (de Vaus, 2001). 
Different methods may produce different depths of findings. As such, the 
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challenge is to tailor the research design and methods to the specific aims of 
the project (Patton, 2002). Social science research mainly falls into one of two 
approaches: deductive approach and inductive approach (Walliman, 2006). 
The deductive approach generally starts from general to specific. A research 
project usually begins with a theoretical consideration, which leads to 
hypotheses. This is followed by data collection, the testing of hypotheses, and 
then the confirmation or rejection of those hypotheses. The deductive 
approach is often used in a quantitative strategy (Bryman and Bell, 2007). On 
the other hand, inductive approach usually starts from specific observation to 
general theories. Such a research project usually begins with a specific 
observation, which in turn leads to the formation of tentative propositions. 
The inductive approach is often used in qualitative research strategy (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). Thomas (2006) outlines the purpose of using an inductive 
approach in that it is used to: (a) condense extensive raw data into a brief 
format, (b) create understandable links between the objectives of the research 
and the outcomes of the raw data, and (c) develop a framework of the causal 
structure of the processes or experiences that arise in the raw data.  
 
This research study aims to explore the influence of different institutions on 
the emergence and development of corporate governance in non-Western, 
emerging societies. Thus, the deductive approach is not suitable for this study 
due to the exploratory nature of this research. The inductive approach is the 
most suitable for this research study as it assists in exploring general patterns 
and themes relating to the impact of institutions on CG as perceived by 
significant social actors.  
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Business research can be classified based on the techniques used (e.g. 
interviews, surveys, and experiments) or the function (the nature of the 
problem that influences the choice of method) into three types: exploratory 
study, descriptive research, and experimental research (Zikmund, 2003). 
Exploratory study is often used when the problem is ambiguous and 
widespread. Research is needed in this case to provide insights and a better 
understanding of the dimensions of the problem. Descriptive research is 
mainly used to describe characteristics of an existing population or 
phenomenon. It helps to determine the answers to what, where, when, who, 
and how. Experimental research is often used to create statistical experimental 
conWUROVWRHVWDEOLVK¶FRQWUDVWJURXSV·7KHVHH[SHULPHQWVFDQEHFRQGXFWHGE\
both pragmatic business people for business development and by scholars for 
conceptual and empirical development.  
 
As this research study aims at exploring the influence of different institutions 
on the formation of corporate governance in non-Western, emerging societies, 
exploratory study is the most suitable approach for this research. An 
exploratory study is most appropriate here because it is useful in new or 
under-explored areas where there is a lack of sufficient theory and concepts to 
describe, analyse, and explain what is going on (Robson, 2002). This 
exploratory study has been conducted in Saudi Arabia and gathered 
information provided by significant social actors, who have relevance for this 
research study. Thus, data have been generated and collected from semi-
structured interviews and from archival sources. The next section details the 
methods used to collect the primary and secondary data.   
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6.4 Research Methods  
 
Research methods dictate the way in which data is collected. There are two 
main types of research methods in social science: quantitative methods and 
qualitative methods. Bryman (2004: 62) describes quantitative research as: 
  
«HQWDLOLQJ WKHFROOHFWLRQRInumerical data and as exhibiting a view of 
the relationship between theory and research as deductive, a predilection 
for a natural science approach (and of positivism in particular), and as 
having an objectivist conception of social reality. 
 
Quantitative data can be collected through four main methods: questionnaire 
surveys, interviews, tests/measures, and observation (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). The objective of quantitative research is to develop empirical models 
and hypotheses relating to a particular domain. In quantitative research, the 
process of measurement is fundamental as any data is translated into numerical 
form so that relationships can be statistically examined. Thus, quantitative 
approaches are used in studies that seek to explain relationships between 
variables or to predict outcomes based on objective findings. Also, quantitative 
methods tend to measure differences among variables and assist in 
understanding the significance of those differences. Statistical measures can 
therefore be used to compare numerical differences in order to determine their 
degree of significance (Glitz, 1997). As such, this approach tends to seek out 
objective, scientific, statistical findings rather than qualitative, in-depth 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI WKH ¶WUXH PHDQLQJ· Rf phenomena. Social phenomena can 
RIWHQ EH ¶XQGHUVWRRG· EXW QRW RIWHQ ¶PHDQLQJIXOO\ PHDVXUHG· IURP D FULWLFDO
realism point of view (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004).  
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2WKHUW\SHVRIPHWKRGVLQVRFLDOVFLHQFHDUHUHIHUUHGWRDV¶TXDOLWDWLYH·DVWKH\
are less concerned with generating numerically measurable, traditionally 
scientific data. Van Maanen (1983: 9) offers a definition:  
 
>4XDOLWDWLYH DSSURDFKHV UHSUHVHQW@«DQ DUUD\ RI LQWHUSUHWLYH WHFKQLTXHV
which seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms 
with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world. 
 
Thus, qualitative methods allow for the flexibility and variety of interpretive 
techniques which are essential for understanding phenomena in social science 
studies. This is consistent with a critical realism perspective and the notion 
WKDW LW LV D KLJKO\ IOH[LEOH ´PHWD-YLHZµ 3UDWW   &UHVZHOO  
points out that: 
 
[a] research problem needs to be explored [when] little information exists 
on the topic. The variables are largely unknown and the researcher wants 
to focus on the context that may shape the understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied. 
 
A qualitative approach is most appropriate when investigating a little-known 
or poorly-understood phenomenon. It is also best for areas that have not yet 
received much attention in the literature. These areas, which have unknown 
variables, need to be treated and covered sufficiently to give broad consent for 
future research, which, in turn, are necessary to broaden the views and provide 
insights that contribute to the literature. 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 10) point out that one important feature of 
TXDOLWDWLYH GDWD LV WKDW ´LW IRFXVHV RQ QDWXUDOO\ RFFXUULQJ RUGLQDU\ HYHQWV LQ 
QDWXUDO VHWWLQJVµZKLFKSURYLGHVDVHQVHRIZKDW ¶UHDO OLIH· LV OLNH4XDOLWDWLYH
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research is concerned with the process of collecting data rather than the 
resulting outcomes (Merriam, 1988). It is also concerned with meaning³the 
way in which people generate a detailed perspective of personal lived 
experience and how they make sense of that experience (Merriam, 1988). 
These propositions are compatible with the ethos of critical realism. Moreover, 
when the research inquiry is on the basis of the participant·VSHUFHSWLRQDQG
interpretation, then the collected data are subjective materials (Herndl and 
1DKUZROG4XDOLWDWLYHUHVHDUFKLVXVHGWRJDLQLQVLJKWVRIDQLQGLYLGXDO·V
experience and to develop a sense of their reality (Herndl and Nahrwold, 
2000). This is well-suited to the philosophy of critical realism. It is also used in 
research that explores where and why knowledge and practices are at odds 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1989).  
 
The qualitative approach is often used for developing an in-depth 
understanding of the research topic through various instruments (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002). These instruments include interviews, observation, case 
studies, and focus groups (Creswell, 1994). Interview methods are well 
established in the study of institutions and their influence on people, 
organisations, and markets (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; 
Lok, 2010). 
 
This adds additional support to the use of this approach when conducting 
studies on different institutions as the qualitative approach is the best strategy 
for discovery and exploring a new area (Miles and Huberman, 1994). As 
mentioned previously, this study focuses on understanding different types of 
institutions in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society as perceived 
by significant social actors and the impact of these 
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formation of corporate governance from an institutional theory perspective. In 
fact, the subject of corporate governance in the Arabian Gulf area has received 
very little attention in the literatuUHGXH WR WKHGLIILFXOW\ WRDFFHVV ¶DFWRUV· DV
this subject is relatively new in the area, which results in a paucity of experts in 
the field. Therefore, the qualitative approach is the best for gathering in-depth 
information from the key actors in the field. Also, qualitative data has 
¶ULFKQHVV· DQG ¶KROLVP· FKDUDFWHULVWLFV ZLWK VWURQJ SRWHQWLDO IRU UHYHDOLQJ
FRPSOH[LW\ VXFK GDWD RIIHU ´WKLFN GHVFULSWLRQVµ WKDW DUH YLYLG DQG LQWHQVH
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10). Furthermore, the exploratory nature of this 
study along with the research questions necessitate the adoption of a 
qualitative approach, which is broadly seen as most suitable for understanding 
SHRSOH·VSHUFHSWLRQVDQGYLHZVRIDSDUWLFXODUSKHQRPHQRQ:DOOLPDQ
Such concepts are not measureable (in a quantitative sense) and difficult to 
understand without face-to-face interaction (Gephart, 2004). Moreover, 
Creswell (1994) recommends using qualitative approach in studies that attempt 
to discover, understand and explore processes, and describe experiences. This 
recommendation is highly relevant to the research questions of this study. For 
the reasons above, this research study employed the qualitative approach to 
explore what do non-Western, emerging society (Saudi Arabia) institutions 
consist of and what the potential influences of these institutions on the 
emergence of the CG regime in this context. The discussion will proceed to 
present ethical considerations that should be taken into account when 
conducting a research study. 
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6.4.1 Ethical Considerations 
 
Qualitative methods commonly provoke discussion about ethics. This is due 
to the nature of qualitative research and the view that it tends to be more 
¶VHQVLWLYH·DQG¶UHFHSWLYH·WRKXPDQIHHOLQJVDQGHPRWLRQV(DVWHUE\-Smith et 
al., 2002). Furthermore, qualitative methods tend to be personal and 
interpersonal; in-depth interviews reveal what is inside people, and they are 
QDWXUDOO\ PRUH ¶LQWUXVLYH· WKDQ TXDQWLWDWLYH DSSURDFKHV 3DWWRQ  ,Q
qualitative methods, the researcher is in a powerful position in relation to 
individuals in which he/she has more control of what information is gathered, 
how it is recorded, how it is interpreted, and how it is reported. Hence there is 
arguably heightened concern with ethical considerations in qualitative methods 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
 
Bryman (2012) points out that discussions about ethical principles in social 
research are broken down by Diener and Crandall (1978) into four main areas: 
(1) whether there is harm to participants, (2) whether there is a lack of 
informed consent, (3) whether there is an invasion of privacy, and (4) whether 
deception is involved. It is important to take these four areas into account 
when conducting any social research because they form a useful account for 
ethical principles in such types of research (Bryman, 2012). A number of 
professional associations such as the British Sociological Association (BSA), 
the Social Research Association (SRA), and the British Psychological Society 
(BPS), have formulated dense codes of ethics that can be useful when 
conducting a social research and are accessible from the Internet. Saunders et 
al. (2012) highlight a number of ethical principles which were taken into 
account throughout the data collection stage of this research study. These 
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principles are outlined in Table 6.1 along with actions taken by the researcher 
of this study during the data collection process. 
 
Table 6.1: Ethical Principles and Actions Taken 
Seq. Ethical Principle Actions Taken by the Researcher 
1 Respect for others The researcher has taken into account valuing the dignity 
and worth of all participants with particular regard to 
SHRSOH·VULJKWV 
2 Integrity and 
objectivity of the 
researcher 
Acting openly, being truthful, promoting accuracy, and 
avoiding deception and dishonesty are essential ethics that 
the quality of a research depends on. These have been 
largely taken into account by the researcher. 
3 Avoidance of harm 
(non-maleficence) 
Embarrassment, stress, discomfort, pain, and conflict are 
some forms of harm that must be avoided and these have 
been taken into account by the researcher. 
4 Voluntary nature of 
participation and 
right to withdraw 
This has been explained (verbally and written) to all 
participants prior to any interview. 
5 Informed consent of 
those taking part 
A sufficient information and assurance about participating 
in the interview were provided to all interviewees to allow 
them to understand the implications of participation and to 
help them make decisions whether to take a part or not 
freely and without any kind of pressure.  
6 Ensuring 
confidentiality of data 
and maintenance of 
anonymity of those 
taking part 
The anonymity of interviewees and their organisations was 
maintained by the researcher who used pseudonyms 
throughout this thesis. The data they provide were used by 
the researcher only for the purpose of this research study to 
ensure confidentiality of data.  
7 Responsibility in the 
analysis of data and 
reporting of findings 
The sources of data were acknowledged, the accuracy of 
outcomes was ensured, and the findings were reported fully 
and accurately irrespective of whether they contradict 
expected outcomes.  
 
 
9ROXQWDU\SDUWLFLSDWLRQRU¶LQIRUPHGFRQVHQW·LQDUHVHDUFKVWXG\VLJQLILHV´WKH
H[SUHVVHGRULPSOLHGDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWZDLYLQJDQLQGLYLGXDO·VULJKWWRSULYDF\
ZKHQKHRUVKHDJUHHVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQDUHVHDUFKVWXG\µ=LNPXQG
Thus, confidentiality (which will be discussed further in the interview 
approach sub-section) was stressed when recruiting participants. Permission to 
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collect tape recordings and access to the data was also requested and attained. 
The design considered the anonymit\RISDUWLFLSDQWV·GDWD H[FOXGLQJSULYDWH
and identifiable data of organisations and participants), respect for privacy 
(phrasing interview questions as neutral and non-intrusive), collecting only 
necessary data for the study, and preserving sensitive data from exposure for 
the interest of any other organisations or participants. The next sub-section 
presents the interview approach employed in this research study.  
 
6.4.2 Interview Approach 
 
Rubin and Rubin (2005: 4) assert that qualitative interviews are: 
 
conversations in which a researcher gently guides a conversational 
partner in an extended discussion. 
 
$ IXQGDPHQWDO DVVXPSWLRQ RI DQ LQWHUYLHZ LV WKDW ´SHUVSHFWLYH RI RWKHUV LV
PHDQLQJIXO NQRZDEOH DQG DEOH WR EH PDGH H[SOLFLWµ 3DWWRQ  
Therefore, interviews are used to elicit detailed information about the research 
topic from the answers given by the participant (Rubin and Rubin, 2005), to 
PLQLPLVH ¶FURVVFXOWXUDO·PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJV 3DWWRQ DQG WREXLOG WUXVW
WRHQDEOH¶FRJQLWLYHDFFHVV·6DXQGHUVHWDO 
 
Qualitative interviews are commonly classified into two main categories: Semi-
structured interviews and unstructured interviews (Arksey and Knight, 1999; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Patton, 2002; Robson, 2002; Bryman, 2004). 
Unlike structured interviews, which are generally employed in social surveys 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999), a semi-structured interview is defined by Robson 
(2002: 270) as consisting of: 
Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
144 
 
predetermined questions, but the order can be modified based upon the 
LQWHUYLHZHU·V SHUFHSWLRQ RI ZKDW VHHPV PRVW DSSURSULDWH 4XHVWLRQ
wording can be changed and explanations given; particular questions 
which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee can be omitted, or 
additional ones included. 
 
This type of interview is narrower in focus than broader interviews which are 
known as unstructured interviews with open-ended questions (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2005). Qualitative interviews also differ in the subject of focus: whether 
they are about eliciting understandings or meanings or whether their purpose 
is to describe specific events or processes (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). 
 
As this research is exploratory in nature, this research study has utilised semi-
structured interviews that were derived from a prepared set of questions which 
were piloted and refined in line with Easterby-6PLWKHWDO·VVXJJHVWLRQV
This type of approach keeps the interview on track and guides interviewees to 
answer the interview questions in relation to the research topic. Moreover, 
semi-structured interviews keep the conversation in focus by asking a series of 
specific questions about the topic to elicit meanings. Semi-structured interview 
LV VHOHFWHG KHUH EHFDXVH LW HQDEOHV ´UDSSRUW WR EH GHYHORSHG DOORZV
participants to think, speak and be heard; and [is] well suited to in-depth and 
SHUVRQDO GLVFXVVLRQµ 5HLG HW DO   ,Q WKLV VW\OH RI LQWHUYLHZLQJ
participants are encouraged to talk informally, like friends rather than strangers 
(Madill, 2011). This allows vigorous rapport to be developed with each 
interviewee and enables them to speak freely and openly about their lived 
experiences (Smith, 2011), while remaining in the subject area. By asking clear 
and transparent questions, the level of confusion is minimised. It is also worth 
noting WKDW H[FHVVLYH JXLGDQFH FDQ FRQVWLWXWH ¶OHDGLQJ· TXHVWLRQV ZKLFK LV
dangerous as it risks undermining the validity of the study. Also, some 
Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
145 
 
interviewees might provide some potentially interesting ideas, so the 
interviewer should be also open to unexpected conversations during the 
interviews. This type of interviews offers the social actors an opportunity to 
give their perceptions on the influence of institutions on corporate governance 
without limiting them to specific areas. This can be achieved through building 
a rapport with participants (Bailey, 1996) to ensure they freely express as rich 
an opinion as possible.  
 
There are different ways of establishing a rapport with interviewees. For 
example, researchers may dress in a business suit or look scholarly and speak 
free of bias of sex, accent, class, and race (or minimising or controlling them) 
(McNeill, 1990). Researchers can also aim at neutralising any cross-cultural 
misunderstanding (Patton, 1990) through their linguistic abilities (such as the 
case in this particular research, where the researcher is fluent in both Arabic 
and English languages). Researchers must also prepare well for the interview, 
start with a brief introduction of the research topic, and move in a sequence of 
present to past events or general to specific situations that helps to keep the 
interview on track (Patton, 1990). This also helps the collection of rich, high 
quality data.  
 
There are different ways of conducting interviews. For example, face-to-face 
interviews, telephone interviews, and email interviews (Arksey and Knight, 
1999; Fowler, 2002; Zikmund, 2003). All these ways of interviewing have 
certain strengths and weaknesses. For example, telephone and email interviews 
are helpful when it is difficult or impossible to physically travel to the 
respondents (Walliman, 2006). On the other hand, the interviewer cannot 
always judge the quality of responses that result from these methods as he/she 
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cannot use visual aids to explain poorly understood questions and to 
encourage respondents to be full in their answers. There are also no visual 
clues, such as eye contact, smiling, facial and hand gestures, and body language 
(Walliman, 2006). A face-to-face interview is a two-way conversation between 
an interviewer and a respondent which helps in obtaining complete and 
precise information (Zikmund, 2003), developing a larger picture of the topic, 
analysing the data in a more elaborative way, and networking (Fowler, 2002). 
In a face-to-face interview, the interviewer has more chance of judging the 
quality of responses on an on-going basis, noticing any poorly understood 
questions, encouraging interviewees to fully answer questions, and using visual 
signs such as smiles and gestures in order to gain the best response (Walliman, 
2006). For these reasons, this research study has used face-to-face interviews.  
 
Face-to-face interviews can take place in a variety of situations: at work, in the 
home, outdoors, or in any place that suits the interviewee (Zikmund, 2003; 
Walliman, 2006). For example, the interviews in this research study have been 
conducted at work and in restaurants. These interviews lasted in an around 60 
to 90 minutes in order to obtain as rich information as possible without losing 
concentration (for more details, see Table 6.2). Confidentiality, which refers to 
´WKHREOLJDWLRQRQ WKHSDUWRI WKH UHVHDUFKHUQRW WR UHYHDO WKH LGHQWLW\RI DQ
LQGLYLGXDO UHVHDUFK VXEMHFWµ =LNPXQG   KDV EHHQ DSSOLHG LQ DOO
interviews. When some interviewees asked questions about other organisations 
or other participants, general and opaque replies were given. This approach 
has been adopted in order to maintain adequate privacy of sensitive data about 
each organisation, to ensure that rich and valid data can be obtained (as many 
participants often think that researchers have a moral duty to improve 
situations) (Knight, 2002), and to reduce the probability of causing participants 
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to feel in any way uncomfortable (Kvale 1996). A fieldwork diary entry was 
made before and after each interview in order to observe, link empirical data 
to a theoretical position/paradigm, and consider the possibility of alternative 
interpretations based on other positions (Goldpaugh and Rivers, 2003). 
 
Table 6.2,QWHUYLHZV·'HWDLOV3  
# Date Organisation Place Position Rank Length N/V 
1 18 Dec 11 Services-6 Work Director of 
Corporate 
Development 
SMT 60 min Notes 
2 19 Dec 11 Insurance-1 Resta-
urant 
CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 2 hours Voice 
3 21 Dec 11 Industry-1 Work CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 2:30 
hours 
Voice 
4 24 Dec 11 Industry-3 Work Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 60 min Notes 
5 27 Dec 11 Petrochemical-1 Work CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 50 min Notes 
6 07 Jan 12 Cement-1 Work Business Dev. 
Dept. Manager 
SMT 60 min Notes 
7 08 Jan 12 Bank-1 Work VP & Head of 
Compliance 
Division 
SMT 90 min Voice 
8 09 Jan 12 Services-1 Work CEO TMT 100 min Voice 
9 10 Jan 12 Services-3 Work Director of 
Shareholders 
Affairs 
MMT 50 min Voice 
10 23 Jan 12 Bank-2 Work Legal Consultant SMT 75 min Notes 
11 24 Jan 12 Services-2 Work CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 2 hours Voice 
12 31 Jan 12 Bank-4 Work Deputy Head, 
Financial Dept. 
SMT 75 min Voice 
13 01 Feb 12 Bank-3 Work Deputy Group SMT 90 min Notes 
                                                 
3
 Key: 
Length: duration of the interview   
N/V: type of data taking (notes taking / voice recording) 
Rank: level of authority: top management (TMT), senior management (SMT), middle management 
(MMT).       
 
Location: 
Interviews from 1 to 9 were conducted in Jeddah city. 
Interviews from 10 to 23 were conducted in Riyadh city. 
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General Manage 
14 05 Feb 12 Bank-5 Work CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 60 min Notes 
15 06 Feb 12 Industry-2 Work Director of 
Accounting and 
Internal Auditing 
SMT 60 min Notes 
16 07 Feb 12 CMA Work Head of CG TMT 90 min Voice 
17 07 Feb 12 CMA Work Advisor 1, 
Market 
Supervision 
SMT 60 min Notes 
18 08 Feb 12 Services-4 Work Director of 
Investor 
Relations + 
Secretary of the 
Board 
SMT 45 min Voice 
19 11 Feb 12 Retail-1 Work CG Division 
Head 
MMT 60 min Notes 
20 12 Feb 12 Stock-Exchange Work Primary Market 
Manager 
MMT 90 min Voice 
21 21 Feb 12 Bank-7 Work Deputy Head, 
Finance Dept. 
SMT 60 min Notes 
22 03 Mar 12 Services-5 Work CG Division 
Head 
MMT 60 min Notes 
23 05 Mar 12 Bank-6 Work CG Dept. Head MMT 60 min Notes 
 
 
Sampling: interviews were conducted with twenty three significant social 
actors. Nine interviews were conducted in Jeddah city between December 
2011 and January 2012, and fourteen interviews were conducted in Riyadh city 
between January 2012 and March 2012. The sample included Saudi Arabian 
corporate governance managers of listed firms, Saudi Arabian regulatory 
authority officials, and Saudi stock exchange mediator representatives in order 
to elicit information about the research topic (see Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: Interview Sample Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each interviewee was interviewed once in the first stage of interviews. The 
only condition for participation was that participants had to be closely linked 
to corporate governance in terms of their work. This condition was set to 
ensure that all questions about the role of institutions in the emergence of the 
CG regime in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society could be 
answered fully. In particular, each actor was interviewed to provide his 
inclusive perception about the influence of each institution (politics, kinship, 
religion, family, market, legal, bureaucratic administration) on the emergence 
of the governance regime in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society. 
In order to clarify the findings from the first stage of interviews, seven 
participants were re-interviewed in a second stage of interviews. Interviewing 
CG Managers of 
listed firms 
Saudi Arabian 
Firms¶ 
Governance 
Kinship 
Regulatory Authority 
Officials 
Politics 
Stock Exchange 
Mediator 
representatives 
Religion 
Market 
Family 
Legal 
Bureaucratic 
Administration 
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social actors generated insights and themes from different perspectives in 
terms of the role played by institutions with respect to the emergence of 
corporate governance in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging context. 
Table 6.3 EHORZRXWOLQHVLQWHUYLHZHHV·GHWDLOV 
 
Table 6.3,QWHUYLHZHHV·'HWDLOV4 
                                                 
4
 Key: 
Rank: level of authority: top management (TMT), senior management (SMT), middle management 
(MMT). 
# Organisation Pseud-
onyms  
Position Rank Qualification Experience 
1 Services-6 P22 Director of 
Corporate 
Development 
SMT MBA 17 years 
2 Insurance-1 P3 CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT MSc Management 8 years 
3 Industry-1 P6 CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT MSc acc. & fin., 
PhD res in CG 
7 years in CG 
4 Industry-3 P20 Compliance 
Manager 
MMT Not supplied 6 years in CG 
5 Petrochemical-1 P10 CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT BSc in accounting 5 years in CG 
6 Cement-1 P8 Business Dev. 
Dept. Mgr. 
and CG 
Supervisor 
SMT BSc in Business 
Administration  
6 months in CG, 
total: 16 years 
7 Bank-1 P1 VP & Head of 
Compliance 
Division 
SMT Diploma 3 years in CG 
8 Services-1 P2 CEO TMT BSc Law 5 years in CG 
9 Services-3 P7 Director of 
Shareholders 
Affairs 
MMT BSc Industrial 
Engineering 
5 years in CG 
10 Bank-2 P5 Legal 
Consultant 
SMT Not supplied 25 years 
11 Services-2 P4 CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT MBA 1 year in CG 
12 Bank-4 P14 Deputy Head, 
Financial 
Dept. 
SMT BSc Accounting CG: 3, Banking: 
11 
13 Bank-3 P9 Deputy Group 
General 
Manage 
SMT Not supplied CG: over 10 years 
14 Bank-5 P15 CG & MMT BSc in Accounting 6 years in CG 
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$FFHVVWRLQWHUYLHZHHVZDVLQLWLDOO\DFKLHYHGWKURXJKWKHUHVHDUFKHU·VSHUVRQDO
connections to a number of corporate governance bodies in Saudi Arabia. 
Then, direct communication with concerned participants was been made 
through phone calls in order to develop more contacts for interview. It is 
ZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV·FRQWDFWLQIRUPDWLRQLVDYDLODEOHRQWKHZHEVLWH
of the Saudi stock exchange company (Tadawul). This approach is used most 
frequently to conduct explorative and qualitative research, primarily through 
LQWHUYLHZV 7KH UHVHDUFKHU·V LQWURGXFWLRQ DERXW KLPVHOI DQG D EULHI
introduction about the research topic along with its purpose and objective to 
some degree reduced the problems associated with obtaining the trust of 
respondents, as the interviewees know that they will be asked some sensitive 
questions. Thus, this approach helped in terms of obtaining details and real 
Compliance 
Manager 
15 Industry-2 P17 Director of 
Accounting 
and Internal 
Auditing  
SMT Not supplied Not supplied 
16 CMA P12 Head of CG TMT BSc Accounting, 
Dip 
CG:4, central 
banks:16 
17 CMA AG Advisor 1, 
Market 
Supervision 
SMT BSc in accounting CG: 6 years, 
Collective: 21 
years 
18 Services-4 P11 Director of 
Investor 
Relations + 
Secretary of 
the Board 
SMT BSc Industrial 
Engineering 
CG: 6, total: 9 
19 Retail-1 P16 CG Division 
Head 
MMT BSc in Economics 6 years in CG 
20 Stock-Exchange P23 Primary 
Market 
Manager 
MMT Not supplied Not supplied 
21 Bank-7 P19 Deputy Head, 
Finance Dept. 
SMT Not supplied 6 years in CG 
22 Services-5 P21 CG Division 
Head 
MMT BSc in Business 
Administration 
6 years in CG 
23 Bank-6 P18 CG Dept. 
Head 
MMT MSc in Accounting 2 years in CG 
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facts about existing problems instead of getting superficial information as long 
as the interviewer has built initial rapport in phone calls. A good advantage of 
this approach is reaching to the most suitable people for this study, that have a 
background in corporate governance systems. Those people can potentially 
provide rich and high quality information relevant to the research questions of 
this study.   
 
The direct approach strategy was secured through preparation by the 
interviewer. An access document along with an interview guide was written to 
selected participants after initial project approval. The access document is bi-
lingual (written in English and in Arabic), and provides a brief description of 
the research topic and the objectives of pursuing such a study in the Saudi 
Arabian context and the potential benefits to the participants. 
 
Building Trust: gathering rich data can be obtained through building trust 
between the interviewer and the respondents (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) suggest that building trust can be achieved 
through the following steps: firstly, by ensuring that the researcher is well 
informed about the organisation by using annual reports and publications in 
advance; secondly, by avoiding being over-anxious about collecting all the data 
in one attempt as relationships take time to develop such that ensuring repeat 
access and discussion will be beneficial; finally, by overseeing the potential 
effects of using audio recording during the interviews, which mainly depends 
RQ DQ LQWHUYLHZHH·V DQ[LHW\ DERXW FRQILGHQWLDOLW\ VXFK DV NHHSLQJ QDPHV
SRVLWLRQV DQG DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ·V FRQfidential data. These steps have been 
followed during the interviews, as building trust is an important factor in 
obtaining rich, in-depth information from the respondents.  
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Attracting Participants: interviewees were attracted to participate in these 
interviews in two ways: first, explaining to them that there are potential 
barriers to the development of corporate governance in the area, and 
demonstrating the fact that numerous financial crises have occurred due to 
poor corporate governance mechanisms (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Mitton, 
2002; Daily et al., 2003; Millar et al., 2005); second, offering to provide them 
an executive summary of the results from this research study.   
 
Question Design: there are some important issues about wording and 
phrasing that were taken into account when designing the interview questions. 
This is because the wording and the way in which a question is asked affects 
WKH LQWHUYLHZHH·V UHVSRQVH 3DWWRQ $UNVH\ DQG.QLJKt (1999) suggest 
some recommendations when designing questions which can be applied to all 
types of interviews:  
 
x Vocabulary: choosing clear and understandable words for the particular 
cultural or social sample being interviewed. 
x Prejudicial language: avoiding reinforcing particular beliefs or prejudices. 
x Ambiguity: avoiding the misunderstanding of words that can be 
interpreted in different ways. 
x Leading questions: avoiding using questions that suggest or lead 
interviewees towards a particular answer. 
x Double-barrelled questions: avoiding questions that ask two in one. 
 
These recommendations have been taken into account when the interview 
questions have been designed. These suggestions have helped obtaining rich 
information about the research topic. In addition, the interview questions were 
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prepared in English, translated to Arabic, then all the collected data from 
interviews in Arabic were translated back to English by the researcher.  
 
Sequence of Questions: with regards to the sequence of interview questions, 
Patton (2002) prefers to begin with noncontroversial present situations and 
then progress to past events. He also suggests beginning with general 
questions and moving into more specific, detailed questions. As such, the 
interview schedule was alLJQHGWRVRPHRI/HHFK·VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVLQ
WKDW ¶JUDQGWRXU·TXHVWLRQVDUHXVHGWRRSHQWKH LQWHUYLHZDQGPRUHVSHFLILF
probing questions then follow. This structure enables participants to settle into 
the interview, introduce some broad issues, and then delve into the finer 
details (Leech, 2002). A commonly used sequence is outlined by Robson 
(2002) in five stages as follows. Firstly, an introduction, where the interviewer 
commences the interview by introducing himself and explaining the purpose 
of the interview should be provided. Secondly, warming up, where general 
questions should be asked in order to settle down the conversation should 
occur. Thirdly, the main body of the interview, where deep and detailed 
questions can be asked should take place. It is suggested to ask risky questions 
late at this stage so that, if the respondent refuses to carry on, less information 
ZLOO EH ORVW )RXUWKO\ D ¶FRRO-RII· SHULRG VKRXOG WDNH SODFH ZKHUH
straightforward questions can be asked to clarify things already mentioned 
during the interview and also to defuse tensions that might have come across. 
)LQDOO\¶FORVXUH·VKRXOGKDSSHQZKHUHWKHQRWHERRNLVDZD\DQGWKHUHFRUGHU
is off then showing gratitude and appreciation by the interviewer is 
recommended at all times. Some interesting topics may well arise towards the 
end of the interview. At this stage, the interviewee can be asked for suggesting 
a suitable participant for this research as he has developed a good idea about 
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the research topic. These steps can allow the interviewer to gain more 
information from the interview which may further help in answering the 
research questions and meeting the objectives of this research. Therefore, this 
sequence of interview questions was followed in this research. 
 
Tape Recording, Note-taking, and Transcription: tape recording is a 
suitable method in qualitative interviews as it keeps the researcher 
concentrating on what is said (Arksey and Knight, 1999). It also increases the 
accuracy of data collection (Patton, 1990). It is always required to have the 
LQWHUYLHZHH·V SHUPLVVLRQ IRU WDSH UHFRUGLQJ +RZHYHU XVLQJ WDSH UHFRUGLQJ
does not eliminate the need for taking notes as it helps to formulate new 
questions, to check out something said earlier, to facilitate data analysis at a 
later date (Patton, 1990). In case permission of tape recording is not granted, 
then a much more thorough and comprehensive note-taking exercise is 
required. Arksey and Knight (1999) advise any researcher who is going to take 
notes to devise his own shorthand or customise his speedwriting. Patton 
(1990) points out that a useful aid is using a form containing headings to 
organise the notes into sections of different areas of the topic while 
interviewing. Arksey and Knight (1999) suggest expanding on what was said 
immediately after the interview as the longer the researcher waits the more 
details are likely to be forgotten. These suggestions were taken into account 
when the interviews were conducted with social actors in order to collect 
thorough data and meet the objectives of this research. Tape recordings were 
FROOHFWHGZKHUHUHVSRQGHQWV·SHUPLVVLRQZDVJDLQHGDORQJZLWKGHWDLOHGQRWH-
taking with the remaining interviewees. The recordings were transcribed into 
text document for analysis by the researcher.  
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Pilot Study: in the context of exploratory research, a pilot study is a research 
project that pre-tests selected research methods on a smaller sample and on a 
smaller scale (Zikmund, 2003). The purpose of a pilot study in qualitative 
research is to ´LGHQWLI\ DQG UHFWLI\ ORJLFDO DQG DQDO\WLFDO GLIILFXOWLHV LQ WKH
UHVHDUFKGHVLJQDPELJXRXVTXHVWLRQV LQFRUUHFW URXWLQJµ 6FRWWDQG0DUVKDOO
2003: 497). Conducting a pilot study is an important step because when the 
researcher conducts a trial run to the selected method, he/she will become 
aware of any shortcomings and can make any appropriate amends (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999). 
 
Table 6.4: Pilot Studies5 
# Date Organisation Location Place Position N/V 
1 12 Dec 11 Insurance-1 Jeddah city Work CG & Compliance 
Manager 
Voice 
2 13 Dec 11 Industry-1 Jeddah city Work CG & Compliance 
Manager 
Voice 
3 17 Dec 11 Services-6 Jeddah city Restaurant Director of Corporate 
Development 
Notes 
 
A pilot study was conducted with corporate governance managers of three 
different listed firms in Jeddah city in December 2011 (see Table 6.4). Those 
interviewees were interviewed again during the main interviews. The interview 
questions have been pre-tested on them to assess whether the questions are 
clear, understandable, and unambiguous. Any questions that created confusion 
were omitted or re-phrased in the final interview schedule. Pilot studies also 
tend to help researchers to realise how long it takes to run the interview 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999). The next subsection presents the interview guide 
used during the interviews. 
                                                 
5
 Key: 
N/V: type of data taking (notes taking / voice recording) 
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6.4.3 Interview Guide 
 
The depth of interview guides depends wholly on the interviewer and their 
ability to specify key issues in advance. One advantage of interview guides is to 
allow the interviewer to make the best decisions on how to efficiently use the 
length of time available for the interview. This keeps the interview focused 
whilst allowing observations and experiences to arise (Patton, 2002). Table 6.5 
lists the set of questions which have been prepared and used when the 
interviews have been conducted in order to meet the objectives of this 
research. Key words, such as an ¶institution·, have been defined and explained 
to the interviewee in advance to avoid ambiguity or misunderstanding. This 
interview guide in Table 6.5 is the final outcome following refinements from 
the pilot study.  
 
Table 6.5: Interview Questions 
Seq Main Questions Additional Questions 
1 What are the main activities of the organisation? On which basis have they 
been selected? 
2 Is CG division separate or embedded within the 
board? 
Why? 
3 What is the CG structure in the company?  
4 What is the mechanism of selecting the members of 
the board of directors in the company? 
 
5 Before applying CG by the CMA in 2006, who was 
appointed as (or what was the mechanism of 
selection and on which basis): Chairman, MD, 
CEO, CFO, and the members of the board? 
 
6 Can you talk about the relationship between your 
company with each of the following: 
The CMA, SAMA, MOC, Tadawul Stock 
Exchange. 
 
7 Is the company complying with the audit committee 
and nomination and remuneration committee? 
Can you talk more about 
this? 
8 Are there any factors or pressures that might control 
the organisation in setting up the policies and 
Can you give more details? 
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procedures? 
9 What are your main tasks as you work in the field 
of CG? 
 
10 How does CG work in this organisation?  
11 Have you noticed any changes in the Saudi Arabian 
CG in the past few years?  
Can you expand more? 
12 Is/Was there any resistance to change from the 
company side? 
 
13 CG document which was issued by the CMA, how 
was it been formed? 
 
14 Did the CMA send you a draft of the CG document 
(to make comments on it) before issuing it? 
 
15 It is stated in the CG document that: ³WKHDQQXDO
report of any company should disclose about the 
GHWDLOVRIFRPSHQVDWLRQRIWKHERDUGRIGLUHFWRUV´
To what extent does your company comply with 
this statement? 
 
16 What is the influence of the CMA on listed 
companies in order to drive CG or implement CG? 
Are there any pressures? 
 
17 Is there any role played by culture or society in 
setting up the rules or implementing/applying CG 
in Saudi Arabia? 
 
18 How do you feel that the Saudi Arabian CG system 
is different to those apparent globally? 
 
19 Do you have any comments, observations, or 
anything more you feel it is important for this 
research but we did not talk about? 
 
 
6.4.4 Interview Bias 
 
There is always a possibility that the process of interviewing may create or 
suffer from bias. However, this can be reduced by using simple, clear, short, 
and precise questions, avoiding technical, vague, and slang language (Choi and 
Pak, 2005). Easterby-6PLWKHWDOVXJJHVWWKDW¶SUREHV·FDQEHXVHGDVDQ
intervention technique to sharpen responses in the following ways: repeating 
the initial question, building onto incomplete answers, focusing on specific 
information, offering the interviewee suggestions or ideas to think about, and 
PLUURULQJRU UHIOHFWLQJ WKH UHVSRQGHQW·V DQVZHUVXVLQJGLIIHUHQWwords. They 
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DOVR LQGLFDWH WKDW ¶SUREHV· VKRXOG QHYHU OHDG WKH LQWHUYLHZHH EXW WR OHDYH
questions open to avoid bias. Following these techniques, alongside using 
open questions, has been useful for this research study as it appears that they 
have improved tKH LQWHUYLHZHHV· UHVSRQVHV 7KH QH[W VXE-section highlights 
the importance of using archival sources for conducting data analysis.  
 
6.4.5 Archival Sources 
 
The second data collection method is to use data from archival sources, 
including published reports and papers by the financial authorities in Saudi 
Arabia, such as the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), annual reports of listed firms, related private 
sector publications, and historical documents. However, a major difficulty 
associated with archival sources is that these data are not published for the 
purpose of this research. Thus, they did not particularly help in answering the 
research questions of this study to some extent. The task was to look at these 
archival sources and try to elicit any data that could reveal information about 
any influences of institutions on the formation of governance systems in Saudi 
Arabia. In particular, any influences on how different organisations are 
managed and how rules and regulations are applied.  
 
Another difficulty that has arisen when archival sources were used was that 
this research study was in danger of absorbing any errors or biases that may 
have been included within these documents. Thus, triangulation³a technique 
that XVHV ´PRUH WKDQ RQH PHWKRG RU VRXUFH RI GDWD LQ WKH VWXG\ RI VRFLDO
SKHQRPHQDµWRLQFUHDVHWKHYDOLGLW\RIUHVXOWV%U\PDQDQG%HOO³
was useful in this case. The study has employed this technique for comparing 
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data collected from interviews and archival sources to provide a more 
EDODQFHGSLFWXUHDQG´WKLFNGHVFULSWLRQµ0LOHVDQG+XEHUPDQ 
 
Among all these different types of archival sources, it was found that the 
annual reports of listed firms were somewhat helpful as they included in-depth 
information relevant to the research topic. These comprehensive annual 
UHSRUWVFRQWDLQXVHIXOLQIRUPDWLRQVXFKDVWKHILUP·VVL]HDQGDJHWKHFDSLWDO
GHWDLOHG ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV WKH DFWLYLW\ RI WKH ILUP VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV
future plans, the extent of complying with the corporate governance 
document, many disclosure items (e.g. the ownership and awards of the board 
members), and detailed descriptions of the responsibilities of the board of 
directors and emerged committees from the board. These annual reports were 
obtained from the Saudi stock exchange website (Tadawul). 
 
Using archival sources helps to understand the nature of institutions which is 
essential to understand how these institutions affect the emergence of a 
corporate governance regime in a non-Western, emerging society. Both data 
collection methods (conducting interviews and using archival sources) have 
assisted this research study in obtaining reliable and meaningful information 
and also in obtaining information that is a tangible reflection of the situation. 
The next sub-section presents the approach used to analyse and interpret the 
collected data. 
 
6.4.6 Data Analysis 
 
The purpose of data analysis is to interpret the data collected and make 
inferences and conclusions in order to answer the research questions 
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(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). In qualitative research, data analysis is 
performed simultaneously with data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989). Miles and 
Huberman (1994) outline three activities of analysis: data reduction (i.e. 
selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming), data display (i.e. 
an organised, compressed assembly of information that allows conclusion 
drawing and action), and conclusion drawing and verification (i.e. what things 
mean, noting regularities, causal flows, patterns, possible configurations, 
explanations, and propositions). This research study has employed conceptual 
analysis to analyse and interpret the data from interviews and archival sources. 
For analysing the data from interviews in the field, thematic analysis has been 
used, which started to be a common approach in analysing qualitative data in 
different fields (Boyatzis, 1998). According to Braun and Clarke (2006: 6), 
WKHPDWLF DQDO\VLV LV ´D PHWKRG IRU LGHQWLI\LQJ DQDO\VLQJ DQG reporting 
SDWWHUQVWKHPHVZLWKLQGDWDµ+RZHYHU%R\DW]LVDUJXHVWKDWWKHPDWLF
analysis is wider than this view as it also interprets various aspects of the 
research topic. One of the most important features of thematic analysis is its 
flexibility (Braun and Clarke, 2006) which is compatible with the highly flexible 
paradigm of critical realism (Pratt, 2011). For example, conversation analysis 
and interpretative phenomenological analysis have relatively limited variability 
in applying the method within that framework (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Furthermore, grounded theory, discourse analysis, and narrative analysis, have 
a technique that guides analysis and have different manifestations of the 
method from within the broad theoretical framework (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). On the other hand, thematic analysis is independent of theory and can 
be applied across a wide-range of theoretical, epistemological, and ontological 
approaches (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Through this theoretical freedom, 
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thematic analysis offers a practical and flexible tool of analysis, which may 
offer a rich, thick, detailed, and complex account of data (Boyatzis, 1998).  
 
Aronson (1994) and Braun and Clarke (2006) offer useful guidance on how to 
perform thematic analysis which can be outlined as follows: 
 
x Data collection: notes taking and recording of interviews. 
x Familiarisation with the data: transcribing the data, reading it, and 
highlighting initial ideas. 
x Producing initial codes: coding interesting pieces of data and patterns of 
experiences coming from direct quotes or paraphrased common ideas. 
x Searching for themes: combining relevant codes or patterns into potential 
WKHPHV ZKHUH WKHPHV DUH GHILQHG DV SDWWHUQV VXFK DV ´FRQYHUVDWLRQ
topics, vocabulary, recurring activities, meanings, feelings, or folk 
VD\LQJVDQGSURYHUEVµ7D\ORUDQG%RJGDQ 
x Reviewing themes: checking the relevance of the themes with the coded 
extracts and the entire data set, and creating a thematic map of the 
analysis. 
x Defining and naming themes: refining the themes and the overall story they 
tell to draw a comprehensive picture from the collective experience. 
x Producing the report: selecting vivid examples, relating the analysis to the 
research questions, objectives, and literature, and producing a scholarly 
report from the emerging patterns. 
x Obtaining feedback: discussing the findings with the participant in follow-
up interviews. 
x Building a valid argument: reading the existing literature in the field, 
making inferences, and developing a story line. 
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Once the literature connects with the outcomes, the story that the researcher 
constructed becomes valid. A developed narrative helps the reader to 
understand the entire process of the research (Aronson, 1994). These steps of 
conducting data analysis have been followed in this research study in order to 
develop important inferences and themes from the data set. The next section 
summarises the chapter. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has thoroughly discussed and described the methodology used in 
this research study and has justified the reasons for selecting and adopting 
such methods in this study. This research study is considered from a critical 
realism perspective as the focal philosophical position. This philosophical 
paradigm prioritises ontology over epistemology (i.e. the theory of being over 
the theory of knowledge) in the way that the world is should guide the way 
knowledge of it can be obtained (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004). A 
IXQGDPHQWDOIHDWXUHRIFULWLFDOUHDOLVPLVWKDWLWLVDKLJKO\IOH[LEOH¶PHWD-YLHZ·
in which, it has the ability to contain inquiry in both natural and social science 
(Pratt, 2011). Moreover, it tends to support theory development over time. 
This perspective assumes that both knowledge and the world are structured, 
differentiated, and changing (Bhaskar, 1979). The critical realism paradigm 
takes into account the importance of social context which is a fundamental 
aspect of institutional theory.  
 
This research study aims to explore the influence of institutions on the 
emergence of the corporate governance regime in a non-Western, emerging 
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context, where there is a lack of theory and concepts that describe, analyse, 
and explain what is going on. Exploratory study is needed in this case to 
provide insights and a better understanding of the dimensions of the problem. 
As far as this research study is exploratory in nature, it has been designed 
towards an inductive approach that assists in exploring general patterns that 
adjust the focus area through the perception of social actors as well as 
secondary data outcomes. In addition, the inductive approach is useful when 
creating meaningful links between research objectives and the outcomes of 
raw data, and when developing a framework of the basic structure of 
experiences that arise in the raw data. 
 
The qualitative approach is the research method used in this research study to 
investigate little known and poorly understood aspects of the emergence of 
corporate governance. Adopting such a strategy was useful for discovering and 
exploring new influences of institutions on the development of corporate 
governance in a non-Western, emerging context. This has been conducted 
through employing semi-structured interviews to collect data from significant 
social actors. The sample consisted of corporate governance managers of 
listed firms, stock exchange mediator representatives, and regulatory authority 
officials. Three pilot studies were conducted with three CG managers of listed 
firms. Subsequently, twenty three face-to-face semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with managers, representatives, and officials. Next, seven follow-up 
interviews were conducted with seven CG managers of listed firms. 
 
The collected data from these interviews were analysed using thematic analysis 
techniques. This technique has helped in identifying a number of emergent 
themes from the transcribed and translated data. These emergent themes 
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represent the main outcomes of analysis as they have been interpreted and as a 
result, important inferences have been obtained in two stages as shown in the 
next two chapters.  
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Chapter 7: 
First Stage of Data Analysis: Emergent Themes 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter focused on the methods used to conduct this research 
study. It identified the philosophical position of the researcher, the research 
design, the methods, and the approach of data analysis that has been adopted 
to analyse and interpret the collected data from semi-structured interviews 
with significant social actors in a non-Western, emerging context. As 
mentioned previously, the objective of this research study is to focus on 
understanding different institutions in a non-Western, emerging society and 
their influence on the development of a corporate governance regime from an 
institutional theory perspective. 
 
This chapter primarily focuses on the description, evaluation, interpretation, 
and analysis of the data collected from the interviews. The annual reports of 
listed firms have also been looked at in order to increase the validity of the 
outcomes. Upon conducting this, this chapter attempts to obtain inferences to 
answer the research questions. Thematic analysis is the basic approach 
employed for this task. The analysis and interpretation start by identifying the 
emergent themes; followed by, describing and evaluating these themes. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section outlines the emergent 
themes. The second section describes and evaluates the emergent themes. The 
third section shows a comparative analysis. The fourth section presents an 
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attempt to quantify the data. The fifth section shows cross-links among 
institutions.  
 
7.2 Emergent Themes 
 
In this stage, the data collected from semi-structured interviews were recorded 
then translated by the researcher. A number of themes emerged from the 
collected data through interviews of significant social actors in Saudi Arabia. 
Table 7.1 was created to show thH ¶SURFHVVHV· RI FRQGXFWLQJ GDWD DQDO\VLV
(Pratt, 2009). It shows the emergent themes from the collected data supported 
by some evidence. Also, it shows initial interpretations to give sense and 
meaning to the emergent themes. Moreover, it shows possible associated 
themes with other themes to draw cross relations between the themes. 
 
Table 7.1: Emergent Themes  
First Order Second 
Order 
   
Key 
Institution 
Emerging 
Themes 
 
Example Quotes (Evidence) 
Initial 
Interpretation  
Associated 
Themes 
 
An 
Expression 
of the 
Bureaucratic 
State  
(The Capital 
Market 
Authority) 
Imposed 
compliance  
- Audit committee exists in the bank before 
it was imposed by the CMA. (Bank-1) 
- The CMA imposes penalties to companies 
for not complying with the rules. (Insurance-
1) 
- We adopted audit and nomination and 
remuneration committees based on the 
compulsion of the CMA. (Bank-4) 
Some listed 
companies 
consider CG as 
an imposed 
system that 
must be 
followed.  
- 
Bare 
minimum 
compliance 
- We implement CG regulations as required. 
(Cement-1) 
- We do disclose about this statement, it is 
mandatory by the CMA. (Bank-2) 
- We have to follow CG rules and comply 
with it. (Bank-7) 
Some listed 
companies 
comply with 
minimum CG to 
avoid penalties. 
Imposed 
compliance 
Exceeding 
minimum 
compliance 
(Best 
practice)  
- Our CG is comprehensive to all the 
standards whether they are mandatory or 
optional items. (Services-1) 
- In our company we follow best practices. 
(Services-2) 
- We comply with CG items much more than 
those in CG document of the CMA. 
(Services-4) 
Some listed 
companies try to 
achieve best 
practice in CG 
compliance.  
Supportive 
Role 
(Religion) 
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Implementat
ion: The 
regulatory 
role   
- ,IZHGRQ¶WVHHDUHVSRQVHIURPDFRPSDQ\
we start our procedures in warning them and 
imposing penalties against them. (CMA) 
- Penalties increase the awareness of people 
to implement CG. I think the number of 
penalties is increasing in order to force listed 
companies to implement CG practices. 
(Bank-1) 
The regulator 
plays the 
standard role 
with companies 
that do not have 
self-motivation 
to implement 
CG. 
Imposed 
compliance; 
Bare 
minimum 
compliance; 
Regulations 
failure   
Implementat
ion: The 
awareness / 
cooperative / 
partnership 
role 
- We seek help from the CMA whenever we 
struggle, and they are so cooperative with 
us. (Petrochemical-1) 
- :HVHHNWKHLUKHOSWKH&0$LIZHGRQ¶W
understand any item in the document. 
(Retail-1) 
- We help and cooperate with listed 
companies most of the time. (CMA) 
The regulator 
plays the 
partnership role 
with companies 
that are 
interested in 
implementing 
CG and 
developing 
practices.  
Exceeding 
minimum 
compliance 
Regulations 
failure  
- The CMA has not grown in a complete 
shape, and the standards are still incomplete. 
(Services-1) 
- We are still in the first steps of CG and we 
are still trying to understand it. (Insurance-1) 
- The problem is not in CG document itself, 
it is in the implementation itself. (Bank-1)  
There can be 
regulations 
failure due to 
improper 
implementation, 
less education 
and awareness, 
or lack of 
diffusion. 
- 
 
Family  
Resistance  - CG appears in the country because of the 
accumulation of family members in the 
board who are against or refuse CG. 
(Services-2) 
- )DPLO\PHPEHUVGRQ¶WZDQWWRGLVFORVHIRU
their awards and other information. 
(Cement-1) 
- It is only the sensitivity of disclosing about 
personal information. This is the thing that 
faces most resistance. (CMA)  
Family 
companies 
appear to resist 
control, 
transparency 
and disclosure. 
- 
Abuse 
(Selecting 
board 
members) 
- It is normal to find a manager as one of the 
family members. (Stock-Exchange) 
- The mechanism was selecting family 
members with some qualifications and 
experiences. (Bank-6) 
-  Selecting family members with 
qualifications. (Services-6) 
Family owners 
appear to 
appoint less 
qualified 
members of the 
family on the 
board of 
directors 
Control; 
Conflict of 
interest; 
Entitlement; 
Resistance 
Conflict of 
interests  
- The board of directors not to exploit the 
company for their own interests. (Services-
1) 
- There VKRXOGQ¶WEHDQ\H[HFXWLYHPHPEHU
in audit committee in order to avoid conflict 
of interests. (Services-2) 
- There were some factors that affected the 
procedures here in the company to serve 
specific interests to some family members 
because some of them own a large number 
of shares. (Retail-1)  
Managers 
appear to serve 
their own 
interests without 
looking for 
shareholders or 
other 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶
interests. 
- 
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Control 
(Decision 
Making) 
- The family and their relatives affect 
negatively on the development of CG in 
terms of decision making, abusing, 
exploiting, etc. (Insurance-1) 
- The family has no more power in 
controlling the company since the CMA 
applied CG in 2006. (Cement-1) 
- CG comes to make a control on decision 
making. (Services-5)  
Decisions 
influenced by 
the family 
appear to serve 
their personal 
interests.  
Conflict of 
interest 
Entitlement 
(Separation 
of ownership 
and control) 
- Family companies face a big challenge 
which is separation of ownership and 
control. (CMA)  
- When a family company becomes a public 
company, there must be already family 
settings exist from the existing majority. 
(Services-1)  
- The penalties that been imposed by the 
CMA are more against family companies 
that turned to public due to the problem of 
separation of ownership and control. (CMA)  
Some family 
settings still 
exist when the 
company turns 
to a public 
company which 
might affect the 
continuation of 
the company. 
Conflict of 
interest; 
Control; 
Abuse; 
Resistance  
 
Kinship 
Abuse 
(Independen
ce) 
- Family control is quite strong in this 
country, many companies appoint their 
relatives from the 1st degree in high 
positions. (Bank-3) 
- CG document comes to limit these abuses 
(appointing relatives in the board). (Bank-4) 
- There should not be a member in the board 
of directors FODVVLILHGDVDQµLQGHSHQGHQW¶
while he has a relationship from the first 
degree with a member in the board of 
directors or executive directors. (CMA) 
Appointing 
relatives from 
the 1st degree in 
the board of 
directors might 
create 
accumulation in 
the board which 
may lead to 
imbalance in 
making 
decisions and 
conflict of 
interests. 
Control, 
Conflict of 
interest 
Control 
(Decision 
Making) 
- The control of the relatives is a barrier to 
&*7KDW¶VZK\&*DSSHDUVLQWKHFRXQWU\
(Services-2) 
- Kinship still exists. In banking sector it is 
VRPHZKDWWKHUHZHFDQ¶WKLGHLWBank-1) 
- The influence of family members or their 
relatives appears clearly in the decision 
making. (Services-5)  
There can be 
imbalance in 
decisions made 
by relatives 
from the 1st 
degree which 
may not serve 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶
interests.   
Conflict of 
interest 
 
Religion  
Association 
(Similar 
principles)  
- CG has similar principles to the religion. 
(Industry-3) 
- CG is compatible with the religion and the 
religion supports CG system. (Services-4) 
- The law is compatible with the religion in 
the country as well as CG principles. (Bank-
2)  
The religion and 
CG share 
similar 
principles and 
agree in 
objectives. 
- 
Implementat
ion: 
Supportive 
Role 
- The religion is considered as a motivator to 
CG and supports it. (Bank-5)  
- CG principles emerged from the religion. 
So the religion is a driver. (Stock-Exchange) 
- The religion is not a pressure, but a motive 
to comply with CG. (Services-1) 
The religion 
supports and 
motivates CG to 
accomplish their 
same objectives. 
Association  
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Compliance 
(Sharia 
Comp.) 
- 2XUWDVNVDUHWRSURWHFWVKDUHKROGHUV¶
rights, make sure that the work process is 
under Sharia compliance, make sure that we 
follow and implement CG rules. (Bank-5) 
- Our activity is investments under Sharia- 
based law. (Services-6) 
- We provide Sharia compliance banking 
services, which are supervised by an 
external Sharia board. (Bank-1) 
Sharia-based 
companies find 
it easier to apply 
a CG system 
due to similar 
principles of 
Sharia and CG. 
Association  
 
 
 
The themes that emerged under each key institution are as follows: 
 
7.2.1 An Expression of the Bureaucratic State  
 
This key institution emerged due to the important role of the regulatory body 
¶7KH &DSLWDO 0DUNHW $XWKRULW\· WKH &0$ DV YLHZHG E\ significant social 
actors, in driving corporate governance in the country which is considered as 
an expression of the bureaucratic state in this research context. The regulator 
plays different roles and has different styles in applying CG on all listed 
companies in order to correctly implement CG rules. The CMA mainly plays 
two roles: (a) the standard regulatory role, and (b) the cooperative/awareness/ 
partnership role which will be expanded in the next section. A number of 
themes emerged under this institution. These themes are as follows. 
 
7.2.1.1 Imposed compliance. 
7.2.1.2 Bare minimum compliance. 
7.2.1.3 Exceeding minimum compliance (best practice). 
7.2.1.4 Implementation: the regulatory role. 
7.2.1.5 Implementation: the awareness/cooperative/partnership role.  
7.2.1.6 Regulations failure. 
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7.2.2 Family Ties 
 
This institution is the most obvious one that emerged during the first stage of 
data analysis. It concerns the power of family businesses and its prevailing 
impact on the development of CG in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, 
emerging society. The initial analysis, as perceived by significant social actors, 
indicated negative roles by the family institution centred on conflict of 
interests. The Themes that emerged under this institution are as follows. 
 
7.2.2.1 Entitlement (separation of ownership and control). 
7.2.2.2 Control (decision making). 
7.2.2.3 Conflict of interests. 
7.2.2.4 Abuse (selecting and appointing board members). 
7.2.2.5 Resistance to change.  
 
7.2.3 Kinship Networks 
 
This institution emerged separately but some interviewees consider it as an 
extension to family ties due to the nature of culture in this country. This 
institution captures all blood relationships to the families such as relatives and 
their influence on the CG regime in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging 
society. The Themes that emerged under this institution are as follows. 
 
7.2.3.1 Abuse (independence of board members). 
7.2.3.2 Control (decision making). 
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7.2.4 Religion  
 
This institution emerged due to the dominant religion in the Saudi Arabian 
non-Western, emerging society. It differs from family ties and kinship 
networks in a way that it has a supportive influence to the emergence of CG in 
the Saudi Arabian emerging society as any monotheistic religion concurs 
entirely with CG concepts and principles as viewed by some interviewees, 
whereas family ties and kinship networks are considered as barriers to the 
development of CG in this society. The Themes that emerged under this 
institution are as follows. 
 
7.2.4.1 Association (similar principles): trust, credibility, justice, transparency, 
GLVFORVXUH SURWHFWLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV SHQDOWLHV SXQLVKPHQWV
cooperation, fair competition, giving advice, not cheating, not 
harming, no obscene profit, etc.    
7.2.4.2 Implementation: supportive role. 
7.2.4.3 Compliance (Sharia compliance). 
 
In this research study, Microsoft Word 2007 was used manually by the 
researcher to facilitate the extraction of pieces of material, copying and pasting 
them into cells in a table, sorting similar ideas, and linking quotes. This 
method follows ideas by Pratt (2009). This method was used due to its 
simplicity and capability to deal with both languages, English and Arabic. The 
next section gives a comprehensive description and evaluation of the emergent 
themes.  
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7.3 Meta-narrative 
 
7KLV ¶PHWD-QDUUDWLYH· VHFWLRQ LV DQ RYHUDUFKLQJ DFFRXQW E\ WKH DXWKRU 7KH
section provides a broad description and evaluation of the emergent themes 
and supports these with evidence from the interviews of data. It is an attempt 
to give a comprehensive explanation to the phenomenon being studied and to 
elicit meanings from the collected data to offer a better understanding. 
 
7.3.1 An Expression of the Bureaucratic State 
 
This institution was mentioned frequently among all interviewees through its 
NH\DFWRU¶7KH&DSLWDO0DUNHW$XWKRULW\7KH&0$·WRVKRZLWVHIIHFWLYHUROH
in applying and implementing CG rules in all listed firms making it a key 
institution in this research study. Six themes emerged under this key 
institution. These themes fall into two main categories: compliance and 
implementation. These are described and evaluated as follows, starting with 
compliance. 
 
7.3.1.1 Imposed Compliance 
 
It was inferred that there are some companies that consider the CG system as 
an imposed system that must be complied with in order to avoid punishment. 
When P1 from Bank-1 was asked if the market forms any pressures on CG, he 
points out that: 
 
The market in Saudi Arabia is not mature yet to impose its opinion ... 
The one who imposes the rules, is the CMA through its CG system. 
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So, there is a sign in this evidence that reveals CG is an imposed system 
implying scope for resistance in its implementation or one in which 
implementation varies based on the extent to which the firm complies only to 
the bare minimum that is necessary versus others who view the system more 
favourable (I return to this in a later discussion of themes, for example, Sub-
section 7.3.1.2 below). He also considers that an audit committee is an 
imposed committee by the CMA that must be created in any listed company. 
The evidence also shows that it is only a matter of time before the market 
institution will have an influence on the emergence of a CG regime in this 
society. Thus, time is an important factor in this respect. Finally, when P1 
from Bank-1 was asked about the influence of the CMA on listed firms in 
order to drive CG or implement CG, he reports that: 
 
The CMA issues regulations and gives time limit to implement them 
(pressure) ... I think the number of penalties is increasing in order to 
force listed companies to implement CG practices. 
 
This is another sign which reveals that the CMA forces listed firms to 
implement CG practices. P14 from Bank-4 notes that the nomination and 
remuneration committee was created in the bank based on the compulsion of 
the CMA which reveals that it was not created to follow best practice. P3 from 
Insurance-1 was asked if there is any resistance to change from the company 
side, he replies:  
 
1RWKHUHLVQ·W2QWKHFRQWUDU\ZHKDYHWRFRPSO\ZLWKWKHUHJXODWLRQV
otherwise we will be penalised. 
 
So, it does not seem to be a matter of following best practice but rather an 
avoidance of penalties by complying with what the CMA requires. He also 
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insists that the CMA imposes penalties to companies that do not comply with 
CG rules and this punishment can be extended to suspend the stock exchange 
of this company. Suspension is the worst scenario faced by a company as it 
affects their reputation and credibility in the market, their stock price, and their 
relationship with other parties such as the CMA and the Ministry of 
&RPPHUFH02&0RUHRYHU WKH02&KDVWKHSRZHUWRVWRSDFRPSDQ\·V
activity, so as a result, the firm becomes unable to sell products or conduct 
projects as explained by P3 from Insurance-1. 
 
7.3.1.2 Bare Minimum Compliance 
 
This theme emerged when it was observed that some companies comply with 
the minimum requirements of CG. P14 from Bank-4 reports that the annual 
report contains many items such as company results, reasons of deviation, 
VKDUHKROGHUV·DQGRZQHUVKLSULJKWVOLVWLQJUXOHVHWFEXWWKH\WHQGWRPHQWLRQ
the minimum and do not go beyond this minimum. This could be a sign of 
aiming only to achieve minimum compliance. P5 from Bank-2 similarly notes 
that both audit, and nomination and remuneration, committees are mandatory 
items by the CMA and they have to be adopted and followed which means 
WKH\ ZRXOGQ·W EH FUHDWHG LI RSWLRQDO 7KXs, it is a sign of bare minimum 
compliance and not an effort towards best practice. P12 from the CMA 
reveals that both committees are the minimum required from listed firms in 
order to activate the role of the board of directors. He indicates that the board 
of directors should create committees based on the needs and the nature of 
the company. So these two committees are the minimum requirement but all 
other committees such as, risk committee, executive committee, and 
investment committee are optional to all listed companies based on their needs 
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as mentioned in the CG document of the CMA. This means listed companies 
have the choice to create committees as much as they need whenever they suit 
their activity, work nature, and size. He was also asked if CG causes a financial 
burden to listed firms such as extra employees and divisions. He concludes 
that: 
 
7KDW·V ZK\ &* DVNV IRU WKH PLQLPXP 7KH &0$ GRHVQ·W ZDQW DQ\
financial burdens as of applying CG which make it harder to those large 
and small companies. Therefore, whenever the company size becomes 
larger, the CG document allows it to go beyond and exceed the 
minimum, such as creating more committees based on the needs and 
nature of the company and based on what the board of directors sees 
because these committees need money. However, other companies 
consider that creating more committees and meetings could be an extra 
expense that cannot be afforded, especially if they have small and simple 
structures. Therefore, there is a minimum that must be applied and there 
is flexibility for who wants to implement CG in a way that serves them. 
 
This evidence shows that CG does not appear to make extra financial burdens 
on listed firms, in contrast, it asks for compliance with the minimum standards 
in order to meet the objectives of CG. Thus, the CMA wants to keep the 
burden as low as possible in order to be affordable to all listed companies, so 
they would not have an excuse for non-compliance with CG regulations. 
However, it can be seen from some previous statements of the firms that, in 
some instances, compliance is seen as an expense. Some firms appear to 
cooperate with the minimum only to avoid penalties and do not go beyond the 
minimum, which implies a lack of genuine interest and effort towards CG in 
some cases. 
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7.3.1.3 Exceeding Minimum Compliance (Best Practice) 
 
This theme emerged when it was inferred from the data that a large number of 
companies tend to exceed the minimum compliance of the CG document by 
complying with more optional items in order to achieve best practice. A 
number of companies such as, Industry-1, Services-2, and Petrochemical-1, 
created a separate division for CG in order to follow best practice. P6 from 
Industry-1 points out that: 
 
We are trying to do our best to comply with the maximum regulations of 
6	36WDQGDUGDQG3RRU·V³an American financial services company) as 
S&P has got 110 disclosure items. This means not only compliance with 
local CG but also with international one. For example, forecast and 
ownership concentration. 
 
This evidence demonstrates the intention of this company to comply with the 
maximum requirements of CG to follow best practice which shows a genuine 
interest and effort towards CG. This means more transparency and disclosure 
can be added in the favour of shareholders. Thus, it may increase the 
credibility of this company to its shareholders. This participant added two 
examples of international CG practices: forecast (e.g. IPO forecast decision) 
DQG RZQHUVKLS FRQFHQWUDWLRQ HJ IDPLO\ PHPEHUV· FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RQ WKH
board of directors). When P2 from Services-1 was asked about the way that 
CG works in their company, he notes that: 
 
The task then is to make updates by applying the highest standards 
suggested by the CMA or available at the market in a way that they 
always keep updating and implementing their procedures as a best 
practice. In our company, whenever we see something suggested or 
optional, we apply it without waiting for it to become mandatory 
whenever we find it effective, in line with the executive management, and 
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JLYHVKLJKHUVWDQGDUGV LQ WUDQVSDUHQF\6RZK\GRQ·WZHDSSO\ LW"6R LQ
our company we comply with the best practice whether it is mandatory 
or optional which is totally compatible with protecting shareholders and 
GRHVQ·WDIIHFWRXUZRUNQDWXUH 
 
After looking at the background of this company from its annual report, along 
with the evidence from the interview, it seems that this firm is looking towards 
gaining greater legitimacy because they follow Sharia-based rules (this will be 
discussed later in this chapter) and has obvious CG objectives, as revealed by 
the interviewee. It can also be seen that they are looking to gain more 
credibility and trust from their shareholders by attempting to take care of them 
well beyond any minimum expectation, such as being more transparent and 
trying to protect their rights and serve their interests. Furthermore, it can be 
inferred that some companies are moving towards complying with best 
practice for many reasons such as achieving best results, protecting 
shareholdeUV· ULJKWV DQG JDLQLQJ PRUH FUHGLELOLW\ WR DWWUDFW LQYHVWRUV 7KLV
LQIHUHQFHDSSHDUVWREHLQIDYRXURIVHUYLQJVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWV5HJDUGLQJ
the formation of the CG document which was issued by the CMA, P13 from 
the CMA points out that: 
 
It is a collective work inspired by the Companies Act regulations, CG of 
benchmarking countries such as the USA and the UK, and OECD 
practices (an international Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development). So the target is always to look for best practice.  
 
This evidence reveals the intention of the CMA towards achieving best 
practice. This intention is obvious through the role played by the CMA in 
cooperating, advising, and assisting listed firms to implement CG as required 
which will be discussed later in this section. The evidence also shows that the 
CG document was not created due to the multiple collapses and historical 
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experiences of this country just as those which occurred in the Western World 
have subsequently sparked the movement towards CG. In contrast, it was 
adopted from different resources and customised to fit in this context in a way 
that pursues best practice. The evaluation will now move from compliance to 
describe the implementation.  
 
7.3.1.4 Implementation: the Regulatory Role 
 
This theme emerged as a role played by the CMA with less responsive firms to 
CG rules. The CMA needs to take action against these companies as reported 
by P12 from the CMA: 
 
,I ZH ILQG D FRPSDQ\ GRHVQ·W KDYH VHOI-motivation, neglects, and 
prejudices in the requirements here the role of the regulator comes 
through speaking, sending letters, imposing penalties and other 
correction procedures.  
 
So these correction procedures are being applied on companies that do not 
have self-motivation to implement CG rules but the nature of the statement by 
P12 implies that the approach is somewhat punitive and coercive as opposed 
to a narrative or discursive based approach to engage companies with CG. P13 
from the CMA agrees with his colleague and points out that: 
 
,IZHGRQ·WVHHDUHVSRQVHIURPDFRPSDQ\ZHVWDUWRXUSURFHGXUHV LQ
warning them and imposing penalties against them.  
 
This is another piece of evidence that shows the regulatory role played by the 
CMA with less responsive companies in order to engage these firms with CG. 
This appears reasonable because if listed companies do not respond and 
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comply with CG regulations, then CG objectives will not be achieved which 
can lead to a recession or perhaps a financial crisis. These procedures would 
increase transaction costs for the CMA from a new institutional economics 
perspective. Both interviewees from the CMA suggest to look at the Saudi 
stock exchange website and to evaluate the penalties imposed against listed 
companies. They are trying to highlight the type and amount of violations of 
listed companies which are relatively high and concentrated in disclosure items 
as per both interviewees. This implies that there is a trend in not disclosing 
SURSHUO\RUDVUHTXLUHGZKLFKFRQWUDGLFWVWKHYLVLRQRI&*7KDW·VZK\WKLV
role of the CMA appears reasonable and can help to achieve CG objectives. 
P1 from Bank-1 emphasises what has been said and indicates that:  
 
The penalties that were imposed by the CMA are more in disclosure than 
in other CG items. So more than 95% of these penalties were due to 
disclosure issues. 
 
This evidence also reveals the reason behind the failure of some companies to 
comply with CG rules³the lack of disclosure. This CG item forms a high 
percentage of the overall number of penalties. Thus, this leads to two 
inferences: (a) listed companies do not want to disclose as required and as 
stated in the CG document for different reasons, (b) there is a difficulty in 
determining the level of disclosure needed. The first proposition is a problem 
caused by firms, because listed companies are not so interested in properly 
disclosing their revenues, future plans, and awards of the board of directors as 
they consider this to be priYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW LVQ·W IRU WKHSXEOLFGRPDLQ
This is why the CMA is serious on this matter and always pushes to disclose as 
UHTXLUHGLQIDYRXURISURWHFWLQJVKDUHKROGHUV·ULJKWV7KHVHFRQGSURSRVLWLRQ
is a problem caused by the CMA, which means that there is possibly a lack of 
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awareness and shortage of information provided from the CMA side. In this 
FDVHGLIIXVLQJVXIILFLHQWDZDUHQHVVDQGSURSHUHGXFDWLRQWREURDGHQSHRSOH·V
understanding and knowledge can be helpful.  
 
7.3.1.5 Implementation: the Awareness/Cooperative/Partnership Role 
 
This theme emerged as a role played by the CMA with firms that are self-
motivated and are interested in applying CG rules as revealed by P12 from the 
CMA: 
 
Sometimes we play as one team with listed firms in order to develop 
practices. This happens in case we find the company is really interested in 
applying and implementing CG. 
 
AG from the CMA agrees with his colleague and reports that:  
 
We help and cooperate with listed companies most of the time.  
 
So the CMA helps, cooperates, and opens doors for those who are interested 
in the subject of CG as confirmed by P17 from Industry-2:  
 
The CMA is so effective and cooperative to clarify and explain any 
misunderstandings.  
 
Another respondent agrees with this and points out that: 
 
The CMA follows up with all listed firms, cooperates with them, and 
answers their enquiries. (P16 from Retail-1) 
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These statements imply that there is an obvious role played by the CMA in 
order to drive CG in the country which is the cooperation and awareness role. 
This appears as a positive role of the CMA towards listed companies who 
respond to the instructions of the CMA and implement CG as required or 
more which signals for better improvement and development of CG in the 
society. A number of listed firms seem to be happy with the way in which the 
CMA deals with them as the CMA cooperates, helps, and assists them in their 
daily work within this field. This implies that these companies do not mind 
working with the CMA in order to apply, implement, and comply with CG. 
When P8 from Cement-1 was asked about the way in which the CMA drives 
CG, he replied:  
 
Through imposing penalties. The reputation of the company can be 
affected because the penalties are being announced in detail on the 
website. However, they are very cooperative with us. 
 
This evidence illustrates that there is another negative side of not responding 
to CG rules which is the reputation of the company that can be affected 
through increased violations that are announced on the stock exchange 
website. Thus, good reputation can be a motive to listed companies to 
properly comply with CG rules which in turn attracts the investors to invest 
more in this firm.  
 
7.3.1.6 Regulations Failure 
 
CG regulation might fail as noted by a participant when he was talking about 
the factors that might control the organisation in setting up the policies and 
procedures. He gives an example for regulations failure in that: 
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What happened in the financial crisis in 2007/2008, although there are 
hard rules and regulations that are very strict, so we are talking about the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the CMA, Central Banks, Basel 
Committee (for banks), risk reduction, and with all of that, neither 
owners nor administrators were able to catch the aggressive side of 
investors which is greed, power, and avariciousness and such bad 
behaviours. (P1 from Bank-1)  
 
There is a sign in this evidence which implies that the regulations might fail 
due to negative human behaviour. Even the regulations could not stop these 
actions which could be a reason for why crises occur. It can be inferred that 
WKHUHJXODWLRQVDUHFRQVWUDLQHGE\SHRSOH·VEHKDYLRXUDQGDFWLRQVDQGmay not 
protect people even if they are perfect. In this sense, this interviewee expands 
on this point and gives an explanation by saying that: 
 
The problem is not in the CG document itself, it is in the 
implementation. 
 
Thus, the implementation appears to be a major factor in regulation failures 
DQG FULVHV ZKLFK UHIOHFWV WKH ¶EDG· EHKDYLRXU DQG DFWLRQV RI VRPH SHRSOH
These failures can also be attributed to a lesser understanding by people of the 
subject of CG as highlighted by P3 from Insurance-1: 
 
We are still in the first steps of CG and we are still trying to understand 
it. 
 
Thus, little understanding and less knowledge or the background of people 
responsible for CG can lead to vagueness and ambiguity which might cause 
regulation failures. Thus, it is the role of both the firm and the CMA, to learn 
more about CG and become familiar with it in order to gain a better 
understanding of the nature of CG and realise that implementing CG is 
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something good for the population and society. One more possible reason for 
regulation failure is outlined by P2 from Services-1, he points out that: 
 
The CMA has not grown in a complete shape, and the standards are still 
incomplete. 
 
He indicates that CG is still growing in Saudi Arabia, it is in its initial stages, 
and has not been completely formed. This was also confirmed by P12 from 
the CMA when he was asked if CG is presently at a satisfactory level in the 
country or not, he argued that: 
 
Are you pointing to have we got to the required level? No. There are 
more steps and expectations from listed firms and other elements in the 
market that contribute to motivate and add quality to support and 
enhance CG culture in the country. 
 
This statement by the head of CG in the CMA implies that it is the 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\RIOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVWRHQKDQFHDQGSURPRWH&*QRWWKH&0$·V
responsibility. The CMA expects more from listed firms and the 
LPSURYHPHQWVVKRXOGDULVH IURPWKH OLVWHGFRPSDQLHV· VLGH7KLVHPSKDVLVHV
what P2 from Services-1 said about the CMA as it has not grown in a 
complete form. It seems that it is a matter of time in order to enhance CG 
culture in the society. So the time factor seems important in strengthening the 
CMA to drive the CG system in this society. The task then, is to work harder 
RQ&*LPSOHPHQWDWLRQIURPWKHOLVWHGFRPSDQLHV·VLGHDQGIURPWKH&0$LQ
order to achieve best practice. 
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7.3.2 Family Ties 
 
A total of 19 participants observed that the family is a reason for applying CG 
in Saudi Arabia, which can be considered as a key institution in this research 
study. This institution includes five themes which are described and evaluated 
as follows. 
 
7.3.2.1 Entitlement (Separation of Ownership and Control)  
 
One of the biggest challenges that family firms may face whenever they want 
to become public firms is the separation of ownership and control which was 
pointed out by a number of practitioners. P12 from the CMA observes that: 
 
« IDPLO\ FRPSDQLHV IDFH D ELJ FKDOOHQJH ZKLFK LV VHSDUDWLRQ RI
ownership and control. It is a big challenge in the continuation of the 
company.  
 
7KLV HYLGHQFH VKRZV WKH GDQJHU RI WKLV ¶XQKHDOWK\· DVSHFW WKDW FDQ KDYH D
direct impact on the success and continuation of a firm. P12 considers this as 
¶DELJFKDOOHQJH·ZKLFKLPSOLHVKLVH[SHULHQFHLQWKLVPDWWHULQZKLFKKHFRPHV
across a number of cases that may have either failed to continue or barely 
passed the challenge. This implies how serious and significant this matter is. 
This can be attributed to the indirect or little control of shareholders on 
management decisions which does not seem to be something that owners 
(family members) approve of.  
 
Most of the firms in Saudi Arabia are family firms and some of these 
become public firms. So when a family company becomes a public one, 
WKHUHPXVWDOUHDG\EH¶IDPLO\VHWWLQJV·H[LVWIURPWKHH[LVWLQJPDMRULW\WKH
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management of family companies is totally different as they make the 
decisions that suit them. As they are in a board of directors, nobody from 
RXWVLGH FDQ LQWHUYHQH EHFDXVH LW·V WKHLU RZQ PRQH\ « EXW QRZ WKH\
FDQ·WDFWDQ\PRUHDVZKHQLWZDVDIDPLO\FRPSDQ\P2 from Services-1) 
 
This is evidence that demonstrates the difficulty of separating ownership and 
FRQWUROEHFDXVH WKH IDPLO\ LVQR ORQJHU DEOH WR ¶DFW· DVZKHQ LWZDVVLPSO\D
family firm. In the past, family members used to control, organise, direct, and 
manage the firm in their own way that suits their business and serves their 
interests. Also, those members do not look after their shareholders and their 
rights. However, this is changed now after the CMA applied CG regulations 
on all listed companies in 2006 in Saudi Arabia. So neither senior management 
nor family members are able to exceed their authority. It can also be inferred 
from this evidence that the time interval is an important factor here. It seems 
that family domination is being weakened by the regulatory authority, provided 
that they are unable to act as they did previously. Furthermore, some family 
settings (i.e. behaviours), such as serving own interests and appointing family 
members onto the board, still exist when the company becomes a public 
company which can be attributed to collective action problems and poor 
coordination.  
 
The penalties that are imposed by the CMA are more against family firms 
that become public due to the problem of separation of ownership and 
control. (AG, from the CMA). 
 
This reveals that the problem of separation still exists and CG comes to treat 
such a problem through warnings and punishments which can be a solution to 
reduce these practices from family companies. This can be seen as a divorce 
between shareholders (ownership) and managers (control) which in other 
words, both have clashing views. This is dangerous to a large extent because it 
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FDQGLVWRUWFRUSRUDWHGHFLVLRQVDQGFUHDWHGHYLDWLRQRIDILUP·VLQYHVWPHQWVLI
not properly or sufficiently controlled or governed.  
 
There is evidence that CG is, to an extent, improved in this matter as it 
reduces the power and domination of the family by the gradual process of 
implementing CG rules by the CMA. P8 from Cement-1 points out that:  
 
CG is improved a lot by the gradual process that the CMA practices in 
implementing CG items. Many actions and decisions of the family that 
we used to see in the past disappeared, such as making decisions that 
VHUYHVSHFLILFLQWHUHVWVDQGPLJKWQRWJRZLWKWKHILUP·VREMHFWLYHV7KH
domination of the family in this company is totally changed. The family 
has no more power in controlling the company since the CMA applied 
CG in 2006. 
 
This evidence points to the gradual process followed by the CMA. At the 
beginning they issued the CG document with only the basic rules. Then they 
started to gradually turn optional items into mandatory ones such as audit, and 
nomination and remuneration committees that recently became mandatory 
and must be found in any listed firm. This approach seems to be logical and 
gives the chance for listed companies to learn how to implement CG practices 
properly on a gradual basis.  
 
7.3.2.2 Control (Decision Making) 
 
This theme is frequently mentioned during the interviews which emphasises its 
importance and its influence on the topic. P1 from Bank-1 was asked about 
the influence of the family when there were no mechanisms for selecting 
members of the board in the past, he argues that:  
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The family has a negative impact on CG. They mix between general and 
private. Family firms think that the decisions are personal and of interest 
to the family only and not to shareholders. 
 
Given this evidence, it can be seen that the family institution appears to be a 
barrier to the development of CG in which the decisions are of interest to the 
family only if it is not well treated. Mixing between public and private 
ownership is a problem and can be attributed to the lack of awareness and 
knowledge about the nature of public firms. Moreover, when P19 from Bank-
7 was asked if there are any factors or pressures that might control the 
organisation in setting up the policies and procedures, he confirms that:  
 
,QWKHSDVW\HV WKHUHZHUH«WKHERDUGRIGLUHFWRUVZDVGRPLQDWHGE\
family members that have a strong influence in decision making and 
applying rules. 
 
This is another example which shows how decision making is influenced by 
the family before applying a CG system in the country which can affect setting 
up the policies and procedures of companies. It can also be inferred from this 
evidence that the time plays a role in changing the degree of family control. 
The regulatory authority plays this role in reducing the power of the family 
which increases, at the same time, the power of the regulatory authority. P2 
from Services-1 gives an example about his company when it changed from a 
family company to a public one. He notes that the members of the family 
became guided by the rules of CG in making decisions:  
 
For example, when our company has changed from a family business to a 
public company, the board of directors, including the members who are 
majority shareholders (own the highest percentage), have limits and a 
URDGPDSWRZDONRQZKHQPDNLQJGHFLVLRQV«7KHPDQDJHUVDUHEHLQJ
watched with every decision taken, so I think it is a positive thing.  
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The top management has a specific and clear guidance to follow which is the 
CG document. This guidance illustrates all items in detail, such as authorities 
and responsibilities in order to control the decision making in these firms. He 
indicates that this guidance of CG is a positive thing to everybody: 
shareholders, investors, employees, and other stakeholders. When P16 from 
Retail-1 was asked about the mechanism of selecting board members before 
applying CG by the CMA in 2006, he reports that members of the family used 
to be appointed onto the board of directors in addition to the executive 
directors. Consequently, he was asked if he feels any domination of the family 
in decision making. He points out that: 
 
Yes, in the past, the decision making of the family was so obvious and 
much stronger than now, but after the CMA applied its CG system, many 
of these practices disappeared.  
 
It can be clearly inferred from this statement that CG dealt with some 
practices that family members would otherwise dominate such as decision 
making. This shows the efforts of the CMA to eliminate this aspect due to its 
negative impact. When P21 from Services-5 was talking about the pressures 
that might control setting up the policies and procedures of the company, he 
claimed that: 
 
&*DLPVWRWDNHFRQWURORQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ«WKURXJKLGHQWLI\LQJWKH
responsibilities of each member. 
 
This control on decision making can be achieved through specifying 
authorities, responsibilities, and limitations of the members of the board of 
directors and executive directors, so it would reduce the domination of the 
family in making decisions. It can be inferred from this that some members of 
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top management do not know exactly their boundaries and limitations. So they 
might take some actions that are not within their authority which may 
negatively impact the growth, development, and continuation of the firms. 
This could be attributed to the lack of proficiency of the organisations.  
 
7.3.2.3 Conflict of Interests 
 
This theme seems to be a dilemma in which the CG system attempts to 
eliminate its impact on stakeholders. The intention here is to focus and 
capture any conflict of interest owing to the family dominance. Conflict of 
interest occurs usually between the owners (the family) and the managers (the 
agents) or with other non-family shareholders or stakeholders when the agent 
is involved in multiple interests. It can also occur when the board of directors 
wants to exploit the company for their own interests as indicated by P2 from 
Services-1 ZKHQKHSRLQWVRXW WKDW´>W@KHPDLQSRLQWRI&* LV VKDUHKROGHUV·
protection, and the board of directors not to exploit the company for their 
RZQ LQWHUHVWVµ P8 from Cement-1 was asked if there were any factors or 
pressures that might control the organisation in setting up the policies and 
procedures, he observes that:  
 
In the past, there were some pressures. For example, when the board of 
directors consisted of members of the family (the owners), there were 
some actions, authorities, decisions, and orders that serve their own 
LQWHUHVWVZLWKRXWORRNLQJDIWHUVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWVEHFDXVHWKHUHZHUH
no clear rules to control that, but now, since the existence of the CMA , 
this cannot happen.   
 
This evidence indicates that there was a clear conflict of interest from family 
firms due to the absence of rules. The CMA worked this out to overcome this 
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problem through its CG system. It can be inferred from this evidence that 
absence of rules and lack of diffusion can drive the investments and trades to 
DQXQNQRZQGLUHFWLRQEDVHGRQSHRSOH·VEHKDYLRXUDQGDWWLWXGH,WFDQDOVREH
inferred that the domination of the family through the high occurrence of 
conflict of interest is being reduced by the CMA. This shows the importance 
of the time factor in this respect. P2 from Services-1 was asked to talk and give 
details on audit committee and its responsibilities. He gave a good example 
based on his own position in the company: 
 
$V ,·P D &(2 LQ WKLV FRPSDQ\ , FDQ·W EH D PHPEHU RI WKH DXGLW
committee in order to avoid conflict of interest (this committee should 
be under the board of directors not the CEO). However, the CEO or the 
&)2FDQEHPHPEHUV¶RIILFLDOO\·EXWWKDW·VQRWDEHVWSUDFWLFHEHFDXVH,
FDQ·W EH D PHPEHU LQ WKLV FRPPLWWHH ZKHQ Whis committee checks my 
work.  
 
What this interviewee says sounds logical because if he becomes a member in 
the audit committee and a CEO at the same time, then a conflict of interest 
FDQ HDVLO\ RFFXU DV KH ZRXOG EH DEOH WR LQIOXHQFH WKH FRPPLWWHH·V DXGLWLng 
processes. There is strong evidence to suggest that CG afforded an attempt to 
eliminate conflict of interest caused by the family institution through creating 
an audit committee. P14 from Bank-4 also indicates that making sure that 
there is no conflict of interest is the duty of the audit committee whereas three 
other respondents report that it is the duty of the nomination and 
remuneration committee in their firms. These three interviewees are P18 from 
Bank-6, P15 from Bank-5, and P10 from Petrochemical-1. When P21 from 
Services-5 was asked if there were any factors or pressures that might control 
the organisation in setting up the policies and procedures, he replies that:  
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,GRQ·WVHHDQ\SUHVVXUHVEXWDV,VDLGSUHYLRXVO\ZKHQ,·YHWDONHGDERXW
the influence of the family, conflict of interest was a big issue in the 
company and I think CG came along to treat such problems, also it came 
along to specify the responsibilities of the members of the board and top 
management in order not to exploit their positions which serve their own 
interests. 
 
It can be seen that conflict of interest caused by the family institution is a 
major factor impacting on the continuation and success of a company as the 
owner (the family) wants to maximise the profits, but the manager wants to 
serve his own interests. Thus, the interviewee indicates that CG appears to 
treat such problems by specifying the authorities, responsibilities, and 
limitations of the board members and executive directors in order to give a 
clear vision about the tasks and duties of each person. P1 from Bank-1 argues 
that:  
 
The concept of conflict of interest needs to be clarified [treating it] to 
give the sense of distinguishing between family companies and public 
companies where shareholders are the minority in this case. 
 
It appears that the causes of conflict of interests are still unclear to some 
owners (the family), managers, and shareholders. This can be attributed to the 
lack of awareness, diffusion, and education in this topic. This problem can be 
treated through practising CG accurately and raising awareness and knowledge 
on this matter to give better understanding about its causes and impacts. P2 
from Services-1 observes that: 
 
Now there is no conflict of interest in our company although the family 
are themselves the majority shareholders. So CG has removed the 
embarrassment from the executive management with the board of 
directors, which means that any decisions made are specific and clear 
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standards of CG. So there is no prejudice towards anyone whether they 
own thousands of shares or just one share. 
 
It appears that CG rules worked to some extent in this company as there is no 
more embarrassment between the executive directors and the board of 
directors, such as overlapping authorities, orders, and actions which can affect 
the development of the firm. It appears that CG attempted to eliminate this 
major dilemma, which is to the favour of stakeholders. It can be inferred from 
the above evaluation that there are different dimensions of family domination 
that can cause a conflict of interest. Some of these include: family domination 
through the decisions and authorities, and lack of raising awareness and 
education of family members. This signals that conflict of interest is a matter 
that needs to be handled well. 
 
7.3.2.4 Abuse (Selecting and Appointing Board Members) 
 
This theme arose mainly when the respondents answered question number 
five in the interview schedule (see Table 6.5). The question tried to determine 
the mechanism of selecting board members, the chairman, MD, CEO, and 
CFO in the organisation before applying CG by the CMA in 2006. Twelve 
interviewees reported that the selection criteria was based on a range of 
relationships such as family members, relatives, qualified friends, and business 
relationships because there were no active rules for nominating, selecting, and 
appointing members. P12 from the CMA points out that:  
 
3ULRUWRWKH&0$ZDVQ·WDVSRZHUIXODVLWis now. So there were no 
active rules that control the selection of these individuals. Each company 
has its own way to do it. Family companies (that turned to ownership) 
have their own way; partners have their own way too. 
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All of the twelve interviewees pointed out that the CMA dealt with such a 
GLOHPPDE\FUHDWLQJD¶QRPLQDWLRQDQGUHPXQHUDWLRQ·FRPPLWWHHDQGPDGHLW
compulsory for all listed firms, so there is no more family control on selecting 
and appointing members. Also, the CMA issued clear written rules in its CG 
document for selecting board members which in turn, the nomination and 
remuneration committee can rely on when selecting those individuals. This 
committee has different tasks as P3 from Insurance-1 concludes: 
 
Nomination and remuneration committee nominates the members of the 
board of directors and executive management based on their experience 
and qualifications, it makes the policy of awards for the board members 
and executive management, and it evaluates the performance of the 
board members. 
 
A nomination and remuneration committee is also interested in management 
contracts (P4 from Services-2), project development issues (P17 from 
Industry-2), and nominates the selected names to the public (shareholders) for 
voting in the general assembly (P6 from Industry-1). The tasks of this 
committee seem to be efficient in terms of reducing the impact of family 
FRQWUROZKLFKLVRQHRIWKHREMHFWLYHVRI&*LQRUGHUWRSURWHFWVKDUHKROGHUV·
rights and maintain integrity in the stock market. This serves as another 
example of how the CG system appears to be predominantly focused on not 
only professionalising conduct but also on reducing the danger of the family 
institution compromising the position of other stakeholders. 
 
7.3.2.5 Resistance to Change  
 
Resistance to change is a theme that emerged when question number twelve 
was asked to all interviewees to find out if there was any resistance to change 
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from the company after changes were made to CG over the past few years. A 
number of interviewees reported that there was a resistance to change from 
the founders (mostly when they were family companies) as P4 from Services-2 
points out:  
 
There is a strong resistance from the owners of some companies against 
the CMA and CG because they are unable to practice whatever they want 
DQGOLNHDVEHIRUH7KH\GRQ·WOLNHFRQWURODQGWKH\GRQ·WZDQWWRGLVFORVH
too much news and financial information. 
 
This resistance (by some listed companies but not all) appeared when the 
CMA started to apply and activate CG items gradually on listed firms to 
regulate them. It is only natural that any change faces a degree of resistance in 
different forms that lies mainly in the loss of power. P4 explains the forms of 
resistance as not completely refusing CG, but either by creating a department 
that works as a defensive front for the company and deals with the CMA to 
get rid of their requests and problems, or by announcing incomplete news just 
in a way that they guarantee avoiding violations without telling the full story. 
Both forms of resistance indicate that some people do not believe that CG is 
something good and healthy for society. In contrast, they believe it is 
something obligatory that must be applied and followed without thinking 
about the advantages and financial return. P19 from Bank-7 reveals another 
form of resistance to change when he was asked the same question, he replies:  
 
Yes, there was a little resistance in the past. CG is against conflict of 
interest which some people do not like, such as family members of the 
board.  
 
7KLV LPSOLHV WKDW VHUYLQJ RQO\ IDPLO\ PHPEHUV· RZQ LQWHUHVWV FDQ EH
considered as a form of resistance because they are not serving the interests of 
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anyone else involved such as other shareholders and other stakeholders. Three 
interviewees (P16 from Retail-1, P21 from Services-5, and P8 from Cement-1) 
reveal that there was a resistance to change from the founders who were 
family members in which it was hard for them to be transparent about the 
financial statements, awards and bonuses of the members of the board, and 
some other information that they considered to be sensitive. However, it 
appears that this is treated to some extent as P16 from Retail-1 points out:  
 
It has gradually disappeared with the follow-ups of the CMA, CG team, 
and the audit committee.  
 
This evidence connects with bare minimum compliance as discussed earlier, 
implying scope of resistance in implementing CG rules which varies based on 
the extent to which the firm complies with CG rules as the bare minimum or 
to a greater extent. The evidence here to some extent also implies subversive 
or partial compliance such as the points made previously about releasing 
information but not the entire facts. It is worth noting that there is still an 
obvious type of resistance which still exists³the disclosure by family firms 
that become public as revealed earlier when the discussion highlighted the 
amount and type of penalties against listed companies in the regulatory role 
WKHPH7KXVLWLQGLFDWHVWKDW¶EDG·EHKDYLRXULVVWLOOSUHVHQWHYHQDIWHUWKH&*
system was introduced.   
 
7.3.3 Kinship Networks 
 
When asked about the mechanism of selecting board members and executive 
management before applying CG in Saudi Arabia, fourteen participants 
observed there is an influence of kinship, mainly relatives from the first 
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degree, such as a parent, sibling, or child, that affects the emergence of CG 
system in the Saudi Arabian emerging society. Many interviewees consider 
kinship as an extension to family institution due to the nature of culture in this 
society. This is the reason behind having two similar themes in both family 
and kinship institutions that are: abuse and control. These two aspects 
emerged and are highlighted as follows.  
 
7.3.3.1 Abuse (Independence of Board Members) 
 
This theme appeared several times during the interviews when talking about 
kinship which seems to indicate its importance and influence on the 
development of CG. P2 from Services-1 reports that:  
 
The board of directors cannot appoint more than a specific number from 
one family, first degree relatives, or major shareholders. There must be 
independent parties with financial or legal backgrounds that have no 
blood relations to the family, so there will be no imbalance on the board 
of directors. There must be a balance and to have this balance there is no 
place for kinship control. The board of directors is responsible in front 
of the public to achieve good results. So it is difficult for the board of 
directors to select members of the family or relatives without good 
reason, as they become responsible for any consequences.  
 
This implies that CG is against any imbalance on the board such as appointing 
half the number of members from first degree relatives. Therefore, the 
indications are that there are clear rules for assigning independent members 
and appointing relatives from the first degree onto the board of directors. 
There should be standards for qualifications and there are a specific number of 
relatives that can be assigned onto the board which cannot be exceeded. This 
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is important to maintain balance in the company when making decisions as 
P12 from the CMA points out:  
 
We still have in Saudi Arabia selection of board members with kinship 
UHODWLRQV7KDW·VZK\ WKH&*GRFXPHQW ZDV LQWURGXFHG DQG VWDWHV WKDW
one third of the members should be independent. That means 
independent from the ownership and control, thus, there will be a 
balance when making decisions. 
 
7KLV HYLGHQFH GHILQHV WKH WHUP ¶LQGHSHQGHQW PHPEHUV· DV WKH\ DUH
independent from ownership and control. Also it shows the legal percentage 
of independent members on the board as one third. Thus, this regulation 
ensures having balance on the board will include independent members, non-
executive members, and a managing director. So there will be no opportunity 
for kinship accumulation on the board of directors to have control of the firm. 
It can also be implied from the evidence that the aspect of appointing relatives 
onto the board of directors is being reduced over time through the increased 
supervision by the CMA. This shows the importance of time as a factor in 
changing the selection criteria which is an important item in CG systems. A 
number of interviewees such as, P10 from Petrochemical-1, P3 from 
Insurance-1, and P9 from Bank-3 indicate that one of the tasks of the 
nomination and remuneration committee in their companies is to make sure of 
the independence of independent members so there can be no conflict of 
interest. As a result, the CG system dealt, to a large extent, the problem of 
appointing first degree relatives by creating a nomination and remuneration 
committee that verifies the independence of members, specifies the percentage 
of independent members on the board, and specifies the standards of 
qualifications for board members.  
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7.3.3.2 Control (Decision Making) 
 
This theme also emerged during the process due to its importance and 
influence on CG in this society. P12 from the CMA indicates that:  
 
We still have in Saudi Arabia the selection of board members with 
NLQVKLS UHODWLRQV7KDW·VZK\ WKH&*GRFXPHQWDSSHDUV and states that 
one third of the members should be independent ... thus, there will be a 
balance when making decisions. 
 
This evidence emphasises that there is an influence of kinship on CG and 
UHYHDOVWKDW&*FDPHDORQJWRWUHDWNLQVKLSSUREOHPVVWRS¶EDG·EHKDYLRXURI
relatives, and provide guidance for appointing relatives onto the board. The 
evidence also shows that it is very important to maintain balance when making 
GHFLVLRQV LQ RUGHU WR SURWHFW VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV 7KLV FDQ EH DFKLHYHG
through specifying the allowed number of relatives, independent members, 
and non-executive members on the board of directors. P21 from Services-5 
agrees with this evidence and notes that:  
 
The influence of family members or their relatives appears clearly in 
decision making. They might make decisions that do not serve everyone 
who is involved in this company, whether they are shareholders or other 
stakeholders. 
 
7KH HYLGHQFH LPSOLHV WKDW LQ WKHSDVW WKHUH ZHUH VRPH ¶XQKHDOWK\· GHFLVLRQV
made in the firm by family members and their relatives who occupy top 
positions in the organisation. This can affect the growth, revenue, future plans 
of the firm, and the interests of shareholders as mentioned previously. A 
number of interviewees such as, P4 from Services-2, P1 from Bank-1, and P3 
from Insurance-1 observe that kinship has a negative influence on the 
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development of CG in terms of decision making, manipulation, exploitation 
etc. and consider it as a barrier to CG development. Relatives from the first 
degree can have power and control similar to family members in this context. 
7KH\ FDQ ¶DFW· LQ OLHX RI WKH RZQHUV WKH IDPLO\ DV ORQJ DV WKH\ KDYH WKHLU
agreement and have enough trust from the family members to manage the 
firm. Thus, it can be said that the danger of the kinship institution is similar to 
that in the family institution.  
 
7.3.4 Religion 
 
Eleven interviewees observed that the religion of this society has a positive 
role in applying and implementing CG. This role appears in a way that the 
religion supports CG, motivates CG, and shares similar principles that call for 
SURWHFWLQJVKDUHKROGHUV·ULJKWVLQWKHH\HVRIVLJQLILFDQWVRFLDODFWRUV7KLVNH\
institution contains three themes that show the role of religion from three 
different angles.  
 
7.3.4.1 Association (Similar Principles)  
 
This theme emerged when the respondents described or talked about CG 
principles. They observed that CG principles share similar principles of the 
religion in Saudi Arabia. Some of which are as described by P1 from Bank-1: 
 
Trading in our religion is based on not cheating, not harming, no obscene 
profit, etc.  
 
CG calls for similar ethics mentioned in the above evidence as these 
behaviours can have a direct influence on the reform and development of CG 
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in society. It can be inferred that complying with CG principles is considered 
as a compliance with the religion in this country that leads to achieving the 
same objectives. P2 from Services-1 emphasises this evidence and points out: 
 
The standards of the religion are similar to the standards of CG: honesty, 
sincerity, and competence. If we leave CG and comply with Sharia in our 
contracts: Sharia has standards much more [demanding] than CG itself. 
 
P2 adds that CG can be considered as a part of Sharia-based law (which will be 
discussed later in Sub-section 7.3.4.3). If people comply entirely with Sharia, 
then this would cover all CG requirements and more, as perceived by P2. 
+RZHYHU SHRSOH·V FRPSOLDQFH WR 6KDULD LQ 6DXGL $UDELD YDULHV IURP IXOO
compliance down to low or non-compliance depending on the extent of 
SHRSOH·V IDLWK 7KDW·V ZK\ WKHUH PXVW EH D ZULWWHQ GRFXPHQW VXFK DV D &*
document, along with supervisors such as the CMA, in order to observe the 
compliance and behaviour of people towards CG regulations. P6 from 
Industry-1 agrees with this belief and argues that: 
 
I believe that CG has emerged from our religion. The thing that CG has 
added is linking the values and concepts with the firms. For example, 
justice, CG links justice with shareholders and protecting their rights. So 
any monotheistic religion concurs entirely with CG concepts. 
 
P6 shows how CG connects the principles of the religion to daily life in 
companies by providing an example of justice which is a principle in the 
religion as perceived by him and its role iQSURWHFWLQJVKDUHKROGHUV·ULJKWV7KLV
protection can be achieved through applying disclosure as explained by P12 
from the CMA, he points out: 
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The aim of the CMA is the justice in the market through applying 
disclosure items. We always emphasise that the person who owns 20 
shares is exactly similar to someone who owns 20 million shares in terms 
of the timing of receiving information. In the past, the person owns 20 
million shares believed that he owns the company and he was getting 
information which may lead to him making investment decisions in the 
firm, such as increasing his ownership up to 25 million shares because 
the company is making profit or distributing extra shares or making 
contracts, as he has information [sic] that the one who owns 20 shares 
GRHVQ·WKDYH1RZLWLVWRWDOO\GLIIHUHQW1RERG\FDQJHWDQ\LQIRUPDWLRQ
unless it is announced on the Tadawul website (stock exchange website). 
So they all get the information at exactly the same time. The shareholders 
are equal in getting information. 
 
This evidence underlines the importance of applying an important element of 
CG which is disclosure. This element is also emphasised by the religion when 
the same respondent continues that:  
 
3URSKHW 0RKDPPHG 3%8+ VDLG ¶5LJKWHRXVQHVV LV JRRG FKDUDFWHU
and sin is that which wavers in your heart and which you do not 
want people WRNQRZDERXW·7KLVLVWRWDOGLVFORVXUHDQGWUDQVSDUHQF\,W
is as he is saying: hey companies do not keep any info [sic] with you. 
Please disclose about it, if there is something WKDW\RXGRQ·WZDQWSHRSOH
to know about, then there is something wrong. (P12 from the CMA) 
 
So the emphasis on disclosure by the religion, for reasons of justice, fair 
FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG SURWHFWLRQ RI SHRSOH·V ULJKWV FDQ EH FOHDUO\ VHHQ LQ WKLV
evidence. Also, the CMA is highly concerned about the topic of disclosure as 
seen previously when the CMA imposed 95% of the overall penalties against 
listed firms due to improper disclosure by these companies. This shows the 
¶EDG· VLGH RI SHRSOH·V EHKDYLRXU LQ GHDOLQJ with an important issue of 
disclosure items which reflects their lack of interest in complying with both 
6KDULD DQG &* UXOHV SURWHFWLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV DQG FRRSHUDWLQJ E\
providing sufficient information about their business. Some interviewees such 
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as P11 from Services-4 and P2 from Services-1 are happy with applying CG in 
society because they believe that it leads to better religious practice. Other 
interviewees such as, P5 from Bank-2 and P20 from Industry-3 agree that CG 
has similar principles to the religion of the country.  
 
7.3.4.2 Implementation: Supportive Role 
 
This theme emerged when a number of respondents perceived that the 
religion in this society has a supportive role to CG. P1 from Bank-1 points 
out: 
 
The religion in this country is just as any monotheistic religion that serves 
&*DQGGRHVQ·W KDUP LW« LW KDV DPRWLYH DQG LVSRVLWLYH DQGKDV QR
problems with CG. 
 
This evidence shows that they believe that any monotheistic religion agrees 
with and serves CG because they have similar principles and call for the same 
objectives in the eyes of those participants. P2 from Services-1 agrees with this 
by considering the religion as a drive for CG, not a pressure. P12 from the 
CMA adds on this and reveals: 
 
The religion has an influential role in all local organisations. This means 
that there is no system is established here that contradicts the religion in 
WKLV FRXQWU\$QG , GRQ·W WKLQN WKDW DQ\ RYHUVHDV V\VWHP WKDW KDVEHHQ
adopted in this country contradicts the religion. The religion is not a 
barrier to CG; it is a motivator for it. The religion is a major supporter 
for CG. There are some texts from both the holy Quran and Hadith 
SURSKHW·V VSHHFK ZKLFK HPSKDVLVH WKH SULQFLSOHV RI &* IRU PXOWLSOH
reasons, some of which is fair competition. 
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The evidence highlights the supportive role of the religion for CG in this 
context and also shows one reason why the religion plays this supportive role 
for CG, which is fair competition, one of the objectives of both the religion 
and CG. The evidence also indicates that if the subject of CG contradicts the 
religion in the country, then there is no chance to adopt it and apply it. In 
contrast, the religion supports, recommends, motivates, urges and emphasises 
the implementation of CG rules as perceived by the interviewee. When P5 
from Bank-2 was asked if there was any role played by the religion that may 
influence the development of CG in the country, he highlighted the motive 
and supportive role of the religion for CG. P15 from Bank-5 and P23 from 
Stock-Exchange indicate similar views.  
 
7.3.4.3 Compliance (Sharia Compliance) 
 
This theme emerged when six respondents revealed that they adopt Sharia-
based law in all contracts within their firms and comply with it. This 
compliance is supervised by either an internal or external Sharia board that 
guides or reviews all the contracts of these firms in order to achieve best 
compliance with Sharia. It is worth noting that applying Sharia-based rules on 
listed companies is something selective and optional to any listed firm who 
ZDQWVWRDSSO\LWDQGFRPSO\ZLWKLWEXWLWLVQ·WPDQGDWRU\ 
 
P1 from Bank-1 points out that they provide Sharia compliance banking 
services to their customers which are reviewed by an external Sharia board. 
P22 from Services-6 reveals that all their investments are Sharia-based. P2 
from Services-1 notes that all contracts in his company are Sharia compliant 
because this calls for fair competition and they wanted and approved this 
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because of the ease of implementing a CG system, as perceived by the 
participant. P15 from Bank-5 reports that one of his tasks in the field of CG is 
to make sure that the work process is Sharia compliant. When P5 from Bank-2 
was asked if the religion had any role in the CG of the bank as it is under 
Sharia compliance, he points out: 
 
We work under Sharia-based law. We have our own Sharia board that 
works and supervises in order to get products compatible with Sharia. 
For example, loans should be without interest, but there can be a product 
in the middle to buy and sell, to gain some form of benefit. 
  
So he mentions an example of how to avoid contracts with interest, which can 
be done through buying and selling products in order to make it Sharia 
compliant which can be considered as an advantage in trading in the eyes of 
AD. P2 from Services-1 also offers a similar example of how to comply with 
Sharia in all contracts, he outlines: 
 
We brought an external Sharia board to audit our work and show us 
which contracts are compatible with Sharia and which ones are not. 
Thus, we have made some changes in our contracts such as purchasing 
FDUV WKURXJK WUDGH RU ¶0XUDEDKD· 6KDULD ILQDQFLQJ PHWKRG DQG
eliminated other bank contracts with interests. 
 
So this is the way of this company to comply with one element of Sharia 
which is conducting contracts that are only interest free. It can be inferred that 
some companies have a genuine interest in applying both Sharia law and CG 
rules which can be considerHG DV D ¶JRRG· EHKDYLRXU RI WKHVH FRPSDQLHV
towards their society. P20 from Industry-3 argues that: 
 
Many people in this country look for more trades within Sharia 
compliance due to the tangible improvement in these trades [for them]. 
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He highlights the intention of people to move towards trades under Sharia and 
he links this to the improvements that can be achieved. It can be said that 
Sharia compliant companies find it easier to apply a CG system than in non-
Sharia compliant ones because CG rules are simply compatible with Sharia 
principles as perceived by a number of significant social actors. 
 
7.4 Archival Sources Evaluation 
 
Each listed firm must submit an annual report as mentioned previously. These 
reports have been obtained from the Saudi stock exchange website (Tadawul). 
Reports from years 2011, 2010, and 2009 have been mainly reviewed and 
evaluated. This evaluation has captured some inferences mainly from year 
2011 and some from 2010 and 2009. These inferences have direct influence on 
the research topic. These have been organised in the following table. 
 
Table 7.2: Annual Reports Evaluation 
Listed Firm Year of Report Evaluation 
Insurance-1 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm follows the regulations of both the CMA and 
SAMA as it is an insurance listed company. It appears that 
it complies with CG system to the bare minimum. 
Services-1 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm looks towards gaining greater legitimacy through 
following Sharia based rules. 
Bank-1 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm follows Sharia based rules. An external Sharia 
board audits and reviews all the contracts of this firm. This 
may attract investors. 
Services-2 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm has created condensed annual reports with many 
pages. It complies with many optional items which show an 
interest towards exceeding minimum compliance. 
Bank-2 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm has more obvious objectives of CG, such as being 
more transparent with their shareholders through stating a 
lot of details about their current activities and future 
investments.  
Industry-1 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm has created detailed reports and followed 
international best practices which reveal its interest towards 
exceeding bare minimum compliance.  
Services-3 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm has created a decent annual report that contains 
the mandatory items only. This shows its compliance to the 
bare minimum.  
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Cement-1 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm is relatively new in the stock market. It has 
created a basic annual report that includes compliance with 
mandatory items only.   
Bank-3 2011, 2010, 2009 The annual reports of this firm have detailed financial 
reports with many pages. These financial reports have been 
reviewed by great and well-known external auditors. This 
may attract investors.  
Petrochemical-1 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm has not complied with a number of items but it 
has disclosed that in its annual report. Non-compliance 
with some items must be mentioned in the report with valid 
reasons as well. 
Services-4 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm has big future investment plans. This may 
increase the appetite of investors for investing in this firm. 
Bank-4 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm conducts many meetings which they see as 
successful strategy for the continuation of the firm.  
Bank-5 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm follows Sharia based rules to obtain greater 
legitimacy.  
Retail-1 2011, 2010, 2009 The annual report of this firm includes many charts that 
show the growth and development of the firm in the past 
five years, and the benefits from its stock exchange. This 
may increase the confidence of the investors. 
Industry-2 2011, 2010, 2009 The annual report of this firm includes a very detailed 
disclosure of the remunerations of the board members and 
executive directors. it seems that it has a strong nomination 
and remuneration committee.   
Bank-6 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm has a risk committee. This committee seems 
important in the banking sector in order to minimize risks.  
Bank-7 2011, 2010, 2009 The annual report of this firm reveals for the multiple 
contracts of this firm with other firms in details. This 
disclosure might be important for some shareholders.  
Industry-3 2011, 2010, 2009 The annual reports of this firm discloses for detailed 
ownership of major shareholders with detailed information 
about them. This shows an interest towards being 
transparent with other shareholders.  
Services-5 2011, 2010, 2009 It can be seen from the annual report of this firm the 
multiple contracts with other companies as it has 
construction activities. This might be important to some 
investors.  
Services-6 2011, 2010, 2009 This firm follows Sharia based rules in an attempt to 
increase its reputation and credibility. 
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7.5 Comparative Analysis 
 
The research sample included twenty three interviewees from different levels 
of authority such as TMT, SMT, and MMT. These interviews were conducted 
in different organisations from a range of sectors such as, banks, food 
industry, real estate and construction, petrochemicals, telecommunications, 
energy, retail, transport, and the regulatory authority, along with stock 
exchange mediators.  
 
For categorisation purposes, a table is created to illustrate the institutions 
mentioned in each organisation (the frequency). The institutions are classified 
into three categories: supportive institutions to CG, institutions compromising 
CG, and institutions with no apparent influence to affect the development of 
CG, based on the data of the interviews. The bureaucratic state expressed by 
the CMA as a key institution is not added in this table as it was mentioned in 
all interviews. This will be followed by a comparative analysis. Please see Table 
7.3. 
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Table 7.3: The Frequency of Emergent Themes in all Organisations 
Organisation Supportive 
Institutions to CG 
Institutions 
Compromising CG 
Institutions with no 
Apparent Influence 
to Affect CG 
Bank-1 Religion / politics Family / kinship Market /  legal 
Services-1 Religion  Culture / family / 
kinship 
Politics / market 
Insurance-1 - Family / kinship Market / legal / 
politics 
Services-2 Market  Family / kinship Politics  
Bank-2 Religion / legal Family / kinship  Market / politics 
Industry-1 Religion  Market  Politics  
Services-3 - Family / kinship Politics 
Cement-1 - Family  Market 
Bank-3 - Family / kinship Legal / politics 
Petrochemical-1 - Family  Politics 
Services-4 Religion   Market  Politics / legal 
CMA Politics / legal / 
religion 
Market / family / 
kinship 
-  
CMA Politics / legal Family / kinship - 
Bank-4 Religion   Family / kinship Market  
Bank-5 Religion  - - 
Retail-1 - Family  - 
Industry-2 - Family  Market  
Bank-6 - Family / kinship - 
Bank-7 - Family / kinship - 
Industry-3 Religion  - - 
Services-5 - Family / kinship - 
Services-6 Religion / legal Family / kinship - 
Stock-Exchange Religion  Family / market  - 
 
Results  
(Frequency) 
(Religion = 11) (Family = 19) Market = 7 
Legal = 4 (Kinship = 14) Politics = 9 
Politics = 3 Market = 3 Legal = 3 
Market = 1 - - 
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It can be seen from Table 7.3 that two apparent institutions, namely, family 
and kinship, are seen as compromising a CG system due to their high 
frequency. Family institution was mentioned in 19 out of 23 interviews, and 
kinship institution was mentioned in 14 out of 23 interviews. This would be a 
sign of their influence on the development of CG since they scored high 
frequencies. It can be said, based on the interviews, that both institutions are 
considered as barriers to CG because they do not help to achieve the 
objectives of CG. Hence, they are classified as institutions that compromise 
CG. Another apparent institution that was mentioned frequently by 
respondents is the religion institution. It was mentioned in 11 interviews out 
of 23. This would signal its influence on the development of CG since it has a 
high degree of frequency. Based on the interviews, it can be said that this 
institution is considered as a supportive institution to CG because it helps to 
achieve the objectives of CG. Hence, it is classified as an institution that 
supports CG. 
 
Other institutions also emerged during this stage of analysis. These institutions 
are: legal, politics, and market. The interviewees do not agree or have similar 
observations on the influence of these institutions on the development of CG. 
In other words, there might be an effect but each respondent perceives a 
different one (please see Table 7.3). Therefore, these institutions are classified 
as institutions with no apparent influence to affect the development of CG. 
Also, no common characteristic of the interviews such as, age, gender, 
position, and sector, is observed in order to classify these institutions in a 
common category. However, the emergence of these institutions is helpful 
when discussing the first research question that asks about what non-Western, 
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emerging society (Saudi Arabian) institutions consist of, as perceived by 
significant social actors.  
 
7.6 Quantifying the Data 
 
It is possible to quantify qualitative data by counting the number of 
frequencies of a particular word, theme, or content in textual material. It is 
used not only to infer meaning, but also to explore usage (Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005). Thus, the purpose of quantifying the data is to illustrate them, reveal 
better insights, and give a sense of the number of firms raising similar 
observations. However, it is not for statistics, quantification purposes, or 
conducting any statistical analyses due to the sample size.  
 
In this phase of data analysis, the data are quantified based on the number of 
interviews. For example, if 9 respondents out of 23 mentioned the theme 
¶FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW· WKHQ  RI WKH UHVSRQGHQWV KLJKOLJKW RU VXSSRUW WKLV
idea. Moreover, the theme that scores the highest percentage in each key 
institution is considered as a main theme. For example, if a key institution has 
30%, 26%, and 26% of themes, then the 30% one is the main theme. Please 
see Table 7.4 along with the evaluation below.  
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Table 7.4: Quantifying the Frequency of Themes 
Themes Frequency 
 
1. An Expression of the Bureaucratic State (the CMA) 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Imposed compliance 
1.2 Bare minimum compliance  
1.3 Exceeding minimum compliance (best practice)  
1.4 Implementation: the regulatory role 
1.5 Implementation: the awareness/cooperative/partnership role 
1.6 Regulations failure 
 
 13% 
 30% 
 60% 
 13% 
 26% 
 13% 
 
2. Family 
 
2.1 Resistance 
2.2 Abuse (selecting board members)  
2.3 Conflict of interests 
2.4 Control (decision making) 
2.5 Entitlement (separation of ownership and control) 
 
 
 
 21% 
 52% 
 39% 
 34% 
 17% 
  
 
3. Kinship 
 
3.1 Abuse (independence) 
3.2 Control (decision making) 
 
 
 
 21% 
 21% 
  
 
4. Religion 
 
4.1 Association (similar principles) 
4.2 Implementation: supportive role 
4.3 Compliance (Sharia compliance) 
 
 
 
 
 30% 
 26% 
 26% 
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7.6.1 Evaluation 
 
7.6.1.1 An Expression of the Bureaucratic State (the CMA) 
 
7KH WKHPH ¶([FHHGLQJ PLQLPXP FRPSOLDQFH EHVW SUDFWLFH· ZDV PHQWLRQHG
by the majority of respondents, making it the most frequent topic at 60%. This 
reveals the intention of many people towards following best practice by 
exceeding the minimum compliance of CG. For example, a number of 
respondents note that they created committees more than the mandatory ones 
such as executive committee and risk committee. This theme can also be 
achieved through the supportive role played by the religion which will be 
discuVVHG ODWHU LQ WKLV VHFWLRQ 7KH VHFRQG KLJKHVW WKHPH LV ¶%DUH PLQLPXP
FRPSOLDQFH·ZKLFKZDVPHQWLRQHGIUHTXHQWO\E\WKHUHVSRQGHQWVDW7KLV
reveals that fewer companies intend to comply with CG at its minimum or 
standard requirements. For instance, there is much useful information that can 
be mentioned in the annual reports; however, a number of respondents used 
the reports to mention the minimum only without disclosing further 
information that could be of interest to shareholders. It can be said that listed 
firms tend to comply with the minimum because they consider the CG system 
DV DQ LPSRVHG V\VWHP 1DWXUDOO\ WKH OHDVW PHQWLRQHG WKHPH LV ¶LPSRVHG
FRPSOLDQFH·DWZKLFKVKRZVWKDWRQO\DIHZFRPSDQLHVFRQVLGHUWKH&*
system as an imposed system that must be followed. For example, a number of 
respondents point out that the nomination and remuneration committee and 
audit committee are imposed by the CMA which means that they have to 
create them in order to comply with a CG system and avoid penalties.  
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In regards to the roles played by the CMA to implement a CG system in listed 
firms, it played two roles. The first role, which was mentioned frequently by 
the respondents at 26%, is the awareness, cooperative and partnership role. 
This is a more obvious role played by the CMA as long as listed companies try 
to achieve best practice through exceeding minimum compliance of CG. P12, 
the head of CG department in the CMA, notes that:  
 
We play the role of partnership with companies. So sometimes we play as 
one team in order to develop best practice. This happens in case we find 
the company is really interested in applying and implementing CG. 
+RZHYHU LIZHILQGWKHFRPSDQ\GRHVQ·WKDYHWKHPRWLYDWLRQQHJOHFWV
and prejudices the requirements; then here the role of the regulator 
comes through discussion, letters, and imposing penalties and other 
corrective procedures.  
 
Thus, the second role of the CMA is the regulatory role that was mentioned by 
the respondents at 13%. This role appears to be played with less responsive 
firms to CG rules that consider the CG system as an imposed system or only 
comply with the minimum. P1 from Bank-1 believes that the number of 
penalties is increasing in order to force listed companies to implement CG 
rules. Implementing CG rules is important and neglecting these rules may 
cause a regulations failure, as highlighted by P1 from Bank-1 when he gives an 
example of a regulations failure: 
 
What happened in the financial crisis in 2007/2008, although there are 
hard rules and regulations that are very strict, so we are talking about 
Ministry of Commerce, the CMA, Central Banks, Basel Committee (for 
banks), risk reduction, and with all of that, neither owners nor 
administrators were able to catch the aggressive side of investors which is 
greed, power, and avariciousness and such bad behaviours. Although I 
personally hate bureaucracy, it serves in reducing the risk and gamble of 
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the investor (and the administrator if we take it from a positive side in 
this case).    
 
Thus, it is important to comply with CG and implement its rules properly in 
order to avoid such crisis. This can be emphasised through educational 
schemes and raising awareness because the topic of CG is still in its early 
stages in Saudi Arabia, as revealed by some respondents.  
 
7.6.1.2 Family 
 
7KH WKHPH ¶$EXVH· ZKLFK PRVWO\ FRPHV LQ WKH IRUP RI VHOHFWLQJ ERDUG
members is the most frequent topic that was mentioned by respondents at 
52%. Appointing family members onto the board of directors seems to be a 
clear dilemma in listed firms which can have a direct impact on the market in 
terms of control (decision making), conflict of interest, entitlement (separation 
of ownership and control), and resistance. For example, some interviewees 
note that the selection of board members before applying CG in 2006 was 
based on family, blood, and other relationships which can be considered as an 
abuse. A number of respondents observe that this is a major aspect that CG 
addresses. Others point out that this aspect is gradually disappearing after CG 
was applied on listed companies.  
 
¶&RQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW· LV DOVR D ELJ LVVXH DV LW ZDV PHQWLRQHG IUHTXHQWO\ E\
respondents at 39%. Some respondents consider it as a major aspect that 
should be handled and clarified more to give the sense of distinguishing 
between family firms and public ones. A third theme which was also 
PHQWLRQHG IUHTXHQWO\ E\ WKH UHVSRQGHQWV DW  LV ¶FRQWURO· ZKLFK FRPHV
mostly in the form of decision making. Decisions made by the management, 
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especially if they are family members, can have a large impact on the market 
which can create a conflict of interest. For instance, a number of interviewees 
highlight that family members think that decisions are personal and of interest 
to the family too, not only shareholders. More clarification and awareness can 
be helpful in this case.  
 
The fourth theme which was mentioned frequently by the respondents at 21% 
LV¶UHVLVWDQFH·7KLVUHVLVWDQFHFDQKDve different forms as described previously. 
This resistance could occur when separating ownership and control because 
family members are unable to exercise whatever they want and like as before. 
They are being controlled and scrutinised by the regulators. The role of the 
CG division within each company is then to bring all the different views 
together and work as a consultancy body, as noted by P4 from Services-2.  
 
The last theme which was mentioned by a few interviewees at 17% is 
¶HQWLWOHPHQW·ZKLFKFRPHV in the form of separation of ownership and control. 
Although it was mentioned a few times by the respondents, it forms a big 
challenge in the continuation of family firms that want to become public ones, 
as observed by P12 from the CMA. This theme can have a clear influence on 
decision making, conflict of interest, abuse, and may cause resistance.  
 
7.6.1.3 Kinship 
 
7KHWKHPH¶$EXVH·ZKLFKFDQPDLQO\FRPHLQWKHIRUPRILQGHSHQGHQFe was 
mentioned by a number of respondents at 21%. Relatives from the first degree 
must be independent from control, in this case, to comply with CG rules. This 
theme can have an influence on control (decision making) and cause a conflict 
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of interest. The other theme that was mentioned frequently by the respondents 
DWLV¶FRQWURO·ZKLFKPRVWO\FRPHVLQWKHIRUPRIGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ,WKDV
a similar format to the control of family which can have an impact on the 
market by causing a conflict of interest.  
 
7.6.1.4 Religion 
 
7KHWKHPH¶$VVRFLDWLRQ·WKDWFRPHVLQWKHIRUPRIVLPLODUSULQFLSOHVEHWZHHQ
the religion and CG was mentioned frequently by the respondents at 30%. 
These shared principles that were mentioned by respondents are trust, 
credibility, justice, honesty, sincerity, proficiency, transparency, disclosure, 
SURWHFWLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV SHQDOWLHV SXQLVKPHQWV FRRSHUDWLRQ IDLU
competition, advice giving, not cheating, not harming, and no obscene profit. 
This can lead to achieving a CG objectivH ZKLFK LV SURWHFWLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV·
rights that are also supported by the religion, as perceived by a number of 
VLJQLILFDQW VRFLDO DFWRUV 7KH RWKHU WZR WKHPHV ¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ VXSSRUWLYH
UROH·DQG¶6KDULDFRPSOLDQW·ZHUHPHQWLRQHGHTXDOO\E\WKHUHVSRQGHQts at 26% 
for each. The religion supports and motivates CG in order to accomplish the 
&*REMHFWLYHZKLFKLVVKDUHKROGHUV·SURWHFWLRQ6KDULD-based companies find it 
easy to comply with a CG system because of similarity in principles. Both 
themes can be assRFLDWHGZLWKWKH¶DVVRFLDWLRQ·WKHPH 
 
7.6.1.5 Outcomes  
 
)URPWKHDERYHHYDOXDWLRQLWVHHPVWKDWWKHUHDUHVRPHFDXVHVIRU¶FRQIOLFWRI
LQWHUHVW·ZKLFKFDQEHVXPPDULVHGLQWKHIROORZLQJWDEOH 
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Table 7.5: The Causes of Conflict of Interest 
Themes Frequency 
     
 1. Family Abuse (selecting board members)    52% 
 2. Family Control (decision making)   34% 
 3. Kinship Abuse (independence)   21% 
 4. Kinship Control (decision making)   21% 
 5. Family: Entitlement (separation of ownership and control)   17% 
      
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Causes of Conflict of Interest 
 
         Family 
 
  
         Kinship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, when looking at the causes of conflict of interest (please see 
Table 7.5 and Figure 7.1), it seems that family abuse scores the highest at 52%, 
through appointing members of the family onto the board of directors which 
may cause a conflict of interest. Also, family control through decision making, 
which scored 34%, may cause a conflict of interest. Moreover, kinship 
influence through abuse (independence) and control (decision making) that 
may cause conflict of interest share similar percentages at 21%. Finally, 
separation of ownership and control (entitlement) which may cause conflict of 
interest scored 17%.  
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7.7 Cross-links among Institutions 
 
Based on the associated themes in Table 7.1 and the discussion in the previous 
section of the causes of conflict of interest, the following diagram, Figure 7.2, 
is drawn to illustrate these relationships.  
 
Figure 7.2: The Influence of Institutions on CG 
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It has been noticed that there are some cross links between institutions (please 
see Figure 7.2). These cross links arise between the themes of each institution. 
Therefore, this diagram is drawn to summarise all the relationships between 
Sharia 
Association 
Supportive 
Role 
Imposed 
Compliance 
Bare Minimum 
Compliance 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
in Saudi 
Arabia 
Support 
Exceeding 
Minimum 
Compliance Resistance Abuse 
Regulatory 
Role 
Conflict of 
Interests 
Cooperative 
Role Entitlement Control 
Regulations 
Failure 
Control Abuse 
Chapter 7: First Stage of Data Analysis: Emergent Themes 
220 
 
institutions and their themes. It appears that there is a relationship between 
family institution and kinship institution and they both compromise CG as per 
the previous evaluations. It also appears that the religion institution does not 
have any relationship to the family or kinship institutions because the religion 
institution has a supportive role to CG.  
 
By looking precisely at the family institution in Figure 7.2, it can be seen that 
¶FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVW·DSSHDUVWREHDFHQWUDORQHDQGLVDWWDFKHGWRILYHDUURZV
Three arrows come from three themes in the family institution, namely, 
¶DEXVH·¶FRQWURO·DQG¶HQWLWOHPHQW·DQGWZRDUURZVFRPHIURPWZRWKHPHVLQ
WKHNLQVKLSLQVWLWXWLRQQDPHO\¶DEXVH·DQG¶FRQWURO·7KXV¶FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVW·
appears to form the most important theme that impacts CG and is caused by 
the family and kinship institutions that was recently proved when the data 
ZHUH TXDQWLILHG 7KLV UHYHDOV WKDW ¶EDG· EHKDYLRXUV RI IDPLO\ PHPEHUV DQG
their relatives can cause a conflict of interest that does not serve all parties, 
such as shareholders, employees, managers and other stakeholders. When 
FRQVLGHULQJ ¶HQWLWOHPHQW· DQG ¶DEXVH· WKHPHV LW FDQ EH VHHQ WKDW WKH\ DIIHFW
HDFK RWKHU DQG DIIHFW WKH ¶UHVLVWDQFH· ¶FRQWURO· DQG ¶FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW·
themHV 7KLV UHYHDOV WKDW WKH\ ERWK IRUP ¶EDG· EHKDYLRXU IURP IDPLO\
members that can create resistance to accept CG rules, make unbalanced 
GHFLVLRQV DQG FUHDWH FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW WKDW GR QRW SURWHFW VKDUHKROGHUV·
rights.  
 
When looking at the kinship institution in Figure 7.2, it can be seen that two 
DUURZVIURPERWK¶DEXVH·DQG¶FRQWURO·JRWR¶FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVW·7KLVPHDQV
WKDW WKH ¶EDG·EHKDYLRXURI UHODWLYHV FDQFDXVHDFRQIOLFWRI LQWHUHVWDVQRWHG
above. It can alsREHVHHQ WKDWDQDUURZJRHV IURP ¶DEXVH· WR ¶FRQWURO·7KLV
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reveals that if the relatives are not independent from control, they can affect 
the decision making within the firm. Therefore, CG requires independence of 
these relatives to avoid such problems.  
 
When considering the religion institution in Figure 7.2, it can be seen that 
¶DVVRFLDWLRQ·LVDWWDFKHGE\WZRDUURZVWKDWFRPHIURP¶6KDULD·DQG¶VXSSRUWLYH
UROH· $V &* SULQFLSOHV DUH FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK WKH UHOLJLRQ·V SULQFLSOHV ZKLFK
mean that CG has similar principles to the religion as perceived by the 
respondents, it seems to be easy for listed firms to apply Sharia law and 
comply with it, which is optional and not compulsory by law. In addition, as 
CG shares similar principles with the religion, it can be said that religious 
observance has a supportive role for people to implement CG rules and 
comply with them in order to achieve CG objectives, which their religion 
expects. 
 
When looking at the CMA in Figure 7.2, it can be seen that the CMA plays the 
regulatory role with firms that consider CG as an imposed compliance and 
firms that only comply with the bare minimum. This shows the role played by 
the CMA with less responsive companies to a CG system in which the CMA 
imposes penalties and warnings to those firms. The figure also shows that the 
CMA plays the cooperative, awareness, and partnership role with firms that 
exceed minimum compliance of CG in which these firms show an interest and 
self-motivation to comply with both optional and mandatory items of CG. 
This indicates that the CMA deals with listed firms based on their willingness 
to implement CG rules. The self-motivation of a firm can lead to the 
minimum compliance of CG being exceeded as can the supportive role which 
is inspired by the religion (please refer to Table 7.1). It can also be seen from 
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Figure 7.2 that the regulatory role can cause regulations failure due to the lack 
of training, background, and knowledge of CG in the market. This reveals the 
need to raise awareness the subject of CG. 
 
To sum up, based on the three types of analyses (comparing, quantifying, and 
determining relationships), it seems that family and kinship institutions have a 
negative influence on the development of CG in this context, the religion 
institution has a supportive role to the development of CG, and the CMA is 
the body that supervises the implementation of CG through its different roles. 
)XUWKHUPRUH WKH TXDQWLI\LQJ DQDO\VLV VKRZV WKDW ¶FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW· LV WKH
main aspect that compromises CG caused by family and kinship institutions. 
Therefore, these suggest that the matter of CG is influenced by family, 
kinship, religion and an expression of the bureaucratic state. 
   
7.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has focused on describing, evaluating, interpreting, and analysing 
of the data collected from semi-structured interviews with significant social 
actors in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging context. Thematic analysis 
was used to analyse and interpret the data collected from the interviews, where 
this approach is a flexible tool for obtaining productive, dense, and a detailed 
account of the data. The process of conducting the analysis was started by 
creating a table that includes key institutions, emergent themes, examples 
(evidence), initial interpretation, and associated themes. The frequently 
mentioned ideas were identified as emergent themes. Each group of associated 
themes represent a key institution. The emergent themes were analysed, 
interpreted, and evaluated and as a result, prolific inferences were obtained.  
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The findings suggest that the regulatory authority, represented by the Capital 
Market Authority as an expression of the bureaucratic state through its 
themes, emerged as an institution that influences the emergence and 
development of CG in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society in a 
supportive way. The religion in this society has a supportive influence too. 
Both the family and kinship institutions, through their emergent themes, 
impact the development of CG in a negative way in this non-Western, 
emerging context. A comparative analysis was conducted to show the 
frequency of emergent themes among the entire sample. This analysis revealed 
that family, kinship, religion, and the bureaucratic state institutions were the 
frequently mentioned institutions by the significant social actors. Whereas 
politics, legal, and market institutions did not show any frequency by the 
participants. This frequency of emergent themes was quantified in order to 
infer meaning, explore usage, illustrate the data, show better insight, and gives 
a sense of the number of firms that raised similar observations. This 
quantification offered considerable insight in that it explored a number of 
causes of conflict of interest caused by both family and kinship institutions. In 
the family institution, the themes: abuse (selecting board members), control 
(decision making), and entitlement (separation of ownership and control), 
appear to have a greater influence and considerable causes of conflict of 
interest. In the kinship institution, the themes: abuse (independence) and 
control (decision making) appear, to a large extent, to cause a conflict of 
interest. The influence of institutions through their emergent themes was 
drawn in Figure 7.2 and cross-links among institutions were illustrated to show 
a summary of all the relationships of institutions along with associated themes.  
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The observations from this research study did not capture any potential 
relationships between the bureaucratic state and both the family and kinship 
institutions in favour of the argument that the CMA treats firms with family 
backgrounds differently from those firms who do not have any family 
background. So it does not appear that the CMA plays, for example, the 
regulatory role with listed firms that have a family background nor does the 
CMA play the cooperative role with non-family background listed firms. This 
observation has not been captured in this research study and, thus, there 
appears to be no relationship between the bureaucratic state and both family 
and kinship institutions in this regard.  
 
The annual reports of listed firms played an important role in assisting analysis 
as the reports offered a broad picture of the situation and helped in the 
understanding of a number of issues. This has helped the researcher, in some 
cases, to obtain a better interpretation. For example, when looking at the 
annual report of Services-1, it can be observed that this firm looks towards 
gaining greater legitimacy through following best practice. The perception of 
P2 from Services-1 indicated that the task of the CG department in his firm is 
to apply the highest standards suggested by the CMA as long as these rules are 
compatible with protecting shareholders and do not affect the nature of work. 
This example revealed how annual reports added more validity to the evidence 
through indicating similar tendencies. The next chapter presents the second 
stage of data analysis of the follow-up interviews with significant social actors. 
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Chapter 8: 
Second Stage of Data Analysis: Development 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided inferences and interpretations of the collected 
data from semi-structured interviews to investigate the influence of institutions 
on the development of CG as perceived by significant social actors. This 
chapter aims to provide further interpretations to the emergent themes from 
the first stage of data analysis and make further inferences in order to validate 
the findings that arose from this stage of the study. 
 
This chapter offers further observations and interpretations of the data based 
on seven follow-up interviews with a group of firms that were interviewed in 
the first stage (see Table 8.1 below). It was an opportunity to discuss the 
emerging ideas and findings with the respondents and observe their 
viewpoints and perceptions while gaining respondent insights into the 
relevance of the themes emerging from the first stage of analysis. Therefore, 
using the technique of follow-up interviews, the intention is to provide further 
insights and better understanding into the findings so far, such that a greater 
depth of analysis and evaluation of the data gathered qualitatively is achieved. 
Additional understanding into the impact of institutions on the development 
of CG is the desired outcome. This approach is consistent with ideas by 
Creswell (2009), who indicates that collecting and analysing follow-up 
qualitative material, such as additional interviews, is beneficial in exploratory 
research to explain and interpret initial findings. 
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7KLV FKDSWHU LV GLYLGHG LQWR WKUHH VHFWLRQV 6HFWLRQ  SUHVHQWV D ¶PHWD-
QDUUDWLYH·RIWKHGDWDFROOHFWHGIURPWKHVHFRQGVWDJHRILQWHUYLHZVZKLFKLVDQ
overarching account by the author. Section 8.3 shows the amendments made 
to the cross-links among institutions and their emergent themes. The last 
section, 8.4, summarises the chapter.  
 
Table 8.1: Follow-up Interviews· Details 
# Date Organisation Place Position Rank Length N/V 
1 27 Aug 12 Services-2 Work CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 60 min Voice 
2 27 Aug 12 Industry-2 Work Director of 
Accounting and 
Internal Auditing 
SMT 45 min Voice 
3 29 Aug 12 Insurance-1 Work CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 60 min Voice 
4 29 Aug 12 Industry-1 Work CG & 
Compliance 
Manager 
MMT 60 min Voice 
5 29 Aug 12 Bank-1 Work VP & Head of 
Compliance 
Division 
SMT 60 min Voice 
6 05 Sep 12 Services-1 Work CEO TMT 30 min Voice 
7 05 Sep 12 Bank-4 Work Deputy Head, 
Financial Dept. 
SMT 45 min Voice 
 
 
8.2 Meta-narrative 
 
7KLV ¶PHWD-QDUUDWLYH· VHFWLRQ LV DQ overarching account by the author of this 
research study. It provides further description and evaluation to the emergent 
themes from the first stage of data analysis supporting them with evidence 
from the follow-up interviews. Moreover, it assists in identifying any additional 
emergent themes that may have bearing on this research study. 
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8.2.1 An Expression of the Bureaucratic State 
 
The emergent themes under this institution (six themes) were discussed with 
significant social actors. This institution, as mentioned previously, is 
represented by its key actor The Capital Market Authority (CMA) as it is the 
only regulator body for stock exchange in Saudi Arabia. The two main 
HPHUJHQWDVSHFWVRI¶FRPSOLDQFHDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ·ZHUHGLVFXVVHGZLWKWKH
respondents and some issues arose during this stage of analysis. 
 
With regards to implementation which consists of two themes, namely, the 
regulatory role, and the awareness/cooperative/partnership role, P2 from 
Services-1 adds on the roles played by the CMA to become three roles: (1) the 
regulatory role, (2) the awareness/cooperative/partnership role, and (3) the 
observer role. So the third one is added by P2 in order to complete the picture 
of the roles played by the CMA in the implementation. The observer role 
refers to tasks of the CMA that lead to monitor and watch how listed firms 
apply, implement, and comply with CG rules. This role did not emerge in the 
initial analysis because it was inferred that the regulatory role covers all these 
tasks but P2 perceives that it is a separated role and should stand by its own. 
P2 expresses that the observer role is an important one because it helps in 
determining whether the rules and regulations are being applied and 
implemented as required or not. Through the observer role, the CMA 
develops a common sense of when it is required to turn optional items to 
mandatory ones based on the efficiency of CG in listed firms that are being 
observed by the CMA and the extent to which firms are engaging in the broad 
spirit of its regulations. This is thought to be a helpful way to reduce 
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transaction costs caused by less or non-responsive firms from a new 
institutional economics perspective. 
 
Two interviewees (P6 from Industry-1 and P14 from Bank-4) note that they 
do not perceive the different roles played by the CMA in their firms. They 
believe that the CMA deals with all listed companies equally. If they comply 
with CG rules of the CMA, the CMA does not appreciate them. If they do 
not, it punishes them. They claim that the CMA should be neutral in all its 
deals with listed firms because the CMA is an observer body and should stand 
at one distance from all listed companies. It can be inferred from this 
observation that the social actors have different perceptions in this regard and 
they look at their relationships with the CMA from different angles which may 
give a flavour of the implementation role played by the CMA. This can be 
attributed to the perception of P4 from Services-2. He points out that: 
We are an incomplete economy, we are an emerging economy.  
 
Thus, it can be implied that the emerging nature of the economy means that 
CG is a difficult notion to exercise because its broader institutionally-accepted 
behaviours are still in formation in this context which refers to the problem of 
competing standpoints from different institutions (e.g., family). Thus, CG in 
this society is still in its first steps and needs to be developed and further 
improved in order to draw a better understanding for the relationships 
between different parties that are involved in applying, implementing, and 
complying with CG rules and regulations. This evidence also strengthens the 
views that the market of the Saudi Arabian society is also incomplete as 
expressed by P1 from Bank-1: 
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The Saudi Arabian market is not mature yet to impose its opinion [on 
behalf of other parties]. 
 
It can be inferred from this evidence that the market institution has no 
apparent influence on the development of CG in this context. In addition, 
there might be a minimum engagement of market institution which may imply 
that there is a sort of resistance to apply CG regulations on the Saudi Arabian 
market. These perceptions have been indicated previously when a comparative 
analysis was conducted in the first stage of data analysis in Chapter 7, Section 
7.5 of this study.  
 
In terms of compliance which consists of three themes, namely, imposed 
compliance, bare minimum compliance, and exceeding minimum compliance 
(best practice), P14 from Bank-4 argues that many people think that CG is an 
imposed system. This perception is consistent with what P3 from Insurance-1 
indicates. P3 points out that:  
 
The CMA imposes CG. Yes, it is an imposed compliance. 
 
7KLVYLHZRI&*FDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKH¶ORZHU·XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVRFLDODFWRUV
of CG and the objectives that CG is trying to achieve. P3 also indicates that as 
long as listed companies are being forced or coerced to apply and implement a 
CG system, they comply only with the minimum standards to avoid facing 
problems with the CMA and try not to exceed bare minimum compliance 
EHFDXVHWKH\EHOLHYHWKDW&*LVMXVWDQLPSRVHGV\VWHPDQGD¶ZDVWHRIWLPH·
Stated differently, there appears to be a lack of dialogue about the relevance of 
CG such that its adoption is seen negatively solely in the light of additional 
regulation. This means that there is not any genuine interest and self-
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motivation to comply with CG rules. It is only a matter of complying with 
written policies. 
 
With regards to regulations failure which is an emergent theme in this 
research, a number of respondents, namely, P2 from Services-1, P3 from 
Insurance-1, and P14 from Bank-4, indicate that CG does not completely 
prevent financial crises and collapses but it reduces their impact and 
likelihood. The logic behind this is noted by P4 from Services-2. He points out 
that: 
 
CG is an understanding and knowledge, not a treatment.  
 
This evidence implies that CG is not a tool that can be used to prevent 
economic recessions or crises. Rather, it is an understanding of a CG culture 
that can be grasped by a proper education and diffused awareness of the topic. 
Misunderstanding of CG by concerned people may cause a conflict of interest 
between the owners and the board of directors, a concentrated ownership 
rather than a dispersed one (I will return to this in Sub-section 8.2.2), 
H[SORLWLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV· LQYHVWPHQWV ZKLFK PD\ LQFUHDVH WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI
recessions, collapses and financial crises.  
 
In summary, it can be inferred that the bureaucratic state expressed by its key 
DFWRU ¶7KH &DSLWDO 0DUNHW $XWKRULW\· SOD\V DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ WKH
development of CG but does not completely prevent financial crises in the 
eyes of significant social actors. The role of this institution emerges mainly in 
implementation and compliance. This institution has the power to apply CG 
rules, watch and supervise the implementation of and compliance with CG 
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regulations, educate concerned people, and raise awareness on the topic of CG 
as perceived by significant social actors.  
 
8.2.2 Family Ties 
 
The emergent themes under this institution (five themes) have been discussed 
with significant social actors. It has been inferred that the family is still an 
important and sizeable reason for applying CG in Saudi Arabia as perceived by 
those respondents which is consistent with the observation in the first stage of 
data analysis.  
 
When P6 from Industry-1 KDVEHHQLQIRUPHGWKDWWKH¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ·RIWKH
family was a frequently mentioned theme by the respondents in the initial 
interviews, he notes that:  
 
Numerous companies suffer from the centrality, which is caused by the 
family, in a number of things, some of which is decision making. CG 
comes along to maintain balance. 
 
7KLV HYLGHQFH LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKH ¶FHQWUDOLW\· RU WKH ¶DFFXPXODWLRQ· RI IDPLO\
members in the board of directors creates some problems or serves specific 
LQWHUHVWV EXW QRW HYHU\RQH·V LQWHUHVWV DV SHUFHLYHG E\ WKLV LQWHUYLHZHH 2QH
major aspect is the decision making which is entirely controlled by the family 
members in some firms and may cause bias when decisions are made, such as 
GHFLVLRQV WKDW VHUYH WKH IDPLO\·V LQWHUHVWVZLWKRXW ORRNLQJ DIWHU VKDUHKROGHUV·
interests. This centrality of family members is also a concern in the eyes of P4 
from Services-2. He points out that: 
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With regards to the firms that have a centrality in the family, their CG 
usually focuses on how to manage and control, how to divide and 
distribute the shares, and how to own. However, CG of listed companies 
should focus on the general regulations and the relations of the 
shareholders and top management. 
  
Thus, it can be observed from this evidence that there is a divergence in the 
focus of CG between listed companies that have a centrality in the family and 
other ones that do not have such centrality. P4 gives some examples of these 
different focuses of CG caused by the centrality of the family. He indicates 
that companies that suffer from the centrality of family have different 
orientations, such as looking after their ownership, management, and control, 
whereas in fact they must look after the contracts, regulations, and 
implementations that serve shareholders rights and protect their interests. 
7KHUHIRUH WKH ¶FHQWUDOLW\ RI WKH IDPLO\· FDQ EH FRQVLGHUHG DV DQ HPHUJHQW
theme in this research due to its importance and influence in the development 
of CG, and the need for it and resistance to it, as perceived by significant 
social actors.  
 
When P2 from Services-1 has been informed about the influence of family 
institution in the Saudi Arabian CG, he indicates that: 
 
The family has a negative impact depending on the loyalty to the CMA. 
They have a power in decision making because they are the majority from 
two sides: ownership, and being on the board of directors. 
  
This suggests that the family institution has a negative impact on CG in the 
eyes of P2. This impact varies by different degrees depending on the loyalty of 
family members to the CMA as expressed by P2. It can be inferred that the 
lower the loyalty of the family to the CMA, the larger the negative impact of 
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the family to CG development. This is a logical outcome when the loyalty of 
the family to the CMA varies between companies. P2 also highlights the 
domination of the family in decision making since they are the majority 
shareholders in addition to composing the board of directors, or the majority 
of it. As a matter of fact, CG arose to reduce the domination of the family by 
applying and implementing CG rules through the CMA gradually as noted 
previously in Sub-section 7.3.2.2 of Chapter 7. The implication then is an 
almost inevitable friction between the regulatory institution represented by the 
CMA and the family institution which bears influence on the development of 
CG. The interviewees shed light on the competing nature of these institutions 
and in part reflect a greater battle of wills between what each see as legitimate 
action. To the family institution, protecting its own interests might in itself 
appear appropriate although to the CMA, the need to protect minority 
shareholders overrules such interest. 
 
,QWHUPVRI ¶VHOHFWLQJDQGDSSRLQWLQJERDUGPHPEHUV·E\WKHIDPLO\ZKLFKLV
an emergent theme in this research, P3 from Insurance-1 provides an example 
that illustrates the reasons behind this selection. He points out that: 
 
/HW·VDVVXPHWKDW,·PDQRZQHURIDILUP,WLVVRLPSRUWDQWIRUPHWKDW
people under my control listen to me and have loyalty for me. Why? 
Because no one is going to disagree, disapprove, have any objection with 
PHRUDJDLQVWPH ,FDQSDVVP\IDPLO\·VRZQ LQWHUHVWV ,FDQUDLVH WKH
awards of the board members (who are family members). However, CG 
does not allow all of these bad practices. CG comes and says that the 
board members must include members with specific charisma and 
specific position. Also, it should include at least three independent 
members.  
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This example, as viewed by AT, explains the reasons behind selecting board 
members through the family in listed companies. When this selection occurs, 
the family is able to serve their own interests, raise the awards for their 
PHPEHUV DQG FRQWURO WKH ILUP WKURXJK WKHLU VHOHFWHG PHPEHUV 7KDW·V ZK\
&*DSSHDUHGDQGDSSOLHGUXOHVDJDLQVWWKHVH¶EDG·EHKDYLRXUVVXFKDVFUHDWLQJ
a nomination and remuneration committee that organise the selection criteria 
and the awards to the board members. P1 from Bank-1 perceives another 
VROXWLRQ IRU FRQWUROOLQJ WKLV VHOHFWLRQ ZKLFK LV WKH QRWLRQ RI ¶DFFXPXODWLYH
YRWLQJ·ZKLFKFDQOLPLWWKHDJJORPHration of the family. The main objective of 
accumulative voting is to protect shareholders rights but is still not a 
mandatory item by the CMA. It works when minority shareholders accumulate 
with each other to make one vote in order to get one seat on the board of 
directors. However, major family shareholders do not like that and they deny it 
in every general assembly as noted by P6 from Industry-1. The reason behind 
denying this by major shareholders is that they are worried by the minority 
shareholders. They are worried that one of the minority shareholders becomes 
a member on the board of directors which, therefore, can affect the decision 
PDNLQJ 7KDW ZDV DQ H[DPSOH RI ¶UHVLVWDQFH· E\ WKH IDPLO\ PHPEHUV DQ
emergent theme in this research) provided by P6 and represented an event that 
occurred within Industry-1. 
 
:LWK UHJDUGV WR WKH ¶VHSDUDWLRQ RI RZQHUVKLS DQG FRQWURO· ZKLFK LV DQ
emergent theme in this research, P1 from Bank-1 perceives that there is a 
difficulty in separation, specifically with family firms that become public ones. 
He argues that: 
 
This separation of ownership and control is more difficult when the 
family owns 50% or more.  
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It can be inferred from this evidence that the larger the share the family owns, 
the more difficult the separation is. CG is weak in these firms in the eyes of P1 
because the domination of family members is high enough to repel the 
intervention of others. This seems to be an unhealthy aspect and dangerous to 
a large extent because it can disintegrate corporate decisions away from 
strategic investments towards self-serving ones if not governed or treated well.  
 
:LWKUHJDUGVWRWKHHPHUJHQWWKHPH¶FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVWV·P17 from Industry-
2 provides a straightforward example. He points out that: 
 
When a family member, who is a member on the board of directors, 
establishes a restaurant inside the company, then this is an obvious sort 
of conflict of interest if not disclosed and approved by all shareholders in 
a general assembly. 
 
MH observes that conflict of interest is a major factor influencing CG 
development and can be caused by the family institution in various ways 
because the family believes that it owns the company as perceived by MH. 
One of the tasks of an audit committee (which is a mandatory item by the 
CMA) is to make sure that there is no conflict of interest. Furthermore, a new 
SROLF\FDOOHG¶WKHSROLF\RIFRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVWV·LVLVVXHGE\WKH&0$ in order 
to reduce the impact of this aspect. P14 from Bank-4 points out that: 
 
There is something new called: the policy of conflict of interests. So there 
should be a policy of conflict of interests inside any listed company and 
the company should inform the CMA about it on a regular basis.  
 
This evidence implies that the CMA is working hard towards eliminating this 
aspect by applying this rule and makes it mandatory for all listed companies. 
P17 from Industry-2 notes that the external auditors should write down a 
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separate report on conflict of interest. This is one of the items that has been 
improved since last year (in the initial interviews), where P17 points out that 
´WKHUHLVDQLPSURYHPHQWVLQFHZHPHWODVW\HDUµ7KHRXWFRPHVIURPWKHILUVW
stage RI DQDO\VLV VKRZHG WKDW ¶FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVWV· FDXVHG E\ WKH IDPLO\
institution is a major factor impacting on the continuation and success of a 
company as the owner (the family) wants to maximise the profits, but the 
manager wants to serve his own interests. More to the point, the outcomes 
VKRZHGWKDW¶FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVWV·LVFDXVHGE\DQXPEHURIHPHUJHQWWKHPHV
from both family and kinship institutions (see Figure 7.1). At present, the 
investigation in the second stage reveals that the CMA asked all listed 
FRPSDQLHV WR VXEPLW WKH ¶SROLF\ RI FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVWV· DQG PDGH LW D
mandatory item. This action of the CMA is in line with the findings and 
observations from the first stage and demonstrates how the system has 
improved since the initial interviews earlier. Thus, this reveals the importance, 
UHOHYDQFHDQGLQIOXHQFHRI¶FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVWV·RQ&*GHYHORSPHQW 
 
In summary, it can be inferred from the above evaluation that the family 
institution plays a negative role in the development of CG in the eyes of 
significant social actors which has been revealed in the first stage of data 
analysis. This role of family institution emerges on a number of aspects such 
as, entitlement (separation of ownership and control), control (decision 
making), abuse (selecting and appointing board members), resistance to 
change, and conflict of interests.  
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8.2.3 Kinship Networks 
 
The emergent themes under this institution (two themes) have been discussed 
with significant social actors. Some respondents still perceive that kinship is an 
extension to the family ties due to the nature of culture in this country and as 
observed in the first stage of data analysis.  
 
When P4 from Services-2 was informed that kinship is an emergent institution 
in the first stage of data analysis, he indicates that there is a dichotomy 
between Saudi Arabia as a non-Western, emerging society and Western 
countries as developed societies. He points out that:  
 
Ownership system in the USA and Europe is dispersed not concentrated 
as in Saudi Arabia, where we have individuals who are major 
shareholders. 
 
KD signals to the problem of ownership in Saudi Arabia as it is centred on 
specific individuals (majority shareholders) not dispersed to minority 
shareholders. Based on this observation, P4 adds:  
 
Decision making in the dispersed ownerships such as the USA and 
Europe is made by minority shareholders [most of the time], but here in 
Saudi Arabia, it is made by majority shareholders. 
 
It can be inferred from both evidences above that P4 raises the implications 
posed by ownership systems at different levels of society. He attributes all the 
problems of family and kinship institutions, such as entitlement and control, to 
the broader notion of an ownership system in a society. This is logical, to an 
extent, because when the majority shareholders dominate and control the 
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decision making (the first emergent theme) in any organisation, they can more 
easily abuse the system, resist change, and create conflict of interest when 
making decisions. There is a danger in the rhetoric put forward by some 
respondents that such negative outcomes are inevitable, but rather it is the 
looseness of CG that creates opportunities for such unfortunate events to 
occur. Therefore, the matter of ownership seems to be influencing the 
development of CG and needs to be governed as perceived by KD.  
 
In terms of the independence of board members (the second emergent 
theme), P1 from Bank-1 argues that the existing regulations are insufficient. 
He provides an example about some close relationships such as nephews, 
FRXVLQV VLVWHUV· KXVEDQGV DQG any others who do not hold the same family 
name and are being appointed as board members where it is harder to discover 
that they are relatives of the family. So these selections are not based on 
qualifications in the eyes of P1. This perception has also been observed by P17 
from Industry-2 when he was talking about kinship institution and claims that 
kinship has an impact on CG even if the relation is from the second or third 
degree. These are the drawbacks of kinship institution on CG as perceived by 
significant social actors and may influence the development of CG.  
 
8.2.4 Religion 
 
The emergent themes under this institution (three themes) have been 
discussed with significant social actors. It has been inferred that the religion 
has a supportive role to implement CG due to the compatibility of principles 
of both the religion and CG in this context, as perceived by the respondents. 
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When P6 from Industry-1 has been informed that the religion is a significant 
institution that influences the development of CG, he indicates that:  
 
CG did not come up with something new to us. The principles and ethics 
of the religion are far better than CG, and they outperform CG. For 
example, justice, freedom, equality, and transparency, are all principles of 
the religion. 
 
This evidence implies that CG and the religion share many important 
SULQFLSOHVDQHPHUJHQWWKHPHLQWKLVUHVHDUFKWKDWKHOSWRSURWHFWWKHILUP·V
DVVHWV DQG WKH VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV +DYLQJ VDLG WKDW SHRSOH LQ WKLV FRQWH[W
should be familiar with these principles and ethics and the focus should then 
be on how to implement CG rules in the correct way. It is worthwhile now to 
note that:  
 
The religion does not ask for CG, but it asks for the ethics and values 
that CG is compatible with. (P4 from Services-2) 
  
It can be inferred from this evidence that CG is not something required by the 
religion in this society in terms of any institutional pressure or provision it may 
apply but rather the notion of CG itself is aligned with religious teachings and 
values. The religion asks for and emphasises on anything that leads to protect 
people and their rights. P2 from Services-1 provides an example of how the 
religion has a supportive role to CG (an emergent theme in this research). He 
points out that: 
 
$SHUVRQ·VFRQVFLHQFH OHDGVKLPQRW WRPDQLSXODWH6R WKH UHOLJLRQ LV D
motivator to implement CG in this case. 
 
Chapter 8: Second Stage of Data Analysis: Development 
240 
 
The evideQFH LPSOLHV WKDWSHRSOH·V LQWHUQDO VHQVHRI ULJKW DQGZURQJ WKDW LV
WKHLU ¶PRUDO FRPSDVV· FRXOGPRWLYDWH WKHP WR FRPSO\ZLWK&*DOWKRXJK LW
varies by each person for many potential reasons³knowledge, education, 
experience, etc.) because they have self-motivation to comply with the rules of 
the religion as viewed by P2 owing to the overarching importance and 
significance of religion in the Saudi Arabian culture. This evidence cannot be 
generalised to the whole society but it gives a sense of how the religion can 
have an influence on the development of CG in this context in the eyes of 
significant social actors. In itself, it may serve as a basis to legitimise the 
broader objectives of CG and its associated regulations. 
 
With regards to compliance with Sharia-based law which is an emergent theme 
in this research, P3 from Insurance-1 reveals that it is optional for any firm 
whether to comply with Sharia-based law or not and the board of directors is 
the one who makes this decision. P3 notes that they comply with Sharia in all 
their contracts and loans in Insurance-1. They seek an external Sharia board 
that consists of at least three specialists to review all their products and 
investments and determine whether these products and investments are 
compatible with Sharia or not. This practice increases the trust from a large 
proportion of their customers as these customers prefer and are interested in 
products that are compatible with Sharia as perceived by P3.  
 
In summary, it can be inferred from the above evaluation that the religion 
institution plays a supportive role in the development of CG in the Saudi 
Arabian non-Western, emerging society in the eyes of significant social actors. 
This role of religion institution emerges on a number of aspects such as, 
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association (similar principles), implementation (supportive role), and 
compliance (Sharia-based compliance).  
 
8.3 Amendments on Cross-links among Institutions  
 
The following figure will show the amendments occurred subsequent to the 
second stage of data analysis. It consists of the four key institutions: family, 
kinship, religion, and an expression of the bureaucratic state, along with their 
emergent themes and the cross-links between these themes.  
 
Figure 8.1: The Influence of Institutions on CG (amended) 
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Figure 8.1 shows the cross-links between the emergent themes in each 
institution. These cross-links have been evaluated and presented previously in 
the first stage of data analysis in Section 7.7. Moreover, Figure 8.1 shows the 
additional emergent themes (shown with bold dashed lines) from the second 
stage of data analysis. There are two additional emergent themes, the first one 
is in the family institution, and the second one is in the expression of the 
bureaucratic state institution, namely, centrality and observer role, respectively. 
The relations of these two additional emergent themes with other themes and 
their impact on the development of CG will be presented as follows.  
 
The first additionDOHPHUJHQWWKHPHLVWKH¶FHQWUDOLW\·LQWKHIDPLO\LQVWLWXWLRQ
WKDW KDV DQ DUURZ JRLQJ WR ¶FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVWV· 7KLV UHYHDOV WKH QHJDWLYH
impact of family institution which may cause a conflict of interest when there 
is a centrality in ownership and not dispersed. This conflict of interest is an 
unhealthy aspect in any society because it can be a major reason for business 
failures and financial crises. 
 
7KHVHFRQGDGGLWLRQDOHPHUJHQWWKHPHLVWKH¶REVHUYHUUROH·LQWKHH[SUHVVLRQ
of the bureaucratic staWHLQVWLWXWLRQWKDWKDVDQDUURZJRLQJWR¶EDUHPLQLPXP
FRPSOLDQFH·7KLVUHYHDOVWKDWWKLVREVHUYHUUROHSOD\HGE\WKH&0$FDQPDNH
listed firms feel that they are under watchful eyes which cause these listed 
companies to comply with bare minimum as a worst case scenario. So this 
practice motivates these listed firms if they do not have self-motivation to 
apply, implement, and comply with CG rules. 
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8.4 Summary 
 
This chapter is an attempt to validate the model evaluation proposed earlier in 
the first stage of data analysis, based on the perceptions presented by 
significant social actors to investigate the influence of institutions on the 
development of CG in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society. In 
general, the inferences from the follow-up interviews offered indicative 
support for the initial propositions in the first stage of data analysis as revealed 
throughout the chapter. This is by determining what Saudi Arabian non-
Western, emerging society institutions consist of such as, politics, legal, 
market, bureaucratic state, family, kinship, and religion, as perceived by 
significant social actors and what the likely influences of these institutions are 
on the development of CG in this context. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has offered further interpretations to the collected data 
from the second stage of interviews. The most important objective of this 
research was to explore the impact of institutions on the development and 
emergence of the CG system as perceived by significant social actors in a non-
Western, emerging context from an institutional theory perspective. Thus, the 
task of this chapter is to cover the following points: (a) summarise the main 
observations, (b) interpret the main observations, (c) discuss the importance 
and relevance of the observations, and (d) discuss the outcomes in light of the 
pre-existing literature (e.g., support or challenge previous studies). The 
discussion of the outcomes from this research study will mainly be compared 
with existing research in emerging societies. However, some examples from 
developed societies will also be offered whenever there is a lack of research in 
emerging societies in order to draw judgements about the meaning and 
relevance of the findings. 
 
This chapter is structured in four sections in order to discuss the observations 
from this research study. Section 9.2 discusses family institution, Section 9.3 
kinship institution, Section 9.4 an expression of the bureaucratic state, and 
Section 9.5 religion institution. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 9: Discussion 
245 
 
9.2 Family Institution  
 
The subject of family institution has been discussed extensively in the 
literature in developed societies due to its importance and influence on a 
variety of phenomena, some of which includes corporate governance. 
However, this discussion is lesser to an extent in emerging contexts. The 
influence of family institution varies from one society to another based on the 
classification of the society, whether it is a developed, an emerging, or a 
developing society. The reason is that each class in general and a society in 
particular has its own nature of family institution that may affect its 
development in various ways. For example, the literature indicates that 
informal institutions, such as family and kinship, are dominant in emerging 
societies due to robust family and kinship relationships and lack of complying 
with the rules in these contexts (Young et al., 2008). This explains the 
importance of family institution in this study, as an informal institution, as the 
research setting of this study is Saudi Arabia which can be considered as a 
non-Western, emerging society with robust family and kinship institutions. In 
light of this, the following sub-sections will discuss the different influences of 
family institution on the emergence of the CG system that emerged from this 
research study. 
 
9.2.1 Entitlement (Separation of Ownership and Control) 
 
A number of respondents mentioned the theme of entitlement in relation to 
ownership and control in the first stage of interviews and noted that it is an 
unhealthy feature and challenge to the emergence and establishment of a 
rigorous CG system in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society. This 
Chapter 9: Discussion 
246 
 
suggests that the separation of family ownership and control is a major 
challenge to the controlling family in this context which may affect the 
continuation of the firm as perceived by P12 from the CMA. Furthermore, P1 
from Bank-1 emphasised the challenge of separating family ownership from 
control in the second stage of interviews by arguing that it is more difficult 
when the family owns 50% or more of the shares in a firm to encourage or 
enact voluntary change. Failing to attain separation of family ownership and 
control may cause a conflict of interest between the management, the owners, 
the shareholders, and other stakeholders, which may have a negative impact 
on CG practices in non-Western, emerging societies. At the very least, it is 
likely to lead to minimal or token implementation of CG as opposed to a 
greater voluntary buy-in into its principles and intentions. This observation 
seems important, because there has been an increasing investigation in the 
literature on the extent of separation of family ownership and control and its 
potential impact on CG practices. For example, a study conducted in emerging 
societies by Claessens et al. (2000) to review a number of features of East 
Asian corporations such as ownership concentration of families. They observe 
that family control has a negative impact on firm performance due to the 
influence of ownership concentration of family on driving the relationship 
between performance, cash-flow, and control rights that affect the efficiency 
of CG. Family control seems to be playing an important role in the 
relationship between firm value and ownership structure. In addition, it 
explains the negative relationship between control rights and market valuation. 
It can be inferred that ownership concentration of families does not serve CG 
implementation in emerging societies due to its negative impact on firm 
performance, cash-flow, control rights, and market valuation that are 
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DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK &* HIILFLHQF\ DV XQGHUVWRRG IURP &ODHVVHQV HW DO·V 00) 
study.  
 
The above observations can be contrasted markedly with the study of Ben-
Amar and Andre (2006) into Canadian firms. These authors studied the 
relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance in 
the context of ownership concentration and separation between ownership 
and control rights. They did not observe that separation of ownership and 
control has any negative impact on the performance of Canadian firms and, 
thus, on the development of CG because dominant shareholders often 
undertake less risky projects as their wealth invested in the firm increases. It 
can be implied that CG works better in developed societies because ownership 
is dispersed and not concentrated as in emerging societies. Ownership in 
emerging societies tends to be concentrated due to the overwhelming 
GRPLQDQFH RI IDPLO\ LQVWLWXWLRQ RI D FXOWXUH·V KLVWRU\ DQG OHJDF\ P4 from 
Services-2 highlighted this issue in the second phase of interviews. He pointed 
out that: 
 
Ownership system in developed countries is dispersed not concentrated 
as in Saudi Arabia, where we have here [in Saudi Arabia] individuals who 
are major shareholders. 
  
This evidence explains why CG tends to work better in developed societies as 
the ownership system is dispersed. Also, it shows that this non-Western, 
emerging context has a high family ownership concentration that creates 
barriers and resistance to the acceptance of CG regulations. This may imply 
either staggered implementation and acceptance, or bare minimum compliance 
with CG instead of embracing its principles, which shows the influence of 
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family institution on CG practices. The institutional background of family 
members appears to allow them to behave in a selfish way in their firms such 
as overseeing their own interests and ownership without caring for non-family 
PHPEHUV· LQWHUHVWV 7KHVH EHKDYLRXUV RI IDPLO\ PHPEHUV SOD\ D UROH LQ
impacting the emergence of CG regime in this non-Western, emerging society 
context.  
 
From the above discussion it can be inferred that the separation of ownership 
and control is still a primary dilemma in emerging societies due to the strong 
family domination which is a main reason for poor minority shareholders 
protection and poor CG implementation. The observations from this research 
study appear to offer support to the argument that the family institution has a 
negative impact on the development of CG and this can be observed in the 
separation of ownership and control. Generally, crossing the threshold from 
founding family management to professional management is difficult even in 
the best of circumstances (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Zahra and Filatotchev, 
2004; Young et al., 2008). This difficulty appears to be greater in emerging 
societies where difficult-to-enforce contracts make it risky for founders to 
return the reins over to outsiders (Ahlstrom et al., 2004; Young et al., 2008). 
Taiwan, an emerging society, has some owners who begun to dilute their 
holdings and reduce their control by selling to institutional investors and 
bringing in outside management, albeit with mixed results (Filatotchev e al., 
2005; Liu et al., 2006; Young et al., 2008). Entitlement of the family shows a 
socially informed view of family actors as deeply enmeshed in a system of 
norms and relations that is culturally constructed in this context (Fiss, 2008).  
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9.2.2 Control (Decision Making) 
 
Burch (1972: 29) stated that: 
 
If an individual, a family or a group of families owns 4% or more of 
voting stocks and has representation on the board of directors, the 
company is deemed to be family controlled.  
 
The above statement illustrates when a firm can be considered as family 
controlled in Western societies, however, it should be over 50% to be 
considered as a family controlled firm in the context of Saudi Arabia, as 
perceived by P1 from Bank-1. This control manifests itself mainly through 
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJZKLFKPD\RUPD\QRWVHUYHDOOSDUWLHV·LQWHUHVWVGepending 
on the institutional forces of family institution. A group of respondents 
mentioned this theme in the first stage of interviews and reported the need to 
govern it. This suggests that numerous firms suffer from family domination 
and centrality mainly through decision making as perceived by P6 from 
Industry-1. Moreover, family listed firms believe that the decisions are 
personal and of interest to the family only and not to shareholders because 
they mix between public and private ownership or interests as expressed by P1 
from Bank-1. Mixing between public and private ownership (e.g. PLC versus 
LTD) is a problem and can be attributed to the lack of awareness and 
knowledge about the nature of public firms. In effect, the controlling family 
PD\ PDNH GHFLVLRQV WKDW VHUYH LWV RZQ LQWHUHVWV DQGQRW HYHU\RQH·V EURDGHU
interests, which in turn, could OHDG WR H[SURSULDWLRQ RI VKDUHKROGHUV· ZHDOWK
and potentially create moral hazards. The stronger the family control, the 
larger the influence of this aspect of family institution on the emergence of 
CG systems. It has also been observed that time plays a role in changing the 
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degree of family control. With the increased control of the CMA over time, 
family domination is reduced. 
 
The above perceptions appear to be important as family control has been 
discussed largely in the literature and by scholars from across a variety of fields 
owing to its broad impact, scope and reach. This relevance primarily views 
institutions as inherently about the role of power and control, where power 
and control relations lie at the heart of CG (Fiss, 2008). Numerous studies 
conducted in developed societies indicate that family control (mainly through 
decision making) has a positive impact on CG (mostly but not always), firm 
value, and firm performance (Mishra et al., 2001; Becht et al., 2002; 
Mustakallio et al., 2002; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). However, this is not the case in emerging societies, where a 
number of scholars argue that family control has a negative impact on CG, 
firm value, or firm performance because the family prefers to advance its 
interests at the expense of non-family shareholders (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; 
Morck and Yeung, 2004). For instance, a study conducted by Morck and 
Yeung (2004) to discuss family control in emerging societies and two 
developed societies, namely, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
reported that many firms from different emerging societies have controlling 
shareholders such as wealthy families. This means that the managers (mostly 
family members) serve the interest of those wealthy families, not the interest 
of public shareholders, as is the case in the United Kingdom and the United 
6WDWHV &DUQH\   VXSSRUWV WKLV LGHD E\ UHSRUWLQJ WKDW ´due to the 
ownership of the family, family members enjoy certain control rights over the 
ILUP·V DVVHWV DQG use these rights to exert influence over decision-making 
SURFHVVHVLQDQRUJDQL]DWLRQµ. The intense reliance on family members and the 
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absence of trust in professional managers can have negative implications for 
corporate governance, such as corruption, moral hazard and self-interest at the 
expense of non-family members. Morck and Yeung (2004) attribute this 
problem to poor education systems in emerging societies which constricts the 
supply of competent managers. It can be observed that institutions play a 
remarkable role in emerging contexts, where supplying proficient and capable 
managers from family members, who can make appropriate and less risky 
decisions, is an acute problem in these contexts. 
 
The observations from this research study also suggest that the family has 
near-dominant power in decision making. This is because they are the majority 
from two sides: (1) ownership and (2) forming the majority of the board of 
directors. Thus, the extent of family impact on the acceptance of an emerging 
CG regime depends on their loyalty to the CMA. The lower the loyalty of the 
family to the CMA, the larger the negative impact of the family to CG 
development. This impact can mainly appear in the decisions made by board 
members from the family that may only serve specific interests which 
contradicts the objectives of CG. This observation is also important, because it 
adds to the field by offering additional support to previous work by Yeh et al. 
(2001) in a sample of Taiwanese listed firms (an emerging society) to analyse 
family control and corporate governance. The findings from their study 
suggest that family-controlled firms with high levels of control have lower 
performance than family-controlled firms with a low level of control. The 
results also suggest that firm value is higher when the controlling family holds 
OHVVWKDQRIDILUP·VERDUGVHDWV7KHVHILQGLQJVLQGLFDWHWKDWDQLQFUHDVH
in family control could reduce firm performance and firm value through 
making improper or less effective decisions. This implies a decline in CG 
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efficiency caused by family institution in this emerging context, since moral 
orders form the foundation of governance system and are represented by 
power and control that influence the formation of a CG system (Fiss, 2008). 
Thus, family control in such a context intrinsically shapes the pattern of the 
CG system depending on the strength of this control. It can be seen that the 
controlling family seek a form of pragmatic legitimacy (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008) which is mainly based RQDFWRU·V VHOI-interest, believing that 
controlling the firm is the best for all parties. However, this guarantees their 
VXUYLYDORQO\DQGQHJOHFWVRWKHUSDUWLHV·LQWHUHVWV 
 
9.2.3 Abuse (Selecting and Appointing Board Members) 
 
The majority of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and noted the need for additional guidance from the regulatory 
authority for selecting board members. This suggests that family listed firms 
are trying hard to aggressively dominate the board of directors through 
selecting and appointing family members onto the board in order to maintain 
their domination over decisions and interests. It can be said that the selection 
of board members is shaped by institutional forces, family selection in this 
instance, which emerge out of organisational and societal processes. It was 
perceived by a group of significant social actors that there were no specific 
standards or guidance for selecting board members before applying the initial 
emergence of the CG system in 2006 in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, 
emerging society. So the selection criteria of board members was based on a 
range of relationships such as family members, relatives, qualified friends, and 
EXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLSV7KLVFXOWXUH·VKLVWRU\DQGOHJDF\ explain why the family 
has a tendency of selecting and appointing members of the family onto the 
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board of directors in which, not only the family watches and serves their own 
interests, but also they monitor and inform all the decisions and future 
investments of the firm. Appointing family members onto the board of 
directors might be counterproductive as it may lead to a loss of trust in the 
board by shareholders. The chief problem here appears to be legacy effects 
from the historical dominance of the family institution on the running and 
governance of firms. As a CG system emerges and legislates to reduce the 
power of the family, resistance forms and compliance tends to be 
unfavourable towards this redistribution of power. Therefore, family members 
act and behave in ways that they historically learned and exercised which can 
have severe impact on the development of a CG system in this non-Western, 
emerging society context.  
 
7KH¶FHQWUDOLW\·RI WKHIDPLO\ D WKHPHZKLFKHPHUJHG LQWKHVHFRQGVWDJHRI
interviews) is principally caused by the appointment of family members onto 
boards of directors. As such, this will not be discussed separately in this 
UHVHDUFK5DWKHUIDPLO\¶FHQWUDOLW\·ZLOOEHUHJDUGHGDVDIRUPRIDFFXPXODWLRQ
of family within the board of directors (i.e. an imbalance within the board of 
directors) that may lead to conflicts of interest. Therefore, it will be merged 
with this part of the discussion.  
 
The issue of selecting and appointing family members onto the board seems to 
be important due to its high frequency among respondents and its reflection in 
the literature by a number of studies in emerging societies (Yeh and Woidtke, 
2005; Yeh, 2008) and developed societies (Morck et al., 1988; Smith and 
Amoako-Adu, 1999). For instance, the above perceptions are in line with Yeh 
DQG:RLGWNH·VZRUNZKRLQGLFDWHWKDWFRQWUROOLQJVKDUHKROGHUVIDPLO\
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owners) do wield influence over board members selection in emerging 
societies due to the robust domination of the family in these contexts. This 
implies that controlling shareholders can do expropriation and abuse by 
appointing less qualified, less experienced, or less mature members from the 
family in top managerial positions in the firm (La Porta et al., 2000). It can be 
LQIHUUHG IURP <HK DQG :RLGWNH·V UHIOHFWLRQV WKDW VHOHFWLQJ DQG DSSRLQWLQJ
family members onto the board of directors is associated with poor CG in 
emerging societies. What also emphasises the significance of selecting and 
appointing family members onto the board, is the numerous rules and 
regulations that promoters of CG develop in order to organise the mechanism 
of selecting board members. More to the point, CG specifies the qualification, 
the independence, and the specification of who can occupy specific positions 
on the board of directors. This would maintain or increase the legitimacy of 
organisations (a classic notion of institutional theory) as the actions of CG 
entity are appropriate, desirable, and proper within a socially constructed 
system of norms, values, and beliefs, and can produce cultural forces of CG 
that may go beyond any organisational control. 
 
It has been indicated previously that the family institution has no apparent 
negative influence on CG systems in developed societies most of the time, but 
this is not always the case. An example of the negative impact of family 
institution through selecting and appointing family members onto the board in 
a developed society is offered by Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999). A study 
conducted by Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) on 124 Canadian family firms 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to examine management succession and 
financial performance found that there is a relationship between appointing 
family successors and poor corporate performance. Moreover, they observe 
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that there is a slight decline in stock prices when family successors are 
appointed into managerial positions, whereas they do not observe this decline 
when either non-family insiders or outsiders are appointed. A possible 
explanation of why these findings emerged in a developed society is that 
institutional impact may vary across generations. This means there may be no 
apparent or direct influence of family on CG within a generation but 
potentially there can be an influence that alternates through generations. This 
can be attributed to the special challenges that family successors face in the 
transition period as those successors are younger and have less established 
reputations rather than their family connection per se (Smith and Amoako-
Adu, 1999). In essence, this evidence seems to find an association between 
appointing family successors and poor performance of listed firms in a 
developed society. This implies that appointing family members in such a 
context may reduce the performance of the firm which can negatively affect 
CG. These findings from a developed society context appear to suggest then 
that initiatives by developing societies along these parameters during the 
emergence of a CG system are crucial to mitigate future problems caused by 
abuse of family strength. 
 
9.2.4 Resistance to Change 
 
A number of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated its danger to firms and the emergence of an effective 
CG regime. This suggests that there is a common resistance from the 
controlling family in listed firms against CG rules of the regulator body 
because these rules restrict family members to practice what serves their own 
interests only as perceived by P4 from Services-2, P19 from Bank-7, and P16 
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from Retail-1. Resisting CG rules by family members may hinder the 
development of CG in the firm and thus, in the society. It also does not help 
WR VHUYH VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWV VXFK DV JDLQLQJ PRUH power and voice, 
because family members are naturally against the loss of their power. This 
observation itself seems important, because there is not enough focus as 
necessary on family resistance in non-Western, emerging societies. Thus, this 
area is under-explored by previous research and needs to be adequately treated 
by scholars due to its bearing in the formation of CG in non-Western, 
emerging contexts. A study conducted by Handler and Kram (1988) to address 
the problem of resistance by family firms found a number of factors 
promoting resistance. An interesting one for this research study indicates that 
the basis of conflict between family and business, which they consider a 
problem of resistance, is a function of diverging values. This can be attributed 
to the conflict of interest between the owners and management (i.e. the agency 
problem) (and more broadly between other shareholders and family members), 
which forms one shape out of several shapes of resistance by the family. They 
suggest a recommendation to this particular problem of resistance in which 
family dynamics should be separated from business issues. Calabro and 
Mussolino (2011) extend this line of thought in that family-controlled firms 
are generally characterised by a society that is constrained by resistance to 
change, which creates concerns over their continuation and survival in a global 
economy. This implies that there is a scope of institutional impact on CG 
caused by family institution through resistance to change and the degree of 
resistance varies across societies.  
 
The abovementioned findings of other studies present some forms of 
resistance developed by family institution, whereas, the observations from this 
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research study offer a different yet important form of resistance by the family 
by suggesting the resistance of controlling family in listed firms against CG 
rules as indicated above. The institutional theory approach suggests that it is 
important to pay attention to expressions of power relationships, obedience to 
power and resistance to it (Clegg, 1989). Based on the findings of this research 
study, this can be observed, on the one hand, in family control that conform 
to power and control and, on the other hand, in resisting the external power of 
the regulatory, minority shareholders, and other stakeholders. So this 
observation itself seems important and adds to the knowledge as it broadens 
our understanding on the different forms of resistance of the family and their 
negative impact on the emergence of a CG regime in this non-Western, 
emerging society. 
 
9.2.5 Conflict of Interests 
 
A group of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that conflict of interest is a common fear for minority 
shareholders. Conflict of interest occurs usually between the owners (the 
family) and the managers (the agent) or with other non-family shareholders or 
stakeholders when the agent is involved in multiple interests.  The problem is 
multifaceted and multi-layered in this context as the board can be agents of the 
family and non-family members but, without sufficient safeguards, will 
inherently protect family interests first. The observations from this study 
suggest that family members on the board of directors sometimes make 
decisions, take actions, and give orders that serve their own interests, or the 
IDPLO\RQO\ZLWKRXWORRNLQJDIWHURWKHUVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWVDVSHUFHLYHGE\
a group of respondents. The institutional approach views that both agent and 
Chapter 9: Discussion 
258 
 
principal and their interests are not simply given, but are constructed through 
their entrenchment in a social system (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). This 
research study suggested a number of causes of conflict of interests, namely, 
control (decision making), abuse (selecting and appointing board members), 
and entitlement (separation of ownership and control), that are caused by both 
family and kinship institutions. This research study identified these causes 
when the data were quantified in the first stage of analysis (please see Table 7.5 
and Figure 7.1). 
 
The above perceptions on conflict of interest appear to be important, because 
there is an increasing number of studies in the literature which discusses the 
aspect of conflict of interest in listed family firms in developed and emerging 
societies due to its high importance, danger, and bearing on the formation of 
CG. For example, Young et al. (2008) conducted a review of CG in emerging 
societies and observed that extensive family ownership and control in 
emerging societies can cause conflicts between controlling shareholders 
(mostly family members) and minority shareholders which they identified as 
principal-principal conflict. This conflict alters the dynamics of the process of 
CG which in turn, needs different treatment from those that deal with 
principal-agent conflicts, which remains the largely-discussed perspective in 
the literature under the agency/principal problem (Young et al., 2008). It can 
be inferred that the increase of occurrences of conflict of interest caused by 
family members can reduce the appetite of shareholders towards investing in 
such a context. This means that CG faces challenges in emerging contexts due 
to the powerful influence of family institution on CG acceptance and 
implementation (thereby requiring greater legislation to force adoption over 
and above voluntary adoption). Overall, observations from this research study 
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contribute to growing evidence that family ownership and control are key 
elements in causing a conflict of interest in non-Western, emerging societies. 
 
Another example of conflict of interest but in a developed society is a study 
conducted by Vilaseca (2002) on Spanish family firms (such example is offered 
to show the occurrence of a conflict of interest and, thus, its danger not only 
in emerging societies, but also in developed societies). The study examined the 
aspects that impact on the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
management and its influence on commitment to family firms. The results 
from his study showed that the level of commitment to the family firm is 
negatively correlated with the number of family members appointed to the 
board of directors. Even so, a positive correlation was found between the 
number of external members of the board of directors and the degree of 
commitment from shareholders. This evidence implies that appointing family 
members onto the board of directors may reduce the level of commitment to 
the firm which can cause a conflict of interest between the agents (the 
shareholders) and the principal (the management). Vilaseca (2002) also 
highlighted that ownership structure and decision making are critical aspects in 
family businesses because they affect the conflict of interest between the 
VKDUHKROGHUV DQG WKH PDQDJHPHQW 7KH ILQGLQJV RI 9LODVHFD·V VWXG\ SUHVHQW
some causes of conflict of interest, such as selecting and appointing board 
members by the family, decision making by the family, and ownership of the 
family. Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) also conducted a study in a developed 
society to examine management succession and financial performance in 124 
Canadian family firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. They argued 
that appointing family successors in senior management positions is a critical 
corporate decision that may cause a conflict of interest between family and the 
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outside shareholder. Perhaps, this is because family successors are relatively 
young and immature yet are appointed in senior management positions in the 
firms which may increase the probability of their carelessness towards minority 
VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWs. The findings from both studies above are also in line 
with the observations from this research study. However, this research study 
explored more causes of conflict of interest, specifically, entitlement, abuse, 
and control, that were caused by both family and kinship institutions as shown 
previously in Chapter 7. Together, these aspects cause a conflict of interest 
which is a major aspect in the emergence and development of CG systems. 
Conflict of interest is thought to be a barrier to the emergence of a CG regime 
and a dilemma in the development of CG systems in non-Western, emerging 
contexts. This is because it alarms investors and minority shareholders and 
raises concerns to invest in a context that is dominated by influential causes of 
conflict of interest, such as control, entitlement, and abuse of both family and 
NLQVKLS LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KLV DSSHDUV LQVXUPRXQWDEOH LI DQ ¶HIIHFWLYH· FRUSRUDWH
JRYHUQDQFH UHJLPHFDQQRWEHHVWDEOLVKHG ¶(IIHFWLYH· LQ WKLV VHQVH UHIHUV WRD
situation where firms embrace the principles of CG beyond mere simple bare 
minimum compliance. Thus, the observation offers additional insights and 
contributes to the literature on the subject of conflict of interest caused by 
family and kinship institutions.  
 
In light of the above observations, the concept of conflict of interest needs to 
be clarified (treating it) to send indications to the controlling family to 
distinguish between family firms and public ones as noted by P1 from Bank-1. 
Furthermore, the responsibilities of the board members and the management 
need to be precisely specified as perceived by P21 from Services-5 in order not 
to exploit these positions in serving their own interests. This would increase 
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the legitimacy of organisations as it is always a principal desire in institutional 
theory perspective.  
 
9.3 Kinship Institution 
 
Kinship institution in developed and emerging societies has been discussed in 
the literature by a number of scholars due to its importance as indicated by 
6WHLHU   LQ WKDW ´NLQVKLS WLHV tend to figure more prominently in 
HPHUJLQJ HFRQRPLHVµ 6RPH VFKRODUV FRQVLGHU LW DV DQ H[WHQVLRQ WR IDPLO\
institution (e.g. Filatotchev et al., 2005; Steier, 2009), while others consider it 
as a separate one (e.g. Young and Wilmott, 2013). In this research study, 
kinship institution, as an informal institution, is considered to be separated 
from family institution due to its distinctive influence on CG in this context as 
perceived and treated separately by significant social actors. This is despite the 
fact that it sometimes shows some overlap with family institution through a 
number of emergent themes. Steier (2009: 518) in his study of familial 
capitalism in East Asia (emerging societies) shows a relationship between 
family and kinship. He points out that: 
 
Familial capitalism presents a strongly horizontal, segmented society 
wherein the core of political and economic networks is constituted by 
personal ties among individuals related to each other through kinship.  
 
The influence of kinship institution on CG will be discussed under two main 
themes, namely, abuse (independence of board members) and control 
(decision making) as follows. 
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9.3.1 Abuse (Independence of Board Members) 
 
A number of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated the need to be strict with the independence of board 
members. This suggests that board members are still being selected through 
kinship relationships in this non-Western, emerging context which may cause 
LPEDODQFH LQ GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ WKDWPD\QRW VHUYH VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWV DQG
wealth, as indicated by some respondents. Some examples of such kinship 
UHODWLRQVKLSVDUHQHSKHZVFRXVLQVVLVWHUV·KXVEDQGVDQGDQ\Rthers who do 
not hold the same family name and are being appointed as board members. 
Even the wife does not change her family name after getting married. Thus, it 
is harder to discover that they are affiliated to the family, since appointing 
immediate relatives to the family, who usually hold the same family name, is 
illegal under CG laws as it violates the condition of independence. So these 
selections are not based on qualifications in the eyes of significant social 
actors.  
 
The above observation seems important, because understanding the social 
circles that senior managers inhabit is particularly important as their 
background and social standing is expected to be reflected in their perceptions 
and views regarding decision making and whose interests are in favour 
(Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Fligstein, 2001). Moreover, abundant studies 
reveal that independence of board members is a key basis for success, 
continuation, increased performance of firms, and of superior benefit to 
shareholders in all societies (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Daily et al., 2003; 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008). As a result, a variety of organisations, such as 
Cadbury and KPMG in the UK, have issued guidelines, such as the Code of 
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Best Practice, designed to form independent boards of directors (Daily et al., 
2003). Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has issued the Code of Corporate Governance which 
includes numerous codes, some of which outlines guidelines for board and 
director independence. This indicates the importance of the independence of 
board members to avoid any manipulation and conflict of interest caused by 
the board members and to achieve best practice. 
 
The observations from this research study support the findings of Filatotchev 
et al. (2005) in a study conducted on 228 listed firms in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange³an emerging society. This study examines the effects of ownership 
structure and board characteristics on performance in these firms that are 
mainly controlled by founding families. They observe that board independence 
from a founding family has a positive impact on performance. It can be 
inferred from their study that if the board members are affiliated to the 
founding family, such as kinship ties, then this can have a negative impact on 
performance. This implies that affiliated board members to the family can 
make decisions that serve their own interests and do not serve stakeholders 
DQGILUPV·LQWHUHVWVZKLFKFDQKDYHDFRQVLGHUDEOHLPSDFWRQWKHSHUIRUPDQFH
of the firms and thus on CG objectives. Therefore, kinship institution can 
have a significant impact on CG practices through less or non-independence 
of board members from the family. It can be learned here that less 
independence of board members from the family owners, such as appointing 
relatives of the family onto the board, can have negative impacts on the 
emergence of CG systems in emerging societies. This is because those relatives 
may abuse their board position and may have different objectives from other 
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shareholders and, thus, may cause conflict of interest which is a dilemma 
against the emergence of CG regime as indicated previously.  
 
9.3.2 Control (Decision Making) 
 
A group of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated the need to govern it. This suggests that decisions 
PDGH E\ NLQVKLS WLHV PD\ QRW VHUYH VKDUHKROGHUV DQG RWKHU VWDNHKROGHUV·
interests as observed by P21 from Services-5, P3 from Insurance-1, and P12 
from the CMA. The institutional approach informs that the power in the form 
of repetitively activated control is not only vested in individual actors, but also 
in social and cultural systems (Fiss, 2008). Listed firms in developed societies 
are often characterised as having dispersed ownership (Anderson et al., 2003), 
while listed firms in emerging societies are often characterised as having 
concentrated ownership (Young et al., 2008). This signals to a problem of 
ownership in emerging societies as it is centred on majority shareholders 
(controlling family and kinship). Consequently, as those major shareholders 
dominate and control decision making in the firm, they can more easily abuse 
the system, resist change, and create a conflict of interest when making 
decisions favouring the kinship (and by extension the family) to the potential 
detriment of others. Such negative outcomes seem to be inevitable, but rather 
it is the weakness of a CG system that creates for such unhealthy events to 
occur. In the context of this study, the rebellion of the family institution 
against the emergence of the CG system that gradually erodes family power is 
mitigated by overt and covert use of kinship institutions to replace or 
supplement the power of the family institution. 
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The above observations appear to be important, because the literature also 
focuses on the control through decision making dominated by kinship ties due 
to its relevance and influence on effective CG. It is worth to note that kinship 
control is inspired by family institution, where the latter is involved in 
supporting kinship institution to guarantee its survival, endurance, and 
domination of ownership and control. Kinship institution often exists when 
family institution is predominant in that context. The observations from this 
research study complement the findings of Yeh and Woidtke (2005) who 
conducted a study in Taiwan³an emerging society. They examined the 
determinants of board composition and firm valuation as a function of board 
composition in listed firms. The findings from their study suggested that when 
the board of directors is dominated by members who are affiliated with the 
controlling family, such as kinship ties, poor governance practices are 
observed. On the other hand, when the board of directors is dominated by 
members who are not affiliated with the controlling family, there can be 
perceived good governance practices. This implies that the domination and 
control of board members who are affiliated with the controlling family mainly 
through decision making are associated with the efficiency of CG practices. 
The lesser the control of those members, the higher the efficiency and 
effectiveness of CG practices. This is because those members make decisions 
that ma\QRWVHUYHVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWVZKLFKFRQWUDGLFWVWKHYLVLRQRI&*
It can be learned here that the control that is dominated by the relatives of the 
family can have a negative influence on the emergence of a CG regime in 
emerging contexts. This is because those relatives can make decisions that 
VHUYH WKHLU LQWHUHVWV DW WKH H[SHQVH RI PLQRULW\ VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWV DQG
thus, cause a conflict of interest that is considered as a major aspect affecting 
the emergence of a CG regime.  
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9.4 An Expression of the Bureaucratic State 
 
There is a body of work in the literature discussing the bureaucratic state 
(Finnemore, 1996; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Omran et al., 2008). However, 
there is limited focus on the influence of this institution on CG. Therefore, 
this research study will attempt to offer new insights and better understanding 
through discussing the influence of an expression of the bureaucratic state, 
represented by its main actor, the Capital Market Authority (CMA), on the 
development of CG in a non-Western, emerging society. In principle, the 
bureaucratic state institution is an efficient and effective body to coordinate 
the complex relations engaged in this dynamic world (Finnemore, 1996). It 
promotes better economic growth in developing and emerging societies 
(Evans and Rauch, 1999). Omran et al. (2008) considers the role of the 
bureaucratic state and its governance system as a third exogenous variable in 
the relationship between legal origin and financial arrangements in emerging 
societies because state intervention is important in these societies. In addition, 
a number of cross-country studies have revealed that an effective bureaucratic 
state along with political stability are positively associated with great stock 
market efficiency (El Erian and Kumar, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Eltony 
and Babiker, 2005). It can be assumed then that the bureaucratic state is also 
positively associated with the implementation of good CG practices. In light of 
this focus on the bureaucratic state, the following sub-sections will discuss the 
important aspects of this institution, as a formal institution, generated from 
this research study. 
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9.4.1 Imposed Compliance 
 
A number of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that CG is an imposed system. This suggests that a 
number of listed firms believe that the CG system is an imposed system that 
must be complied with in order to avoid punishment as perceived by P1 from 
Bank-1, P14 from Bank-4, and P3 from Insurance-1. They also consider this 
compliance as a waste of time and an unnecessary system; although this view 
would appear to place a lot of faith in family and kinship institutions as an 
alternative self-regulating system. This can be attributed to the poor 
understanding of the concept of CG by some actors. This observation itself 
seems important, because there has been no systematic investigation of why 
actors believe that CG is an imposed compliance, whether CG is truly an 
imposed compliance or not, in which contexts this aspect is considerably 
apparent, and what the potential drawbacks are when actors hold such a belief. 
 
The observations from this research study indicate that as long as these firms 
believe that they are being forced or coerced to apply and comply with the CG 
system, they comply with the bare minimum requirements just to avoid being 
punished or penalised. This is dangerous to an extent because the absence or 
lack of self-motivation may not help the growth and progress of CG practices 
in this context and prevent it from taking hold. The risk that CG becomes a 
token gesture complied with only to avoid penalties means that the spirit of 
CG would become lost in a system that sees it as a hindrance as opposed to a 
positive development. The discussion will now proceed to look at the issue of 
imposed compliance from the regulatory angle. 
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There is an explanation offered by Becht et al. (2002) of why CG rules are 
being imposed by regulatory authorities since these rules apparently provide 
adequate protection to shareholders. They argued that the organisations may 
not have all the detailed information available to offer efficient rules. Thus, 
they might impose rules favouring one group over another. Perhaps this is the 
main reason behind what has been perceived in this research study. A number 
of actors in this research study perceived that the CMA deals with all listed 
firms equally and stands at the same distance from all those firms. This way 
the CMA guarantees that there is no favour of one firm over another. This 
implies that there are attempts from the regulatory to maintain integrity and 
fairness in this non-Western, emerging context.  
 
Another line of thought to explain why some social actors feel that CG is an 
imposed system is presented by Robertson et al. (2012). They indicate that the 
Saudi Arabian stock market grew greatly in 2005 but this fast booming growth 
was just a bubble that blew in 2006, which in turn caused a collapse. This 
event led the CMA to issue a CG document in order to force listed firms to 
apply, implement, and comply with the rules (Robertson et al., 2012). This 
indicates that listed firms comply with institutional pressures to achieve 
legitimacy in their operating environment. These formal pressures of the state 
form a coercive isomorphism from a new institutional sociology perspective. 
As far as some social actors have the impression that CG is an imposed system 
by the regulatory authority, the observation appears to lean towards negative 
compliance of listed firms with CG rules. This implies that the task of 
complying with CG rules by listed firms is being accomplished but lacks 
quality and sincerity.  
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9.4.2 Bare Minimum Compliance 
 
A group of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that they comply with CG to the bare minimum. This 
suggests that there are a number of listed firms that comply solely with the 
bare minimum requirements of CG and are not trying to exceed at it or 
achieve best practices as indicated by P5 from Bank-2, P14 from Bank-4, and 
P12 from the CMA. These firms try only to cover the requirements of the 
legal CG document to avoid any troubles with the CMA, thereby complying 
with institutional pressures but arguably in a disingenuous way. This is because 
these firms have no self-motivation or genuine interest towards improving CG 
practices for a better future in this context. This observation itself appears 
important, because there has been no systematic investigation to examine the 
extent of compliance with CG regulations, whether it is a compliance with the 
bare minimum or more than the bare minimum. It is possible that some 
apathy is caused due to the manner in which a CG system aggravates other 
important institutional forces (such as the family) but it might also be a 
response to a system whose value is not immediately discernible beyond the 
costs of formal compliance. 
 
The observations from this research study indicate that listed firms should 
submit a comprehensive report called the annual report that should include, 
IRU H[DPSOH ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV DXGLWRUV· UHSRUWV GLVFORVXUH LWHPV
FRPPLWWHHV· IXQFWLRQV UHPXQHUDWLRQ RI WKH ERDUG DQG WKH H[WHQW RI
complying with the CG document. Listed firms are required to inform the 
CMA about their compliance or the reasons for non-compliance (Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel, 2008). Afterwards, the CMA reviews the annual reports to 
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make sure that these firms comply with the rules and standards as required 
(Hassan et al., 2009). In case of non-compliance, the CMA takes actions 
against the firm which could lead to the suspension or de-listing of the firm 
(Hassan et al., 2009). This would be frightening enough to comply with CG 
rules up to the bare minimum as perceived by a number of significant social 
actors in order to avoid any problems, such as warnings, penalties, 
suspensions, or de-listing, which implies a lack of genuine interest and effort 
towards CG by some listed firms. So, in understanding the influence of the 
regulatory and legislative institution on the emergence and use of CG, there is 
a distinct danger of apathy in which the system is seen as an aggravation to 
other institutional pressures, or is seen as a cost, or is seen as a penalising 
system designed to coerce the application of CG based on the threat of 
penalties for non-compliance. In this manner, firms may reject the voluntary 
pursuit of best CG practices owing to a negative image of the system and its 
intentions. This can also be seen as a form of cognitive legitimacy (Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008) because compliance with CG system by listed firms even 
WRWKHEDUHPLQLPXPDSSHDUVWREHVRPHWKLQJ¶LQHYLWDEOH·,QWKLVVHQVHOLVWHG
firms seek legitimacy in order to pursue continuity (Suchman, 1995). 
 
9.4.3 Exceeding Minimum Compliance (Best Practice) 
 
The majority of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that they are trying to exceed minimum compliance 
with CG rules by complying with voluntary items of CG or other international 
best practices of CG. This suggests that there are a number of listed firms that 
not only comply with the requirements of CG of the CMA only, but also 
exceed this minimum to comply with best practice worldwide as viewed by P6 
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from Industry-1, P2 from Services-1, and P13 from the CMA. These firms try 
to cover the mandatory requirements of CG of the CMA and many other 
optional items that suit the firm and its shareholders. Doing so may increase 
the reputation, credibility, stock price of the firm, strengthen the relationships 
with other parties, and attract investors to invest more in this firm (Coffee, 
2002; McCarthy and Puffer, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). This is 
because these firms demonstrate genuine interest towards improving CG 
practices in this context to improve their management position and strengthen 
progress. It can be also inferred that these firms try to avoid uncertainty, in 
that, there might be symbolic uncertainty, unclear objectives of complying 
with CG rules, or lack of understanding the main values and benefits of 
complying with CG rules. In this case, listed firms exceed compliance with the 
bare minimum by mimicking international CG practices that are professional, 
appropriate, or modern, which may promote a better CG system in this 
society. This can be viewed as mimetic isomorphism from a new institutional 
sociology perspective. These observations seem important, because there has 
EHHQ QR V\VWHPDWLF LQYHVWLJDWLRQ WR WKH UHVHDUFKHU·V NQRZOHGJH WR H[DPLQH
the extent of exceeding minimum compliance with CG regulations, and what 
sort of optional items are being selected to comply with and on which basis.  
 
The observations from this research study demonstrate the method of forming 
the CG document in this context. It is a collective work inspired by the 
Companies Act regulations, CG of benchmarking countries such as the USA 
and the UK, and OECD practices (an international Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development). So the target of the CMA³as an 
expression of the bureaucratic state³is always to see firms adopt best 
practice. This observation complements the fact that, numerous developed 
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societies, such as the USA, the UK, and Germany, and some emerging 
VRFLHWLHV VXFK DV WKH 8$( DQG (J\SW LVVXHG WKH ¶&RGHV RI %HVW 3UDFWLFH·
which include specific requirements for specific CG practices, such as the 
percentage of independent directors on the board. These codes are voluntary 
in nature and the extent of complying with these codes varies across societies 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). More to the point, compliance with these codes 
is more difficult in societies that have greater appearance of controlling 
shareholders (e.g. families) because these codes reduce the influence of those 
controlling bodies which contradicts their objectives (Wymeersch, 1998). It 
cDQ EH LQIHUUHG WKDW LVVXLQJ WKH ¶&RGHV RI %HVW 3UDFWLFH· E\ UHJXODWRU\
authorities is a way to exceed minimum compliance in order to achieve best 
SUDFWLFHZRUOGZLGH8QIRUWXQDWHO\6DXGL$UDELDKDVQRWLVVXHGDQ\¶&RGHVRI
%HVW 3UDFWLFH· \HW +RZHYHU WKH Saudi Arabian CMA emphasises that the 
criteria of best practices of CG mainly represents the guiding principles for all 
listed firms (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008).  
 
The observations from this research study also indicate that voluntary 
compliance with best practice is effective and offers higher standards of 
transparency which protects shareholders greatly. This supports the findings of 
a study conducted by Rodriguez and Anson (2001) in Spanish listed firms that 
comply with the Spanish Code of Best Practice. They indicate that the stock 
prices react positively to the announcement of compliance. This example 
offers further implications in which exceeding minimum compliance is 
associated positively with achieving CG objectives, such as protecting 
shareholderV·ULJKWVDQG LQWHUHVWVDQG LQFUHDVLQJVWRFNILUPSHUIRUPDQFHDQG
profitability. It can be inferred that exceeding minimum compliance (i.e. 
compliance with best practice) leads to achieving better results, protecting 
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VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV DQG JDLQLQJ PRUH credibility to attract investors. This 
LQIHUHQFHDSSHDUVWREHLQWKHIDYRXURIVHUYLQJVKDUHKROGHUV·LQWHUHVWVZKLFK
supports the objectives of CG.    
 
It appears that excessive compliance cannot be explained by legitimacy. In 
other words, legitimisation mechanisms do not explain why these firms go 
beyond the bare minimum to comply with CG regulations. A review of 
previous literature highlights that the new institutional theory focuses 
considerably on legitimacy. However, when analysing these issues, there 
appears to be other factors influencing compliance. It seems that there are a 
range of motivations or increased pressures to comply at greater levels. These 
SUHVVXUHV DUH SHUKDSV H[HUWHG E\ WKH ¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQ· WKDW VHHPV WR
play a role in internationalised businesses. By exceeding minimum compliance 
of CG (i.e. compliance with best practice internationally), these firms can 
accumulate enhanced reputations and gain more credibility in the market.  
 
9.4.4 Implementation: the Regulatory Role 
 
A number of respondents raised this theme during the first stage of interviews 
and indicated that there is an obvious regulatory role of the CMA towards 
listed firms. This suggests that the CMA³as an expression of the bureaucratic 
state³plays the strict regulatory role if it does not observe any self-motivation 
from listed firms to implement CG rules, or observes a lack of response to 
comply with CG rules as perceived by P13 and P12 from the CMA. Then, the 
role of the regulator comes into force through discussions and 
correspondence, which impose penalties and other correction procedures 
which can be viewed as institutional pressures on organisations. Thus, 
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DXWKRULWLHVVXFKDVWKHILQDQFLDOUHJXODWRU\DXWKRULW\´FDQEHDGULYLQJIRUFHLQ
economic transition and development, provided that they are both 
DSSURSULDWHO\HPSRZHUHGDQGFRQVWUDLQHGµ&KHDQG4LDQ,WLVDOVR
believed that less or non-responsive firms would increase transaction costs for 
the CMA because correction procedures are subject to process losses, which 
theorists of the new institutional economics (e.g. Williamson, 1988) see as 
requiring non-regulatory procedures, that is, ones that increase the self-desire 
to comply with and implement CG rules. Williamson (1996) emphasises that 
the CG problem of TCE is not only WKHSURWHFWLRQRIVKDUHKROGHUV·ULJKWVEXW 
also the efficient achievement of transactions by firms within their political 
and cultural environments. These observations appear important, because 
there has been no systematic or exploratory investigation (up to the 
UHVHDUFKHU·VNQRZOHGJH WRH[SORUHWKHUHJXODWRU\UROHSOD\HGE\WKH&0$WR
apply CG rules.  
 
7KH¶REVHUYHUUROH·SOD\HGE\WKH&0$DWKHPHZKLFKHPHUJHGLQWKHVHFRQG
stage of interviews) is somewhat similar to its regulatory role. This role may 
encourage firms to comply with bare minimum requirements as a worst case 
scenario, as revealed previously in the second stage of data analysis. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH ¶REVHUYHU UROH· ZLOO QRW EH GLVFXVVHG VHSDUDWHO\ LQ WKLV
research but will be merged with this part of the discussion. 
 
The observations from this research study indicate that the approach of the 
CMA is somewhat coercive as opposed to a narrative or discursive based 
approach to engage listed firms with CG. In light of this, Becht et al. (2002) 
offers two key reasons for why the intervention of regulatory bodies is 
sometimes required. The first argument is that even if the firm founders or the 
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shareholders design the rules, these rules would not be efficient to some firms 
as these rules cannot contain comprehensive concerns suitable for all the 
parties involved. The second argument is that even if the firms have the right 
to design efficient rules, they may want to change or break them eventually. A 
crisis may occur then as long as the firms do not have the power to commit 
not to alter or break the rules along the way (Becht et al., 2002). These reasons 
appear to show the influence of an expression of the bureaucratic state 
institution on CG by playing the regulatory role with listed firms to apply, 
implement, and comply with CG rules.  
 
The observations from this research study also revealed that more than 95% 
of the penalties against listed firms are due to disclosure problems. This 
implies that there is a lack of disclosure in this context. Managers do not want 
to be more transparent or to share important information about their firms 
and future investments with their shareholders because they believe that these 
details are personal and no one has the right to view them. The role of the 
regulatory authority then is to increase pressure on listed firms in order to 
LPSURYHWKHGLVFORVXUHLQWKLVFRQWH[WWRSURWHFWVKDUHKROGHUV·ULJKWVDQGVHUYH
their interests. The importance of disclosure as a main CG item is revealed in 
OWKPDQ DQG =HJKDO·V  VWXG\ 7KH\ UHSRUW WKDW &* GLVFORVXUH LV
positively associated with the size of the capital market of emerging societies. 
This implies that the larger the capital market is, the more the disclosure exists. 
Thus, this shows the strength and the regulatory role played by the regulatory 
authorities in driving listed firms to disclose, since the strength of regulatory 
authorities is associated with capital markets. Another example that shows the 
importance of disclosure is indicated in 5REHUWVRQHWDO·VVWXG\7KH\
note that the Saudi Arabian CMA regulation is divided into three main parts: 
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(1) shareholder rights, (2) transparency and disclosure, and (3) board of 
GLUHFWRUV· JXLGHOLQHV 7KH\ REVHUYH WKDW WKHVH DUH WKUHH SLOODUV Rf the Saudi 
Arabian CMA regulation that create a strong respect for shareholder rights and 
SURWHFWLRQ6RGLVFORVXUHLVFRQVLGHUHGDQLPSRUWDQWSLOODULQ5REHUWVRQHWDO·V
(2012) study as increasing disclosure offers more protection to the 
shareholders. The regulatory role of the CMA can also be seen as a normative 
isomorphism from a new institutional perspective. This role is played by the 
CMA, as a professional body, to establish environmental forms that are 
consistent with their objectives. The CMA, as a professional body, tends to 
have strong networks with their referent bodies, which establish the standards 
for professional behaviour.   
 
9.4.5 Implementation: the Awareness/Cooperative/Partnership Role 
 
A group of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that there is an awareness and cooperative role played 
by the CMA with listed firms. This suggests that the CMA³as an expression 
of the bureaucratic state³plays a cooperative role with firms that have self-
motivation and genuine interest towards implementing CG rules as perceived 
by P17 from Industry-2 and P16 from Retail-1. The CMA drives the CG 
system in this society through playing this role with listed firms that show self-
LQWHUHVW LQ LPSOHPHQWLQJ &* DV WKH &0$ ´SURYHG WR EH WKH PRVW VXLWDEOH
VRXUFH IRU WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ UHTXLUHGµ +DVVDQHW DO  DQGD VXLWDEOH
body to support and assist listed firms to implement best practices of CG as 
perceived by a number of significant social actors. This observation itself 
seems important, because there is a lack of exploring the cooperative role 
played by the regulatory authority in the literature. Also, addressing this role of 
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the CMA will complete the picture of the different roles played by the CMA in 
driving CG in this context.   
 
The observations from this research study indicate that this approach of the 
CMA seems to be positive (as perceived by a group of significant social actors) 
and offers a good environment for listed firms that want to follow best 
practices. This would create a healthy environment for shareholders and 
investors as it will increase the protection level. This role of the CMA started 
in 2006, when a sharp decrease of the Saudi Arabian stock market occurred 
and resulted in a loss of over half of the market value. This crisis led to 
significant losses for investors and shareholders. As a result, the CMA made 
efforts to offer more fairness and quality for stock trading through raising 
awareness by issuing a CG document as guidance for listed firms (Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel, 2008). The CMA also cooperated, supported, provided 
information, and answered all enquiries of listed firms to develop practices. 
The CMA continues to play this role with firms that have a genuine interest in 
applying and implementing CG rules as perceived by significant social actors. 
What this can add to our understanding is that the cooperative role played by 
the CMA can attract other listed firms to genuinely comply with CG rules 
which can offer considerable development to the CG system in this non-
Western, emerging context. 
 
9.4.6 Regulations Failure 
 
A number of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that regulations may fail to achieve the desired 
outcomes. This suggests that CG regulations cannot constrain the aggressive 
Chapter 9: Discussion 
278 
 
side of controlling investors which is greed, power, and avariciousness and 
such bad behaviours that appear to be related to agency problem or moral 
hazard as observed by P1 from Bank-1, P2 from Services-1, and P3 from 
Insurance-1. These behaviours contributed to developing the global financial 
crisis in 2007, as perceived by significant social actors. This observation 
appears extremely important, because there are numerous studies conducted 
to evaluate past multiple financial crises that were caused by poor CG systems 
due to different institutional impacts such as family, kinship, and the 
bureaucratic state (Johnson et al, 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Erkens et al., 
2012). 
 
The observations from this research study indicate that, despite the fact that 
there are numerous hard rules and regulations issued by different bodies, such 
as the Capital Market Authority, the Ministry of Commerce, Central Banks, 
Basel Committee (for banks), and risk reduction committees, these regulations 
can fail. Such devices played a negative role, particularly during the financial 
crisis in 2007, which raised the question of its power in protecting investors 
and constraining illegal activities (Alghamdi, 2012). The observations from this 
research study complement the findings of a study conducted by Erkens et al. 
(2012). They conducted a study across 30 societies to examine CG during the 
global financial crisis of 2007. They found that most firms to be affected by 
the crisis were firms with a higher institutional ownership (e.g. family 
ownership). This shows the role of institutions in hindering the regulations. 
What can be learned from this is that the CG system is always vulnerable to 
failure. Thus, a continuous development to a CG system is required to reduce 
the impact of failure on society.  
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9.5 Religion Institution 
 
There is a body of literature discussed the relationship between CG and the 
Islamic religion in emerging contexts, because the religion in these contexts is 
dominant (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). This body of literature mainly discussed 
the common aspects between CG and the religion, the role of the religion in 
implementing CG practices, and the extent of compliance with CG rules that 
PHHWWKHSULQFLSOHVRIWKHUHOLJLRQ%HUJHUSRLQWHGRXWWKDW´UHOLJLRQKDV 
been the historically most widespread and effective instrumentality of 
OHJLWLPDWLRQµ7KXVWKHUHLVDORQJDFFHSWHGQRWLRQWKDWWKHUHOLJLRQLQ,VODPLF
world is seen as an effective instrument for legitimation. This research study 
will focus on three aspects of religion institution as an informal institution, 
namely, association, implementation, and compliance that are observed from 
this research study. 
 
9.5.1 Association (Common Principles) 
 
A group of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that there are common principles between CG and 
the religion in this society. This suggests that CG and the religion in this 
context share a large number of principles, ethics, values, and concepts that 
guide conducting business activities as perceived by P11 from Services-4, P20 
from Industry-3, and P5 from Bank-2. Common positive values are, for 
example, justice, honesty, and public interests (Lewis, 2005). Likewise, negative 
values to be avoided, for example, are greed and unfairness (Lewis, 2005). 
Having said that, both CG and the religion call for the same objectives in this 
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society ZKLFK DUH WR SURWHFW VKDUHKROGHUV· ULJKWV VHUYH WKHLU LQWHUHVWV DQG
SURWHFWILUPV·DVVHWV7KHVHREVHUYDWLRQVVHHPLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHWKHUH is, to a 
large extent, a focus in the literature on the apparent influence of the religion 
on business activities and CG practices, which indicates that this institution is 
a key factor in this non-Western, emerging society context.  
 
The observations from this research study indicate that any monotheistic 
religion concurs entirely with CG concepts. For example, justice, trust, 
honesty, credibility, fair competition, not cheating, not harming, and no 
obscene profit, are all principles in any monotheistic religion as well as CG. 
This should give more credit to CG to be generally accepted in such a context, 
which is the case in a number of listed firms. However, other firms have less 
intention to implement CG practices, depending on the strength of faith of the 
actors at play. These observations complement Abu-7DSDQMHK·V VWXG\
He indicated that a major ethical component of any economic activity in 
monotheistic religions is to provide fairness, honesty, and justice, and to 
ensure and SURWHFW DOO SDUWLHV· ULJKWV DQGGXHV+H DGGV WKDW WKLVZLOORIIHU D
balanced society as envisioned to religious ethical values and rules. This 
implies that the religion has a bearing in CG practices as it calls for 
VKDUHKROGHUV·SURWHFWLRQZKLFKLVDSULme objective of CG.   
 
There is an interesting argument noted by Gooden (2001) in which, achieving 
best practice is not only about gaining greatest profitability, fair trading, or best 
efficiency, but also it is about trying to lead and guide the firms according to 
moral standards acceptable to the society. This implies that other factors 
should be taken into account when looking forward to achieve best practice, 
such as moral factors (e.g. the religion), because this would help to accelerate 
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the process of achieving CG objectives. In effect, the religion has a role in 
shaping ethical behaviour such as truthfulness, honesty, and social justice 
(Rizk, 2008). What can be learnt from the observations in this part is that 
understanding that the CG system shares similar principles with the religion in 
this society appears to gain more acceptance of this system by people and, 
thus, serves the emergence of a CG regime. However, importantly, the extent 
to which this is achieved is in part dependent on communicating effectively 
the similarity between a CG system and its principles or rules in relation to 
religious rules accepted by society. This provides a basis to legitimise CG in 
the face of other competing institutional pressures. 
 
9.5.2 Implementation: Supportive Role 
 
A number of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that the religion plays a supportive role on the 
emergence of a CG regime in this society. This suggests that, as long as CG 
calls for similar objectives to the religion, then the religion appears not to exert 
institutional pressures on implementing CG practices, but motivates them as 
perceived by a group of significant social actors. The religion asks for and 
emphasises on anything that leads to protect people and their rights, so it 
seems to be not a barrier to CG practices in this context. This observation 
appears important, because there is a discussion in the literature about the 
important role of the religion institution in shaping and supporting CG in such 
a context.  
 
The observations from this research study indicate that the religion in this 
context is dominant because it is being taught at all educational levels since 
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formal teaching began. So some people are serious in applying and complying 
with the rules of the religion. Accordingly, their conscience leads them to be 
fair and honest, and not to harm or manipulate. In this case, it can be said that 
the religion plays a supportive and positive role in implementing CG practices. 
However, this strength of faith varies to an extent between people, depending 
on self-HGXFDWLRQ DQG SDUHQWV· WHDFKLQJ MXVW DV LQ DQ\ RWKHU VRFLHW\ ,Q WKLV
FDVHSHRSOHV·EHKDYLRXUPD\DIIHFW WKHSDWWHUQ DQG WKH FRQGXFWRIEXVLQHVV
activities. This is why Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) argues that any system without an 
appropriate ethical and moral climate will not influence the development of a 
proper system of governance. Moreover, he claims that CG practices are not 
RQO\ MXVW WKH GHVLJQDWLRQ RU DFWRU·V SRVLWLRQ DQG SRZHU EXW DOVR WKH DFWRU·V
internal moral enthusiasm to fulfil and conduct the job within the context of 
the religion. This implies that the spirit that is offered by the religion seems to 
be the important thing that supports, recommends, motivates, urges and 
emphasises on implementing CG practices in this context.  
 
CG that is supported by the Islamic religion would appear to encourage capital 
formation, foster strong markets, create incentives to engage in value-
maximising behaviour, and encourage judgment and transparency, which are 
all principles central to the religion in this context (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). So 
the religion encourages the values and ethics that are also concepts in CG in 
order to accomplish such targets. In itself, it may serve as a basis to legitimise 
the broader objectives of CG and its associated regulations. It can be learnt 
here that the religion appears to be supporting the emergence of the CG 
regime in this society through supporting the implementation of CG practices.   
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9.5.3 Compliance (Sharia Compliance) 
 
A group of respondents mentioned this theme during the first stage of 
interviews and indicated that they comply with Sharia-based law in their firms. 
This suggests that there are a number of listed firms that comply with Sharia-
based law in all their contracts as a CG system is part of the broader horizon 
of Sharia law, as perceived by a number of significant social actors. This 
compliance is supervised by the Sharia board and is voluntary to any listed 
firm. This observation appears important, because Sharia law represents an 
important approach of the religion in this context that has a bearing in CG 
practices. 
 
The observations from this research study indicate that trading and contracting 
under Sharia-based rules is a desire for many people in this context. Thus, 
compliance with Sharia law may satisfy the actors in the firms and the 
shareholders too. Khalifa (2003) explains why some people in this context 
prefer conducting businesses under Sharia-based rules. He argues that financial 
transactions within Sharia have genuine concern for ethically and socially 
responsible activities as well as prohibiting involvement in illegal activities or 
those which are harmful to social and environmental well-being. This reflects 
underlying moral orders that illustrate how business and social relations should 
be conducted and whose interests have priority. 
 
It is indicated above that a large group of people in this context prefer 
conducting businesses under Sharia-based law, which is entirely voluntary in 
nature. Therefore, listed firms who comply with this law seek internal or 
external Sharia board that reviews all the contracts, corrects weight and 
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measures, checks financial statements and frauds, audits illegal contracts, and 
keeps the market free, to ensure that these processes are compatible with the 
Sharia requirements. Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) point out that a Sharia 
supervisory board is important for two reasons: (1) the investors may lose 
confidence if the management continued to violate Sharia laws, (2) the notion 
that ethics is the basis of Sharia law is believed to prevent people from 
behaving unethically in this society. Therefore, this can prevent chaos and 
PDLQWDLQ EDODQFH LQ WKH PDUNHW 7KLV LV LPSRUWDQW WR JDLQ VRPH LQYHVWRUV·
confidence and appetite to invest in this market, and meet the desire of some 
shareholders to trade in such an environment. It can be seen here that listed 
firms that comply with Sharia-based law appears to be seeking a form of moral 
legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) that is based on normative 
approval and includes procedures, structures, and consequences. This seems to 
be a way of seeking support and pursuing credibility and continuity in this 
environment (Suchman, 1995). It can be learnt from this part that complying 
with Sharia-based law appears to have a role in complying with CG rules in 
this society and, thus, on the emergence of the CG system in this context.  
 
It has been suggested that some listed firms operate with the bare minimum of 
compliance to CG rules. It is also apparent that family and kinship institutions 
appear to be negative in terms of the adoption of the CG system in the Saudi 
Arabian non-Western, emerging society. Interestingly, if the religion in this 
FRQWH[WUHSUHVHQWV ¶DULJRURXVSODWIRUP·RQZKLFKWREXLOG&*SUDFWLFHVDQG
the CMA promotes the logic of CG in line with Sharia principles, acceptance 
of CG regulations may increase. An explanation for this is that the dominant 
religion in this society is very much embedded in the way in which people 
think and behave. If CG were to have some alignment with the religion of this 
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society, effective CG practices would likely become more attractive to 
businesses and compliance would likely increase. It has also been indicated 
previously that some listed firms comply with CG simply to avoid penalties. 
This can be seen as compliance by coercion. However, if the CMA were to 
frame CG principles in line with Sharia understandings, there may be more 
compliance by cooperation, rather than coercion. 
 
9.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the outcomes of this research study in light of the 
existing literature in the field. It has also summarised the main observations, 
interpreted them, discussed their importance and relevance, presented what 
this research study has revealed and added to the knowledge, and what can be 
learned from these observations.   
 
This chapter has mainly discussed the four institutions, namely, family, 
kinship, an expression of the bureaucratic state, and religion, that emerged as 
influential institutions on the emergence of the CG regime in the Saudi 
Arabian non-Western, emerging society. Discussing these institutions and their 
influence on the development of CG has revealed a number of issues that, in 
turn, offered better understanding and new insights to the knowledge. In 
discussing family institution, the observations from this research study appear 
to offer support to the argument that the family institution has a negative 
impact on the emergence of the CG system and this can be observed in the 
failure of separation of ownership and control, decision making dominated by 
the family, selecting and appointing family members onto the board of 
directors, resistance to change by the family, and causing a conflict of interest. 
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Similarly, kinship institution has a negative impact on the emergence of the 
CG regime and this can be observed in the less or non-independence of board 
members from the family, and in the decision making dominated by relatives 
of the family. The domination of family and kinship institutions on listed firms 
can be seen as informal pressures (i.e. coercive) exerted on these firms. It 
appears that the family believes that this is the best way to guarantee success 
and survival and, thus, legitimacy of the firm, while these processes seem to 
JXDUDQWHHRQO\WKHIDPLO\·VRZQHUVKLSDQGLQWHUHVWV)URPDQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDO
sociology perspective, this is seen as a coercive isomorphism, where the family 
seeks legitimacy through exerting its informal pressures on listed firms to serve 
its own interests. In addition, this domination of family and kinship is being 
attenuated by the bureaucratic state represented by its key actor the CMA 
through turning voluntary items to mandatory and increasing supervision and 
audit processes. These theoretical effects of the family and kinship vary over 
time because they are unstable (Whetten, 1989) due to the increased power of 
the bureaucratic state.  
 
In discussing an expression of the bureaucratic state represented by its key 
actor, the CMA, this institution influences the development of the CG system 
mainly through compliance (imposed, bare minimum, or exceeding bare 
minimum) and implementation (the regulatory role, or the cooperative role). 
This influence differs depending on the extent of the acceptance of the CG 
system by the firm. In discussing the religion institution, the observations from 
this research study indicate that this institution has a positive influence on the 
emergence of the CG system. This is mainly because the CG system appears 
to share similar principles with the religion which, in turn, leads to help 
achieve similar objectives. In addition, the religion has a supportive role in 
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implementing CG practices and complying with CG rules through complying 
with Sharia-based law. 
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Chapter 10: 
Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
 
The previous chapter discussed the findings of this research study based on 
the existing literature on the emergence of corporate governance regimes and 
institutional theory. This chapter intends to highlight the theoretical 
contributions of the study, explain the wider implications of the research, 
discuss the limitations of the study, make suggestions for improvements, and 
suggest directions for future research.  
 
10.1 Theoretical Contributions  
 
A number of theoretical contributions arose when the data were analysed, 
interpreted, discussed and compared with the existing literature in Chapters 7, 
8, and 9. This section will summarise and crystallise these theoretical 
contributions.  
 
With regards to family institution, the findings of this research study revealed 
that the family institution, as an informal institution, dominates and appears to 
negatively influence the emergence and development of a CG regime in the 
Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society context. There are five clear 
dimensions that influence this: (1) entitlement (separation of ownership and 
control), (2) control (decision making), (3) conflict of interest, (4) abuse 
(selecting and appointing board members), and (5) resistance to change.  
 
In terms of separation of ownership and control, the findings from this 
research study imply either acceptance but staggered implementation of CG by 
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the family, or bare minimum compliance with CG instead of embracing its 
principles. The institutional background of family members leads them 
naturally to act in a way that is perceived to serve their own interests without 
looking after non-IDPLO\ RU RWKHU VKDUHKROGHUV· LQWHUHVWV 7KH EHKDYLRXU RI
family members plays a role in negatively influencing the emergence of a CG 
regime in this non-Western, emerging society context. 
 
In terms of decision making in family controlled firms, the outcomes of this 
research study suggest that strong family control is often built and achieved 
through the centrality (i.e. accumulation) of family members on the board of 
directors. This appears to create problems such as making decisions that serve 
WKH VSHFLILF LQWHUHVWV RI WKH IDPLO\ EXW QRW HYHU\RQH·V LQWHUHVWV DQG FHUWDLQO\
not those of minority shareholders. Thus, this can be seen as a negative 
influence of family institution on the development of the CG system in this 
society and context. However, time is an important factor as it plays a role in 
strengthening the capabilities of the CMA in terms of enforcing or 
encouraging listed firms to follow the rules and, thus, in reducing family 
control. As CG is relatively new in the Saudi Arabian society, time may allow 
the officials of the CMA to discover all the weak points and treat them. Family 
control over decision making can also be seen as a form of pragmatic 
OHJLWLPDF\ 'HHSKRXVH DQG 6XFKPDQ  WKDW LV EDVHGRQ DQ DFWRU·V VHOI-
interest and comprises of influence, exchange, and character. It appears that 
the controlling family believes that dominating the decision making helps them 
to seek and secure this kind of legitimacy, whereas this action appears to not 
serve the interests of all parties.  
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In terms of selecting and appointing family members onto the board of 
directors, the main problem appears to be legacy effects from the historical 
dominance of the family institution on the running and governance of firms. 
As a CG system emerges and legislates to reduce the power of the family, 
resistance forms and compliance tends to be unfavourable towards this 
redistribution of power. Therefore, family members act and behave in ways 
that they historically learned and exercised, which can have a severe impact on 
the emergence and diffusion of a CG system in this emerging context as well 
as engagement with such a system. Therefore, CG emerges to stipulate the 
qualification, the independence, and the specification of who can occupy set 
positions on the board of directors. This should maintain or increase the 
legitimacy of organisations (a classic notion of institutional theory) as the 
actions of the CG entity are appropriate, desirable, and proper within a socially 
constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs, and can produce cultural 
forces of CG that may go beyond any organisational control. But nevertheless, 
historic leJDF\HIIHFWVLQIDPLO\ILUPVFDQDOWHUWKHLUYLHZRIZKDWLV¶OHJLWLPDWH·
RU¶GHVLUDEOH·DQGWKHVHPD\QRWQHFHVVDULO\DFFRUGZLWKWKRVHGHHPHGE\RWKHU
institutions. It is interesting to note the theoretical plausibility here of a 
hierarchy of institutional pressures that may spur more active compliance or 
otherwise bare minimum compliance. 
 
In terms of resistance to change, this important aspect of family institution is 
under-explored by previous research and, thus, this research study attempts to 
increase our understanding on this aspect due to its bearing on the 
development of CG systems in non-Western, emerging society contexts. The 
institutional theory approach suggests that it is important to pay attention to 
expressions of power relationships, obedience to power and resistance to it 
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(Clegg, 1989). Based on the findings of this research study, this can be 
observed, on the one hand, in family control that conforms to power and 
control, and on the other hand, in resisting the external power of the regulator, 
minority shareholders, and other stakeholders. So this observation itself is 
important and adds to our knowledge as it broadens the understanding of the 
different forms of resistance of the family and the negative impact on the 
emergence of a CG regime in this non-Western, emerging society context 
these can have. 
 
Resistance is also not necessarily by way of non-compliance as compliance can 
be forced (or coerced) through regulation. But in doing so, this takes away 
from the spirit of proactive compliance by firms, embracing CG rather than 
fighting against it. In this study it was observed that resistance took the form 
of bare minimum compliance where compliance was also seen as necessary to 
avoid punishment. Compliance then had nothing to do with the principles and 
benefits of CG but rather to avoid negative sanctions on the firm.  
 
In terms of conflict of interest, the findings of this research study revealed that 
there are a number of causes of conflict of interest, specifically, family control 
through decision making, family abuse through selecting and appointing board 
members, family entitlement through lack of or weak separation of ownership 
and control, kinship control through decision making, and kinship abuse 
through less or non-independence from the board of directors. Together, 
these aspects of both family and kinship institutions cause conflict of interest 
between the family owners (the principals) and the managers (the agents) or 
between non-family shareholders or stakeholders (the principals) and family 
members (the agents). This research study has explored more causes of 
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conflict of interest than those explored in previous studies, which contribute 
greatly to the existing literature in the field. Conflict of interest appears to be a 
barrier to the emergence of a CG regime and a dilemma in the development of 
CG systems in emerging contexts because it alarms investors and minority 
shareholders. It also raises concerns to investors in a way that business activity 
can be dominated by influential causes of conflict of interest, which could 
DSSHDULQVXUPRXQWDEOHLIDQ¶HIIHFWLYH·FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHUHJLPHFDQQRWEH
HVWDEOLVKHG¶(IIHFWLYH·LQWKLVVHQVHUHIHUVWRDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHILUPVHPEUDFH
the principles of CG beyond mere simple bare minimum compliance or 
compliance by coercion (i.e. as a response solely to the threat of sanctions or 
punishments).  
 
With regards to kinship institution, the findings of this research study revealed 
that the kinship institution, as an informal institution, negatively influences the 
emergence and development of the CG regime in the Saudi Arabian non-
Western, emerging society context through two apparent dimensions: (1) 
abuse (independence of board members) and (2) control (decision making). 
 
In terms of kinship abuse through less or non-independence of board 
members from the family owners, the findings of this research study suggest 
that when relatives of the family or close acquaintances are appointed onto the 
board, it appears that they abuse their positions because they have different 
objectives from the core objectives of shareholders. This may cause a conflict 
of interest which is a dilemma in the emergence of a CG regime in this non-
Western, emerging society context. Therefore, less or non-independence of 
board members from the family owners, such as appointing relatives of the 
family onto the board of directors can have a negative impact on the 
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development of CG systems in this context because it can tacitly or explicitly 
reinforce the power base of the family. Worse still, there is the potential for 
the family (as an institution) to either reinforce its own control of the firm or 
attempt to circumnavigate CG legislation through complex kinship 
appointments. This only furthers the problem of compliance and the nature of 
that compliance as discussed so far, which implies a need to reconsider how 
institutions weave together and create opposing forces towards other 
institutions in the implementation of regulatory and behavioural change, such 
as through the emergence and implementation of a CG system and regime.  
 
In terms of kinship control, the findings of this research study suggest that the 
relatives of the family can make decisions that serve the family and their 
LQWHUHVWVDW WKHH[SHQVHRIPLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUV· interests. This may cause a 
conflict of interest that forms barriers to the development of an effective CG 
system and regime. Therefore, kinship control through decision making can 
have a negative influence on the emergence of a CG regime in this non-
Western, emerging society context. However, the aspect of appointing 
relatives onto the board of directors is being reduced over time by the 
regulatory authority and, thus, should in time reduce the conflict of interest 
caused by biased and potentially flawed decision making. The time factor again 
therefore emerges as an important item in the development of a CG system. 
The setting up of a CG system is just the beginning of a process to gradually 
reduce family and kinship power through an iterative process of improvement 
designed to reduce avenues of resistance and non-compliance. But this still 
does not sufficiently explain or offer guidance for how compliance can be 
moved towards more active compliance as opposed to either coerced 
compliance or bare minimum compliance. The risk remains then that certain 
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institutions either game against the CG systems or find other ways to protect 
their own institutional interests or relative position of power.    
 
The domination of family and kinship institutions in listed firms can be seen as 
informal pressures (i.e., coercive pressures) exerted on listed firms. It appears 
that the family believes that this is the best way to guarantee success and 
survival and, thus, the legitimacy of the firm, while these processes seem to 
guarDQWHH RQO\ WKH IDPLO\·V RZQHUVKLS DQG LQWHUHVWV )URP neo-institutional 
perspective, this is seen as a form of coercive isomorphism, where the family 
seeks legitimacy through exerting its informal pressures on listed firms to serve 
its own interests. These findings of both family and kinship institutions 
increase our knowledge on the negative influence of both institutions on the 
emergence and development of a CG regime in a non-Western, emerging 
society context and, thus, contribute to the literature in the field of corporate 
governance and institutional theory.  
 
With regards to an expression of the bureaucratic state represented by its key 
actor, the CMA, the findings of this research study revealed that the regulatory 
authority represented by the CMA³as a formal expression of the bureaucratic 
state³positively influences the emergence and development of the CG regime 
in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, emerging society context through six 
apparent dimensions: (1) imposed compliance, (2) bare minimum compliance, 
(3) exceeding minimum compliance (best practice), (4) implementation: the 
regulatory role, (5) implementation: the awareness/cooperative/partnership 
role, and (6) regulations failure. It is worth noting that there is arguably not 
enough focus in the literature on the influence of the bureaucratic state on the 
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emergence of CG systems. Therefore, this research study attempts to add to 
the knowledge and expand the boundaries of this concept in this field. 
 
In terms of imposed compliance, the findings suggest that if compliance with 
CG rules is seen as an imposed system, then this formal pressure from the 
state forms a coercive isomorphism from a neo-institutional perspective. As 
far as a number of social actors have the impression that CG is an imposed 
system by the regulatory authority, the observation appears to lean towards 
negative compliance with CG rules by listed firms. The risk that CG becomes 
a token gesture complied with only to avoid penalties means that the spirit of 
CG would become lost in a system of firms that sees it as a hindrance as 
opposed to a positive development. Thus, the task of complying with CG 
rules by listed firms is being accomplished but lacks the sincerity of a genuine 
embracement of CG principles.  
 
In terms of bare minimum compliance, the findings suggest that compliance is 
seen as an expense in several instances. Some firms appear to cooperate with 
the minimum only to avoid penalties and do not go beyond the minimum, 
which in some cases implies a lack of genuine interest and effort towards CG. 
So in understanding the influence of the regulatory and legislative institution 
on the emergence and use of CG in a non-Western, emerging society context, 
there is a distinct danger of apathy in which the system is seen as an 
aggravation to other institutional pressures, or is seen as a cost, or is seen as a 
penalising system designed to coerce the application of CG based on the 
threat of penalties or sanctions for non-compliance. In this manner, firms may 
reject the voluntary pursuit of best CG practices owing to a negative image of 
the system and its intentions. This would be to the detriment of the emergence 
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of an effective long-term CG regime. Compliance with CG rules to the bare 
minimum can also be seen as a form of cognitive legitimacy (Deephouse and 
6XFKPDQ  EHFDXVH WKLV FRPSOLDQFH DSSHDUV WR EH ¶LQHYLWDEOH· 7KXV
listed firms seek this legitimacy in order to pursue continuity (Suchman, 1995) 
but going beyond any minimum parameters is subsequently deemed 
unnecessary. 
 
In terms of exceeding bare minimum compliance, the findings suggest that 
some firms demonstrate genuine interest towards improving CG practices in 
this non-Western, emerging society context. It can be also inferred that these 
firms try to avoid uncertainty³in that there might be symbolic uncertainty³
unclear objectives of complying with CG rules, or lack of understanding the 
main values and benefits of complying with CG rules. In this case, listed firms 
exceed compliance with the bare minimum by mimicking international CG 
practices that are professional, appropriate, or modern, which may promote a 
better CG system in this non-Western, emerging society context. This can be 
viewed as mimetic isomorphism from a neo-institutional perspective. Neo-
institutional theory focuses on legitimacy; however, legitimisation mechanisms 
do not explain why this group of firms operates beyond the bare minimum to 
comply with CG regulations. It is suggested that there might be increased 
SUHVVXUHV H[HUWHGE\DQ ¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQ· Wo comply at greater levels. 
This contributes to the understanding of why some firms exceed bare 
minimum compliance within non-Western, emerging societies.  
 
In terms of the implementation of CG and the regulatory role, the findings 
suggest that this is one of the roles played by the regulatory authority for 
driving less or non-responsive listed firms to implement CG practices. 
Chapter 10: Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
297 
 
However, the procedures taken here may increase transaction costs for the 
regulatory authority because correction procedures are subject to process 
losses, which theorists of the new institutional economics (e.g. Williamson, 
1988) see as requiring non-regulatory procedures, that is, ones that increase the 
self-desire to comply with and implement CG rules. Williamson (1996) 
emphasises that the CG problem of TCE is not only protection of 
VKDUHKROGHUV·ULJKWVEXW also the efficient achievement of transactions by firms 
within their political and cultural environment. Moreover, the regulatory role 
of the CMA can be seen as a normative isomorphism from a neo-institutional 
perspective. This role is played by the CMA, as a professional body, to 
establish environmental forms that are consistent with their objectives. The 
CMA, as a professional body, tends to have strong networks with their 
referent bodies, which establish the standards for professional behaviour.   
 
In terms of implementation and the awareness/cooperative/partnership role, 
the outcomes suggest that this is another role played by the CMA for 
encouraging responsive firms to implement CG practices and engage the 
broad spirit of CG regulations. This appears to be helpful in a way to reduce 
transaction costs that can be caused by less or non-responsive firms from a 
new institutional economics perspective. In addition, neo-institutional theory 
indicates that firms comply with institutional pressures to achieve legitimacy in 
their operating environment but in this instance, legitimacy can be achieved by 
simple minimum compliance. Those that view the CMA more positively 
appear to go beyond minimum requirements to implement additional CG 
efforts. Legitimation as a mechanism then does not explain this increased 
endeavour by some firms over others. It does not seem that there are specific 
institutional pressures from elsewhere as to why this is being seen as 
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burdensome or as positive, which suggests that institutional theory alone 
cannot explain some of the events around the emergence of a CG system and 
compliance with regime in a non-Western, emerging society context. 
 
In terms of regulations failure, the findings suggest that CG regulations are 
vulnerable to failing to achieve desired or intended outcomes. This appears to 
be related to the agency problem of moral hazard. Moreover, the findings 
revealed that the time factor seems important in strengthening the CMA³as a 
formal expression of the bureaucratic state³in order to set a dominant CG 
V\VWHPDQGUHJLPHDWWKH¶H[SHQVH·RIWKHLQIOXHQWLDODQGGRPLQDQWIDPLO\DQG
kinship institutions that are being attenuated by the bureaucratic state through 
its actor, the CMA, by turning voluntary items to mandatory ones and 
increasing supervision and audit processes in this non-Western, emerging 
society. It is also a matter of time for the market institution to have an 
influence on the development of the CG system in this non-Western, 
emerging society. Therefore, the findings of this research study may vary over 
time due to the variation of theoretical effects over time. Whetten (1989) 
points out that the time interval is an important factor in theoretical 
development as it places limitations on the study and sets the boundaries of its 
generalisability, and as such constitutes the range of the theory.  
 
The findings also did not capture any potential relationship between the 
bureaucratic state and both family and kinship institutions in favour of the 
argument that the CMA may treat firms with family backgrounds differently 
from those firms who do not have any family background. So it appears that 
the CMA does not play the regulatory role differently with respect to family 
controlled firms versus non-family controlled firms. This observation has not 
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been captured in this research study and, thus, it cannot be judged whether 
there is a relationship between the bureaucratic state and both family and 
kinship institutions in this regard. 
 
With regards to religion institution, the findings of this research study revealed 
that the religion institution, as an informal institution, can positively influence 
the emergence and development of the CG regime in the Saudi Arabian non-
Western, emerging context through three apparent dimensions: (1) association 
(similar principles), (2) implementation in a supportive role, and (3) 
compliance (Sharia compliance). 
 
In terms of an association between religion and CG principles, the findings 
suggest that both the religion in this non-Western, emerging society and a CG 
system share similar principles that lead to common objectives. As a CG 
system looks forward to achieve best practice, other factors, such as moral 
factors (e.g. the religion) should be taken into account. This would help to 
accelerate the process of achieving CG objectives in a non-Western, emerging 
society in which religion provides a strong moral compass and is adhered to or 
seen as a strong institution. As far as CG shares similar principles with the 
religion in this non-Western emerging society, it appears that the CG system 
can then gain greater acceptance by people in this context, which serves the 
emergence and development of a CG regime in this society. However, and 
perhaps importantly, the extent to which this is achieved is in part dependent 
on communicating effectively the similarity between a CG system and its 
principles or rules in relation to religious rules accepted by the society. This 
provides a basis to legitimise CG in the face of other competing institutional 
pressures.  
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In terms of the religion institution playing a supportive role in CG 
implementation, the outcomes suggest that the religion in this society does 
play a supportive role on the development of the CG system. So the religion 
does not exert any contradictory or competing institutional pressure on 
implementing CG practices, but can motivate social actors to implement CG 
practices instead and potentially go beyond the minimum in doing so. This is 
because the religion in this society is strong and its principles are being 
embraced by the majority of the population. Thus, it influences the 
development of a CG system in this non-Western, emerging society context. 
 
In terms of Sharia compliance, the findings suggest that there are a number of 
listed firms that comply with Sharia-based law in a manner that is symbolic of 
CG. This compliance is supervised by an external Sharia board and is optional 
for listed firms to comply with Sharia-based law or not. In this non-Western, 
emerging society, complying with Sharia-based law appears to be important to 
some investors as it gains their appetite and confidence to invest in this 
market, and meet the desire of some shareholders to trade in such an 
environment. Thus, complying with Sharia-based law appears to have a role on 
the emergence of a CG regime in this context. As a result, the religion appears 
to have a bearing on the emergence and development of CG systems in this 
society. Compliance with Sharia-based law can also be seen as a form of moral 
legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) that is based on normative 
approval and includes procedures, structures, and consequences. This seems to 
be a way of seeking support and pursuing credibility and continuity in this 
environment (Suchman, 1995). 
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Given that some firms operate with the bare minimum of compliance in a 
context that includes family and kinship institutions with apparent negative 
influence on CG development, the religion in this society can be viewed as a 
rigorous platform for building CG practices. The CMA can promote the logic 
of CG in line with Sharia principles. This would have a greater likelihood of 
acceptance of CG and likely increase compliance and its attractiveness to 
businesses. These firms comply with CG rules simply to avoid penalties. In 
this sense, the CMA has an opportunity to frame the CG system in line with 
Sharia understandings which can lead to a better basis for compliance by 
cooperation, rather than coercion, in this non-Western, emerging society 
context.   
 
10.2 Practical Implications  
 
A number of practical implications for regulatory bodies arose when the data 
were analysed, interpreted, discussed and compared with the existing literature 
in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. This section will summarise these implications.  
 
It has been revealed that the Saudi Arabian CG document was not created in 
response to the multiple financial crises or any historical experiences. Rather, it 
was adopted from different resources such as the CG document of the UK 
and the USA, and OECD practices with some superficial customisations. 
However, based on the outcomes of this research, it is suggested that an in-
depth and context-specific account of the institutions in this non-Western, 
emerging society should be taken. For example, the CG document should pay 
more attention to the detailed kinship relations in this society such as 
QHSKHZVFRXVLQVVLVWHUV·KXVEDQGVDQGDQ\RWKHUVZKRGRQRWKROGWKHVDPH
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family name and are being appointed as board members where it is harder to 
discover that they are relatives of the family. The CG document can then 
include these hidden or unseen relationships in its regulations for selecting and 
appointing board members. With regards to the religion institution, it was 
revealed in this research study that religion can play a supportive role with the 
CG system in this non-Western, emerging society context due to the 
associated principles that they share. Therefore, the CG system in this society 
can leverage this opportunity to advertise and promote the application of CG 
practices for non-listed firms to become public ones and for listed firms to 
improve the stock market. 
 
More suggestions offered by this research include the interaction among family 
and kinship institutions as pressure against compliance. In this sense, the CMA 
can raise the awareness of the importance of being more transparent with 
shareholders and other stakeholders for better long term durability of firms 
and better credibility of firms with respect to their shareholders. This would 
also increase the reputation of firms in the market, domestically and perhaps 
internationally. Furthermore, the potential of an institutional hierarchy in 
which some institutions over-rule the pressures of others such that which 
form of legitimacy is seen as important for the firm and its board or owners 
has to be accounted for. Determining priorities appears to be useful in 
establishing a rigorous CG regime in such contexts. Moreover, there is a need 
to think about how to foster embracement and active compliance against 
coerced compliance and potentially change the sanction regime to reflect this. 
This might find more acceptance by less-responsive firms to genuinely comply 
with the CG regime in this non-Western, emerging society.  
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Further suggestions offered by this research include the need to pay more 
attention to the areas that might not be covered by existing knowledge of CG, 
such as offering better understanding of the institutional impacts on CG in 
non-Western, emerging society contexts. Understanding institutional 
influences on CG can offer new insights to help adapt such recommendations 
from this research study in future studies on CG in institutional contexts. It 
may also help to adapt the practical recommendations from this study to assist 
in promoting a more stable market and reduce the institutional impact which 
in turn, reduces the impact or likelihood of a financial crisis on the market. 
 
10.3 Limitations of the Study and Directions for Future 
Research 
 
Although this research study offered a number of new insights using academic 
methods to explain the phenomenon and understanding of the research 
problem, a number of limitations need to be considered. These limitations 
offer some exploratory and investigative opportunities for future research. 
 
It has been indicated previously that over time, institutional theory is being 
developed with continuous critiques and revisions. This indicates that there is, 
to an extent, a shortcoming and limitation in the use of institutional theory 
itself. For example, institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) and 
institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) have emerged as outcomes 
of this continuous development of institutional theory.  
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Watson (2012: 135) defines institutional logics as: 
 
the sets of values, rules, assumptions and practices associated with key 
institutions of a society which have been socially constructed over time 
and through which patterns of social organization and human activity are 
shaped and given meaning. 
 
Institutional logics provide a link between institutions and human actions 
which in turn enables institutional logics to provide a bridge between the 
macro structural perspectives of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and 
3RZHOO  DQG =XFNHU·V  PLFUR-perspective. Thus, the term 
¶LQVWLWXWLRQDO ORJLFV·KDVJDLQHG LQWHUHVW DPRQJVFKRODUV7KLVSHUVSHFWLYHFDQ
explain the tension between institutions as it enables and constrains human 
actions as well as it involving the shaping of organisations. Therefore, 
employing institutional logics in this research study can offer further insights, 
such as exploring potential tension between institutions. Exploring tension 
between institutional logics is potentially important in the process of both 
social and organisational change (Watson, 2012).  
 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 215) define institutional work as: 
 
the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions. 
 
The study of institutional work focuses on how action affects institutions 
(Lawrence et al., 2009). Research on this theoretical perspective examines the 
practices of individual and collective actors intended for creating, maintaining, 
and disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011). As far as institutional work 
also brings the interest in agency within institutional theory (Lawrence and 
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Suddaby, 2006), it has the potential to open up space for new discussions on 
corporate governance practices. Agency is an on-going activity where actors 
reflect on and strategically operate within the institutional context where they 
are embedded (Lawrence et al., 2011). Those actors are culturally competent 
actors with robust practical skills and sensibility who creatively navigate inside 
their organisational fields (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) such as corporate 
governance managers who are institutionally embedded in their societies. 
 
This research study targeted significant social actors who have a background in 
CG such as CG managers of listed firms, regulatory authority officials, and 
stock exchange representatives to gain their perception of issues pertinent to 
the research study, its themes and research questions. Since the influential 
institutions in this emerging society are explored in this research study, 
different social actors from these institutions can be interviewed to gain more 
insights about the impact of these institutions on CG. For example, religious 
people can be interviewed to gain their perceptions on the role and influence 
of religion institution on the emergence of a CG regime. Additionally, a 
fruitful avenue for future research may consider the influence of an 
¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQ· RQ &* SUDFWLFHV DV LW KDV EHHQ UHYHDOHG LQ WKLV
research that there might be international pressures exerted by this institution 
to comply at greater levels. This would increase our understanding about 
institutions and their impact on the development of CG practices. 
 
The data and findings informed by this research study were based on a single 
non-Western, emerging society context, Saudi Arabia. Thus, this may raise 
questions about the direct generalisation of the outcomes to other non-
Western, emerging societies or at least ones that differ in nature from Saudi 
Chapter 10: Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
306 
 
Arabia (in institutional terms). As a result, further research needs to be 
conducted in further non-Western, emerging societies in order to advance the 
understanding of the influence of institutions on the emergence of CG 
regimes in such contexts. 
 
10.4 Conclusions 
 
Recent studies highlight the importance of improving CG practices worldwide. 
This importance arises primarily from the major financial crises in which poor 
CG systems played a role. Mitton (2002) argues that recent research highlights 
the importance of understanding CG in emerging societies in order to 
understand what causes financial crises in these contexts (e.g. La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). Improving our understanding of CG therefore will 
contribute to help reduce the impact of financial crises and collapses as well as 
their occurrence. This research study focused on understanding different 
institutions in a non-Western, emerging society context and their influence on 
the formation and development of a corporate governance system from an 
institutional theory perspective as perceived by significant social actors. This 
can be summarised as, firstly, understand what institutions in a non-Western, 
emerging society context (in this case, Saudi Arabia) consist of as perceived by 
significant social actors; and secondly, understand what the likely influences of 
Saudi Arabian (as a non-Western, emerging society) institutions are on the 
emergence, development, and implementation of CG by conducting semi-
structured interviews with significant social actors.  
 
Its conclusion, based on the perception of significant social actors explored in 
the study, suggests that both family and kinship institutions negatively impact 
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the emergence and development of CG in the Saudi Arabian non-Western, 
emerging society. Moreover, it was perceived that the family controls the 
decision making in listed companies and can still abuse the system through 
selecting and appointing board members. The family shareholders resist the 
move to separate ownership and control and the CG rules of the CMA that 
DUHLQIDYRXURIRWKHUVKDUHKROGHUV·SURtection and interests and create conflict 
RILQWHUHVWWKDWVHUYHWKHIDPLO\·VLQWHUHVWV,WZDVDOVRSHUFHLYHGWKDWUHODWLYHV
affiliated to the founding families can dominate the decision making in the 
firms and abuse the system through none or less independence from 
ownership and control.  
 
Moreover, the findings also suggest that the formal expression of the 
bureaucratic state plays a regulatory role with less or non-responsive listed 
firms and plays a cooperative/awareness/partnership role with responsive 
listed firms in order to implement CG practices. This is seen as imposed 
compliance by some listed firms so they comply with the bare minimum. 
Other listed firms take the initiative and show genuine interest towards 
complying with a CG system so they exceed the bare minimum in order to 
achieve best practice.  
 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the religion in this society is strong and 
has a supportive role in implementing CG practices because a CG system 
shares similar principles with the religion and, thus, they both call for common 
objectives. Additionally, a group of listed firms comply with Sharia based-law 
which enhances the compliance with CG rules as perceived by significant 
social actors.  
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This research study proposed significant contributions to the corporate 
governance and institutional theory literature. It generated a better 
understanding about the impact and the role played by institutional factors in 
changing the formation, implementation and likely success of corporate 
governance frameworks in a context very different to historical treatments of 
corporate governance (which are largely based on Western societies with little 
to no treatment of alternative contexts with very different institutional 
conditions). By understanding this from the institutional theory perspective 
and, as perceived by significant social actors, the theoretical contribution of 
the study is to explore how institutions might influence the emergence of 
corporate governance and the reasons why such potentially idiosyncratic 
formation might occur. In essence, this study is an attempt to move away from 
the one-size-fits-all traditional corporate governance research to question how 
and why corporate governance might need to evolve differently, depending on 
the institutions at play. The propositions of this study might also form the 
basis for productive future investigation and research in other non-Western, 
emerging societies.    
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Consent Form 
 
Dear Sir, 
 
My name is Mazin Bukhari, and I am calling from Nottingham University Business 
School. I am conducting a PhD study, in the field of corporate governance, to 
investigate the impact of different institutions such as family, law, politics, religion, 
kinship, bureaucratic administration, and market on the formation of corporate 
governance systems in Saudi Arabia. This research is sponsored by the Ministry of 
Higher Education in Saudi Arabia. As an important member in your organisation, I 
would like to conduct an interview with you to gather rich information about this 
issue. 
 
The interview will last approximately in 60 minutes. You will be asked to answer a 
number of questions about the topic based on your experience, background, and 
knowledge on voluntary basis. You have the right not to answer any certain question 
and withdraw from the interview at any point. Your name and the organisation will 
not be included in the report or in any publication. The collected data from the 
interview will be only used for the purpose of this study and is only available for the 
researcher and his supervisors. Interpretations, inferences, and quotations from this 
interview will be used to write the final report of this study and will probably be used 
in the future for conference and journal publications. I would like to emphasise that 
ethical considerations and confidentiality will be strictly taken into account, 
maintaining the anonymity of the participants and their workplaces throughout all the 
stages in this research. The interview will be recorded based on your approval. 
Thank you for your time and help. 
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5HVHDUFKHU¶VQDPH0D]LQ%XNKDUL 
Email address: lixmb25@nottingham.ac.uk , mazinsb@yahoo.com  
Mobile no.: +966 505353XXX (Saudi), +44 7780767XXX (UK)  
 
6XSHUYLVRU¶VQDPH$QQD6RXOVE\$VVRFLDWH3URIHVVRULQ2UJDQL]DWLRQDO%HKDYLRXU 
Email address: Anna.soulsby@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
Date: 
Time: 
Venue: 
 
Name / Signature   
Age  
Permission to Record  (    ) Yes          (    ) No 
Years of experience  
Qualifications / 
Education 
 
Position   
Field Background  
Organisation Size  
Organisation Age  
Impressions  
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CAPITAL MARKET AUTHORITY  
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS  
IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority  
Pursuant to Resolution No. 1/212/2006  
dated 21/10/1427AH (corresponding to 12/11/2006)  
based on the Capital Market Law issued by 
Royal Decree No. M/30  
dated 2/6/1424AH  
 
Amended by Resolution of the Board  
of the Capital Market Authority Number 1-10-2010  
Dated 30/3/1431H corresponding to 16/3/2010G  
 
 
 
 
English Translation of the Official Arabic Text  
Arabic is the official language of the Capital Market Authority  
 
 
 
The current version of these Rules, as may be amended, can be found on  
the CMA website: www.cma.org.sa  
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PART 1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS  
 
 
Article 1: Preamble  
 
a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the  
management of joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure 
their compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure 
the protection of shareholders' rights as well as the rights of 
stakeholders.  
 
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies  
listed in the Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or 
resolutions of the Board of the Authority provide for the binding effect 
of some of the provisions herein contained.  
 
c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must  
disclose in the Board of Directors` report, the provisions that have been 
implemented and the provisions that have not been implemented as well 
as the reasons for not implementing them.  
 
 
 
Article 2: Definitions  
 
a) Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear  
in the Capital Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in 
the regulations and the rules of the Capital Market Authority unless 
otherwise stated in these regulations.  
 
b) For the purpose of implementing these regulations, the following  
expressions and terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows  
unless the contrary intention appears:  
 
 
Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys 
complete independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute  
an infringement of such independence:  
 
1. he/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the  
company or any of its group.  
2. Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or  
more of the issued shares of the company or any of its group.  
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3. he/she, during the preceding two years, has been a senior executive of  
the company or of any other company within that company's group.  
4. he/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company  
or of any other company within that company's group.  
 
5. he/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the  
company or of any other company within that company's group.  
 
6. he/she is a board member of any company within the group of the  
company which he is nominated to be a member of its board.  
 
7. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with  
an affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, 
such as external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during the 
preceding two years, had a controlling interest in any such party.  
 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not 
have a full-time management position at the company, or who does not 
receive monthly or yearly salary.  
 
 
First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children.  
 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as  
shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community.  
 
Accumulative Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which 
gives each shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares 
he/she holds. He/she has the right to use them all for one nominee or to 
divide them between his/her selected nominees without any duplication of 
these votes. This method increases the chances of the minority shareholders to 
appoint their representatives in the board through the right to accumulate 
votes for one nominee.  
 
 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of  
shareholders that does not control the company and hence they are unable to 
influence the company.  
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PART 2  
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
 
 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders  
A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in  
particular, the right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share of 
the company's assets upon liquidation; the right to attend the General 
Assembly and participate in deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the 
right of disposition with respect to shares; the right to supervise the Board of  
Directors activities, and file responsibility claims against board members;  
the right to inquire and have access to information without prejudice to the 
company's interests and in a manner that does not contradict the Capital 
Market Law and the Implementing Rules.  
 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to  
Information  
 
a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify  
the procedures and precautions that are necessary for the 
shareholders' exercise of all their lawful rights.  
 
b) All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their  
rights shall be made available and such information shall be 
comprehensive and accurate; it must be provided and updated 
regularly and within the prescribed times; the company shall use the 
most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No 
discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation to 
providing information.  
 
 
Article 5: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly  
 
a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six  
months following the end of the company's financial year.  
 
b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of  
Directors. The Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to 
convene pursuant to a request of the auditor or a number of 
shareholders whose shareholdings represent at least 5% of the equity 
share capital.  
 
c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and  
announced by a notice, at least 20 days prior to the date the meeting;  
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invitation for the meeting shall be published in the Exchange' website, the 
company's website and in two newspapers of voluminous distribution 
in the Kingdom. Modern high tech means shall be used in 
communicating with shareholders.  
 
d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively  
participate and vote in the General Assembly; they shall be informed 
about the rules governing the meetings and the voting procedure.  
 
e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the  
greatest number of shareholders in the General Assembly, including 
inter alia determination of the appropriate place and time.  
 
f) In preparing the General Assembly's agenda, the Board of Directors  
shall take into consideration matters shareholders require to be listed in 
that agenda; shareholders holding not less than 5% of the company's 
shares are entitled to add one or more items to the agenda. upon its 
preparation.  
 
g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of  
the General Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board 
members and to the external auditor. The Board of Directors or the 
external auditor shall answer the questions raised by shareholders in a 
manner that does not prejudice the company's interest.  
 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by  
sufficient information to enable shareholders to make decisions.  
 
i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General  
Assembly; the company shall provide the Authority with a copy of 
those minutes within 10 days of the convening date of any such 
meeting.  
 
j) The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the  
General Assembly.  
 
 
 
Article 6: Voting Rights  
a) Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which  
shall not, in any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any 
action which might hamper the use of the voting right; a shareholder  
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must be afforded all possible assistance as may facilitate the exercise 
of such right.  
 
b) In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board  
members, the accumulative voting method shall be applied.  
 
c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is  
not a board member and who is not an employee of the company to 
attend the General Assembly on his behalf.  
 
d) Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others -  
e.g. investment funds- shall disclose in their annual reports their 
voting policies, actual voting, and ways of dealing with any material 
conflict of interests that may affect the practice of the fundamental 
rights in relation to their investments.  
 
 
 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders  
 
a) The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding  
dividends, in a manner that may realize the interests of shareholders 
and those of the company; shareholders shall be informed of that 
policy during the General Assembly and reference thereto shall be 
made in the report of the Board of Directors.  
 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of  
distribution. These dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares 
shall be given, as of right, to the shareholders who are listed in the 
records kept at the Securities Depository Center as they appear at the 
end of trading session on the day on which the General Assembly is 
convened.  
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PART 3  
 
 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY  
 
 
 
Article 8:Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure  
 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and 
supervisory rules related to disclosure, pursuant to law.  
 
 
 
Article 9 1: Disclosure in the Board of Directors' Report  
 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the 
content of the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the 
annual financial statements of the company, such report shall include the  
following:  
 
a) The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the  
provisions which have not been implemented, and the justifications for 
not implementing them.  
 
b) Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the  
company Board of Directors member acts as a member of its Board of 
directors.  
 
c) Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its  
members as follows: executive board member, non-executive board 
member, or independent board member.  
 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions and duties of the Board's main  
committees such as the Audit Committee, the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee; indicating their names, names of their 
chairmen, names of their members, and the aggregate of their 
respective meetings.  
 
e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the  
following:  
 
1 
 
 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H  
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all  
companies listed on the Exchange effective from the first board report issued by the company following the date  
of the Board of the Capital Market Authority resolution mentioned above.  
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1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors.  
2. The Top Five executives who have received the highest  
compensation and remuneration from the company. The CEO 
and the chief finance officer shall be included if they are not 
within the top five.  
 
For the purpose of this paragraph, "compensation and 
remuneration" means salaries, allowances, profits and any of the 
same; annual and periodic bonuses related to performance; long 
or short- term incentive schemes; and any other rights in rem.  
 
f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the  
company by the Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or 
judiciary body.  
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control  
procedures of the company.  
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PART 4  
 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
 
 
Article 10: Main Functions of the Board of Directors  
 
 
Among the main functions of the Board is the following:  
 
a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and  
supervising their implementation; this includes:  
 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, the  
main work plans and the policy related to risk management, 
reviewing and updating of such policy.  
 
2. Determining the most appropriate capital structure of the  
company, its strategies and financial objectives and approving 
its annual budgets.  
 
3. Supervising the main capital expenses of the company and  
acquisition/disposal of assets.  
 
4. Deciding the performance objectives to be achieved and  
supervising the implementation thereof and the overall 
performance of the company.  
 
5. Reviewing and approving the organizational and functional  
structures of the company on a periodical basis.  
 
b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; this  
includes:  
 
1. Developing a written policy that would regulates conflict of  
interest and remedy any possible cases of conflict by members of 
the Board of Directors, executive management and 
shareholders. This includes misuse of the company's assets and 
facilities and the arbitrary disposition resulting from dealings 
with the related parties.  
 
2. Ensuring the integrity of the financial and accounting  
procedures including procedures related to the preparation of 
the financial reports.  
 
  
Appendix II: The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Document 
356 
 
3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures appropriate  
for risk management by forecasting the risks that the company 
could encounter and disclosing them with transparency.  
 
4. Reviewing annually the effectiveness of the internal control  
systems.  
 
c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not  
contradict the provisions of this regulation, supervising and 
monitoring in general the effectiveness of the code and amending it 
whenever necessary.  
 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures,  
for the membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them 
after they have been approved by the General Assembly.  
 
e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with  
stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective rights; in  
particular, such policy must cover the following:  
1. Mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders in case of  
contravening their rights under the law and their respective 
contracts.  
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes that might  
arise between the company and the stakeholders.  
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good relationships with  
customers and suppliers and protecting the confidentiality of 
information related to them.  
4. A code of conduct for the company's executives and employees  
compatible with the proper professional and ethical standards, 
and regulate their relationship with the stakeholders. The Board 
of Directors lays down procedures for supervising this code and  
ensuring compliance there with.  
5. The Company's social contributions.  
f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company's compliance  
with the laws and regulations and the company's obligation to 
disclose material information to shareholders, creditors and other 
stakeholders.  
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Article 11 : Responsibilities of the Board  
 
 
a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b)  
 
 
 
c)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
d)  
 
Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the 
company's Board of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers for 
the company's management. The ultimate responsibility for the 
company rests with the Board even if it sets up committees or 
delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of Directors 
shall avoid issuing general or indefinite power of attorney.  
 
The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in 
the company's Articles of Association.  
 
 
The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible 
manner, in good faith and with due diligence. Its decisions should be 
based on sufficient information from the executive management, or 
from any other reliable source.  
 
A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he 
undertakes to carry out whatever may be in the general interest of the 
company, but not the interests of the group he represents or that which 
voted in favor of his appointment to the Board of Directors.  
 
e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to  
the executive management and the procedures for taking any action  
and the validity of such delegation. It shall also determine matters 
reserved for decision by the Board of Directors. The executive 
management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic reports on 
the exercise of the delegated powers.  
 
 
f)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
g)  
 
The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for 
orienting the new board members of the company's business and, in  
particular, the financial and legal aspects, in addition to their training, 
where necessary.  
 
The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about 
the company is made available to all members of the Board of 
Directors, generally, and, in particular, to the non-executive members, 
to enable them to discharge their duties and responsibilities in an 
effective manner.  
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h)  The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which 
spans more than three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate 
of the company, or drop the company's debts, unless it is authorized to 
do so by the company's Articles of Association. In the case where the 
company's Articles of Association includes no provisions to this 
respect, the Board should not act without the approval of the General 
Assembly, unless such acts fall within the normal scope of the 
company's business.  
 
 
 
Article 12 2: Formation of the Board  
 
 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following:  
 
a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number  
of the Board of Directors members, provided that such number shall 
not be less than three and not more than eleven.  
 
 
b)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c)  
 
 
 
d)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
e)  
 
 
 
f)  
 
The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of 
Directors for the duration provided for in the Articles of Association 
of the company, provided that such duration shall not exceed three 
years. Unless otherwise provided for in the Articles of Association of 
the company, members of the Board may be reappointed.  
 
The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non- 
executive members.  
 
It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors with any other executive position in the company, such as the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the general 
manager.  
 
The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less 
than two members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater.  
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner in 
which membership of the Board of Directors terminates. At all times, 
the General Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H  
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance  
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009.  
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g)  
of the Board of Directors even though the Articles of Association 
provide otherwise.  
 
 
On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways 
of termination, the company shall promptly notify the Authority and 
the Exchange and shall specify the reasons for such termination.  
 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the  
Board of Directors of more than five joint stock companies at the same 
time.  
 
i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company's Articles of  
Association to appoint representatives in the Board of Directors, is not  
entitled to nomination vote of other members of the Board of  
Directors.  
 
 
 
Article 13: Committees of the Board  
 
a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with  
the company's requirements and circumstances, in order to enable the 
Board of Directors to perform its duties in an effective manner.  
 
b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors  
shall be according to general procedures laid down by the Board,  
indicating the duties, the duration and the powers of each committee,  
and the manner in which the Board monitors its activities. The 
committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings or decisions 
with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the 
activities of such committees so as to ensure that the activities 
entrusted to those committees are duly performed. The Board shall 
approve the by-laws of all committees of the Board, including, inter  
alia, the Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration  
Committee.  
 
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of  
Directors shall be appointed in committees that are concerned with 
activities that might involve a conflict of interest, such as ensuring the 
integrity of the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing the deals 
concluded by related parties, nomination to membership of the Board, 
appointment of executive directors, and determination of 
remuneration.  
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Article 14 3: Audit Committee  
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the  
"Audit Committee". Its members shall not be less than three, 
including a specialist in financial and accounting matters. Executive 
board members are not eligible for Audit Committee membership.  
 
b) The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation  
of the Board of Directors, issue rules for appointing the members of 
the Audit Committee and define the term of their office and the 
procedure to be followed by the Committee.  
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the  
following:  
 
1. To supervise the company's internal audit department to ensure  
its effectiveness in executing the activities and duties specified 
by the Board of Directors.  
2. To review the internal audit procedure and prepare a written  
report on such audit and its recommendations with respect to it.  
 
3. To review the internal audit reports and pursue the  
implementation of the corrective measures in respect of the 
comments included in them.  
 
 
4. To recommend to the Board of Directors the appointment,  
dismissal and the Remuneration of external auditors; upon any 
such recommendation, regard must be made to their 
independence.  
 
5. To supervise the activities of the external auditors and approve  
any activity beyond the scope of the audit work assigned to  
them during the performance of their duties.  
 
6. To review together with the external auditor the audit plan and  
make any comments thereon.  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H  
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 14 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory  
on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009.  
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7. To review the external auditor's comments on the financial  
statements and follow up the actions taken about them.  
 
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to  
presentation to the Board of Directors; and to give opinion and 
recommendations with respect thereto.  
 
9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the Board  
of Directors of any recommendation regarding them.  
 
 
 
Article 154: Nomination and Remuneration Committee  
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named  
"Nomination and Remuneration Committee".  
 
b) The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of  
Directors, issue rules for the appointment of the members of the 
Nomination and Remuneration Committee, their remunerations, and  
terms of office and the procedure to be followed by such committee.  
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration  
Committee include the following:  
 
1. Recommend to the Board of Directors appointments to  
membership of the Board in accordance with the approved policies 
and standards; the Committee shall ensure that no person who has 
been previously convicted of any offense affecting honor or 
honesty is nominated for such membership.  
 
2. Annual review of the requirement of suitable skills for  
membership of the Board of Directors and the preparation of a 
description of the required capabilities and qualifications for such 
membership, including, inter alia, the time that a Board member 
should reserve for the activities of the Board.  
 
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and recommend  
changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-10-2010) Dated 30/3/1431H  
corresponding to 16/3/2010G making Article 15 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on  
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4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of  
Directors and recommend remedies that are compatible with the 
company's interest.  
 
5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent  
members and the absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board 
member also acts as a member of the Board of Directors of another 
company.  
 
6. Draw clear policies regarding the indemnities and remunerations of  
the Board members and top executives; in laying down such  
policies, the standards related to performance shall be followed.  
 
 
 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board  
 
1.The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their  
responsibilities, including the preparation for the meetings of the Board 
and the permanent and ad hoc committees, and shall endeavor to attend 
such meetings.  
 
2. The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request  
by the Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an unforeseen 
meeting upon a written request by two of its members.  
 
3. When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the  
Chairman should consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. 
The agenda and other documentation should be sent to the members in  
a sufficient time prior to the meeting so that they may be able to  
consider such matters and prepare themselves for the meeting. Once 
convened, the Board shall approve the agenda; should any member of 
the Board raise any objection to this agenda, the details of such 
objection shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting.  
 
4. The Board shall document its meetings and prepare records of the  
deliberations and the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in 
chapters for ease of reference.  
 
 
Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members  
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of 
remunerating the Board members; such remuneration may take the form of a  
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lump sum amount, attendance allowance, rights in rem or a certain 
percentage of the profits. Any two or more of these privileges may be 
conjoined.  
 
 
 
Article 18. Conflict of Interest within the Board  
 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the  
General Assembly, to be renewed each year, have any interest 
(whether directly or indirectly) in the company's business and 
contracts. The activities to be performed through general bidding shall 
constitute an exception where a Board member is the best bidder. A 
Board member shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal 
interest he/she may have in the business and contracts that are 
completed for the company's account. Such notification shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board member who is an 
interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the resolution to be 
adopted in this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the 
Board of Directors. The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall 
notify the General Assembly, when convened, of the activities and 
contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a personal  
interest and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared  
by the company's auditor.  
 
b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the  
General Assembly, to be renewed annually, participate in any activity 
which may likely compete with the activities of the company, or trade in 
any branch of the activities carried out by the company.  
 
c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board  
members or render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a 
Board member with third parties, excluding banks and other fiduciary 
companies.  
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PART 5 
CLOSING PROVISIONS  
 
 
 
Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force  
 
 
These regulations shall be effective upon the date of their publication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
